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### 1AC---Innovation

#### Advantage One is Innovation:

#### Parker immunity discourages disruptive healthcare innovation

Sage 17 (William Sage, James R. Dougherty Chair for Faculty Excellence in the School of Law and Professor of Surgery and Perioperative Care in the Dell Medical School, University of Texas at Austin; and David Hyman Professor at Georgetown University School of Law, “Antitrust as Disruptive Innovation in Health Care: Can Limiting State Action Immunity Help Save a Trillion Dollars?” Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, Pages 731-734, modified for ableist language indicated by strikethrough and [brackets]) MULCH

Physicians possess this power for a simple reason: the body of doctrines and practices that we call “health law” systematically supports it. Laws protect the public from individuals and therapies not controlled by physicians, and discourage medical self-help. Laws fund physicians’ tools and assure their quality—though unfortunately not their value. Laws mandate and subsidize insurance coverage for the treatments physicians recommend. Laws insulate physicians from corporate structures and contractual norms. Laws mediate disputes between physicians and patients based on professional standards. Laws apply medical criteria to most ethical issues. Finally, laws such as those challenged in North Carolina State Board delegate substantial rule making and disciplinary authority to state licensing boards (i.e., to entities populated from, and controlled by, the medical profession). States typically justify this abdication of direct oversight in terms of physicians’ scientific expertise, and their ethical duty to heal, not harm, patients.

Both individually and collectively, these laws profoundly distort competition in health care and severely hamper the market’s ability to generate the benefits of competition that we see in other industries. Production remains fragmented. Prices are both inflated and arbitrary— and price competition is minimal (when it even exists at all). There are many barriers to competitive entry—even to deliver the most basic services. Geographic markets are needlessly small and are surprisingly concentrated. Supply bottlenecks are common, often to the mutual benefit of large health insurers and dominant health care providers. And innovation is limited to the sorts of inputs that fit into existing production processes—mainly drugs, diagnostics, and medical devices.

The result is that our health care system almost never trades in the types of consumer products that dominate other costly, complex, technologically sophisticated industries. Instead of fully assembled products accompanied by a strong performance warranty, patients are expected to pay for disaggregated professional process steps (including procedures and consultations) to which billing codes have been assigned, and for equally atomized inputs and complements to those professional processes (such as diagnostic tests and surgical supplies). Health insurance agglomerates these unstructured procedural steps and physical inputs into “covered benefits,” but it does not assemble them into actual, useful products—and only a few true Health Maintenance Organizations (“HMOs”) provide comprehensive prepaid care.

The past decade has witnessed growing agreement regarding both the necessary attributes of a high-performing health care system,17 and the managerial strategies for achieving them.18 Much less attention has been paid to the legal obstacles that have long hindered attempts to redesign acute and complex care—let alone to moving the locus of basic care “upstream,” where it can be communally or self-administered, rather than professionally controlled. As currently constituted, American health law presents concrete structural impediments to accomplishing these consensus health policy goals, and also creates opportunities for incumbent providers to delay or sabotage such efforts.

C. Anticompetitive Effects of Medical Licensing The deep legal architecture of health care strongly favors physician self-regulation, and furthers physicians’ professional insularity and self interest. Physician-controlled medical licensing boards have attracted criticism for decades. Milton Friedman famously wrote in 1962: I am . . . persuaded that [restrictive] licensure has reduced both the quantity and quality of medical practice; . . . that it has forced the public to pay more for less satisfactory medical service[;] and that it has ~~retarded~~ [slowed] technological development both in medicine itself and in the organization of medical practice.19

At the time he made it, Friedman’s harsh economic critique of occupational licensing was not widely shared (except among other libertarians). Professional elites were thought to represent a progressive, prosperous alternative to industrial commodification and the supposed exploitation of labor. To be sure, there was some recognition that the professions might use ethical codes to pursue their own economic selfinterest.20 But mainstream economists such as Kenneth Arrow still believed that collective professionalism improved the marketability of health care by fostering the trust needed to overcome medical uncertainty and informational asymmetry between physicians and patients.21 More recently, a wide array of voices have questioned the economics, and even the justice, of professional privilege.22 In 2015, the Obama Administration issued a report on occupational licensing, finding that “licensing can . . . reduce employment opportunities and lower wages for excluded workers, and increase costs for consumers,” and that “the costs of licensing fall disproportionately on certain populations.”23

To be sure, medical licensing laws are not solely to blame for health care’s competitive shortcomings. Other federal and state regulations and subsidies bear responsibility as well. Still, licensing boards set the tone for the rest of health law as gatekeepers into the health professions and arbiters of practice once admitted. These boards determine the permitted scope of practice, confer authority to write prescriptions, police departures from conventional patterns of care, respond to complaints by licensees about outsiders, and decide when (and, usually, when not) to take disciplinary action against a licensed professional.

From a health policy perspective, physician-imposed barriers to market entry and innovation—typically enforced by a professional licensing board—are the most pernicious practice. Licensing boards set standards for acceptability and impose discipline on licensees who violate their dictates. Unlicensed practice is a criminal act. These entry barriers not only deter novel approaches from new directions, such as telehealth and various “upstream” self-care modalities, but they also discourage existing competitors from adopting practices introduced to the market by disruptive innovators.

#### Disruptive innovation in healthcare solves pandemics

Shaikh 15 (Affan T. Shaikh, Professor at Emory’s school of public health Lisa Ferland, Robert Hood-Cree, Loren Shaffer, and Scott J. N. McNabb, September 23rd 2015, “Disruptive Innovation Can Prevent the Next Pandemic” NCBI <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4585064/>) MULCH

Public health surveillance (PHS) is at a tipping point, where the application of novel processes, technologies, and tools promise to vastly improve efficiency and effectiveness. Yet twentieth century, entrenched ideology and lack of training results in slow uptake and resistance to change. The term disruptive innovation – used to describe advances in technology and processes that change existing markets – is useful to describe the transformation of PHS. Past disruptive innovations used in PHS, such as distance learning, the smart phone, and field-based laboratory testing have outpaced older services, practices, and technologies used in the traditional classroom, governmental offices, and personal communication, respectively. Arguably, the greatest of these is the Internet – an infrastructural innovation that continues to enable exponential benefits in seemingly limitless ways. Considering the Global Health Security Agenda and facing emerging and reemerging infectious disease threats, evolving environmental and behavioral risks, and ever changing epidemiologic trends, PHS must transform. Embracing disruptive innovation in the structures and processes of PHS can be unpredictable. However, it is necessary to strengthen and unlock the potential to prevent, detect, and respond.

Introduction

Fifty-two years ago, Alexander Langmuir articulated our modern understanding of public health surveillance (PHS) – the systematic collection, consolidation and evaluation, and dissemination of data (1). In this workflow process, public health provides epidemiologic intelligence to assess and track conditions of public health importance, define public health priorities, evaluate programs, and conduct public health research (2). However, amid this rapidly changing world, PHS has remained sluggish and hindered by the impediments of siloed, vertical (outcome-specific) systems, inadequate training and technical expertise, different information and communication technology (ICT) standards, concerns over data sharing and confidentiality, poor interoperability, and inadequate analytical approaches and tools (3–7).

Gaps and impediments in PHS have become increasingly evident to the world in the wake of the largest Ebola epidemic ever – in which these challenges impacted our ability to prevent, detect, and respond. Under the looming threat of MERS-CoV, leishmaniasis, influenza, multidrug-resistant tuberculosis, and plague, the global public health community now realizes the urgent need to address shortcomings in PHS. Properly preparing for the next major outbreak hinges on our willingness to transform; the consequences of not doing so are dire.

Transforming PHS to meet the needs of the twenty-first century requires novel approaches. A helpful concept to understand and chart this future is disruptive innovation – a term first introduced by Clayton Christensen to describe innovations in technology and processes that disrupt existing markets (8). Disruptive innovations occur when advances in technologies or processes create markets in existing industries. This differs from sustaining innovations, where existing practices are incrementally improved to meet the demands of existing customers; in contrast, newly introduced innovations with disruptive potential (typically unrefined, simple, and affordable in character) target lower-end market needs or create entirely new market segments. As sustaining innovations improve disrupting technologies or processes, these new innovations will meet increasingly greater needs, capture greater market share, and eventually reshape the industry. Christensen uses the example of increasingly smaller disk sizes in the hard disk drive industry, the introduction of hydraulic technology in the mechanical excavator industry, and the rise of minimills in the steel industry to demonstrate the impact of disruptive innovations (8). Here, we describe the need for disruptive innovation in PHS and identify opportunities for disruption in PHS structures and processes.

#### Capacity for innovation solves invisible thresholds for existential pandemics – they’re coming now – new 400 year study + statistical methods

Penn 21 (Michael Penn, Director of Communications, Marketing and Alumni Relations, Duke Global Health Initiative, citing William Pan, Ph.D., associate professor of global environmental health at Duke, Marco Marani, adjunct professor at Duke department of Global Health, where he previously was a professor of civil and environmental engineering and Anthony Parolari, Ph.D., of Marquette University, is a former Duke postdoctoral researcher, Gabriel Katul, Ph.D., the Theodore S. Coile Distinguished Professor of Hydrology and Micrometeorology at Duke, “Statistics Say Large Pandemics Are More Likely Than We Thought” Duke Global Health Institute, <https://globalhealth.duke.edu/news/statistics-say-large-pandemics-are-more-likely-we-thought>) CULTIV8

The COVID-19 pandemic may be the deadliest viral outbreak the world has seen in more than a century. But statistically, such extreme events aren’t as rare as we may think, asserts a new analysis of novel disease outbreaks over the past 400 years.

The study, appearing in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences the week of Aug. 23, used a newly assembled record of past outbreaks to estimate the intensity of those events and the yearly probability of them recurring.

It found the probability of a pandemic with similar impact to COVID-19 is about 2% in any year, meaning that someone born in the year 2000 would have about a 38% chance of experiencing one by now. And that probability is only growing, which the authors say highlights the need to adjust perceptions of pandemic risks and expectations for preparedness.

“The most important takeaway is that large pandemics like COVID-19 and the Spanish flu are relatively likely,” said William Pan, Ph.D., associate professor of global environmental health at Duke and one of the paper’s co-authors. Understanding that pandemics aren’t so rare should raise the priority of efforts to prevent and control them in the future, he said.

The study, led by Marco Marani, Ph.D., of the University of Padua in Italy, used new statistical methods to measure the scale and frequency of disease outbreaks for which there was no immediate medical intervention over the past four centuries. Their analysis, which covered a murderer’s row of pathogens including plague, smallpox, cholera, typhus and novel influenza viruses, found considerable variability in the rate at which pandemics have occurred in the past. But they also identified patterns that allowed them to describe the probabilities of similar-scale events happening again.

In the case of the deadliest pandemic in modern history – the Spanish flu, which killed more than 30 million people between 1918 and 1920 -- the probability of a pandemic of similar magnitude occurring ranged from 0.3% to 1.9% per year over the time period studied. Taken another way, those figures mean it is statistically likely that a pandemic of such extreme scale would occur within the next 400 years.

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But the data also show the risk of intense outbreaks is growing rapidly. Based on the increasing rate at which novel pathogens such as SARS-CoV-2 have broken loose in human populations in the past 50 years, the study estimates that the probability of novel disease outbreaks will likely grow three-fold in the next few decades.

Using this increased risk factor, the researchers estimate that a pandemic similar in scale to COVID-19 is likely within a span of 59 years, a result they write is “much lower than intuitively expected.” Although not included in the PNAS paper, they also calculated the probability of a pandemic capable of eliminating all human life, finding it statistically likely within the next 12,000 years.

That is not to say we can count on a 59-year reprieve from a COVID-like pandemic, nor that we’re off the hook for a calamity on the scale of the Spanish flu for another 300 years. Such events are equally probable in any year during the span, said Gabriel Katul, Ph.D., the Theodore S. Coile Distinguished Professor of Hydrology and Micrometeorology at Duke and another of the paper’s authors.

“When a 100-year flood occurs today, one may erroneously presume that one can afford to wait another 100 years before experiencing another such event,” Katul says. “This impression is false. One can get another 100-year flood the next year.”

As an environmental health scientist, Pan can speculate on the reasons outbreaks are becoming more frequent, noting that population growth, changes in food systems, environmental degradation and more frequent contact between humans and disease-harboring animals all may be significant factors. He emphasizes the statistical analysis sought only to characterize the risks, not to explain what is driving them.

But at the same time, he hopes the study will spark deeper exploration of the factors that may be making devastating pandemics more likely – and how to counteract them.

“This points to the importance of early response to disease outbreaks and building capacity for pandemic surveillance at the local and global scales, as well as for setting a research agenda for understanding why large outbreaks are becoming more common,” Pan said.

#### **Health innovation solves ABR – kills 10 million people per year, more market access is key**

McMurry-Heath 9/16 (Michelle McMurry-Heath is president and CEO of the Biotechnology Innovation Organization, and lives in Washington, D.C. Tomaras is chief scientific officer at Forge Therapeutics, and lives in San Diego, September 16th 2021, “Opinion: Antibiotic-resistant superbugs are a ticking time bomb in global health care” San Diego Union Tribune, <https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/opinion/commentary/story/2021-09-16/superbug-drugs-therapy-antibiotics>) MULCH

The global health-care system faces a ticking time bomb.

Deadly bacteria and fungi are evolving to resist all current antimicrobials. If that happens, everything from chemotherapy to routine surgeries will become extraordinarily risky, since patients’ weakened immune systems won’t be able to fight off these dangerous infections, and existing medicines will be of little use. The United Nations estimates that without new antibiotics, by 2050, superbugs could kill 10 million people a year.

We don’t know exactly when our last antibiotics will lose their efficacy. We don’t know which strain of “superbug” will push us past the tipping point. But we do know that America’s small biotechnology firms house some of the brain power to avert this disaster.

These firms and their scientists — many based here in California — are battling hard against this microscopic enemy. But small biotechnology firms are not just fighting microbial evolution; they are also grappling with a broken antibiotics market whose inefficiencies are putting millions of lives at risk.

Antibiotics are expensive to develop, costing upwards of $1 billion per new medicine. But doctors only prescribe advanced new antibiotics sparingly — because every dose gives bacteria a chance to evolve and become resistant. And most patients only need antibiotics for a few days, unlike insulin or statins, which many chronic disease patients need to take every day for years or even decades.

Because of the high research and development costs and low probability of earning a financial return on antibiotics, many large pharmaceutical companies have pivoted away from antibiotics development. Since the 1980s, the number of major drug companies developing new antibiotics has fallen from 18 to three.

#### Antibiotic resistant superbugs and zoonotic viruses are catastrophic risks that guarantee extinction.

Victor 20 — Gavin Victor, Pioneer Journalist and Philosophy Research Assistant for Whitman College, 2020 (“Forget coronavirus: Worry about antibiotic resistance instead,” *Whitman Wire*, March 12th, Available Online at https://whitmanwire.com/opinion/2020/03/12/forget-coronavirus-worry-about-antibiotic-resistance-instead/, Accessed 07-02-2021)

A survey of experts from the “Future of Humanity Institute” at the University of Oxford states that there is a 19 percent chance of human extinction before 2100. If this is the risk of our extinction, then consequently, an extreme decrease in quality of life is much more likely, too. Among the many risks within contemporary life, issues surrounding antibiotic resistance are almost completely unacknowledged, incredibly dangerous and subject to change with only slight cultural and industrial shifts. The WHO claims that, “without urgent action, we are heading towards a post-antibiotic era, in which common infections and minor illnesses can once again kill.” The UN claims that by 2050, ten million people will die every year from antibiotic-resistant diseases – which is more than the current figure for cancer.

Antibiotic resistance stems from the misuse of antibiotics. The more we use antibiotics, the more we allow bacteria to build up a tolerance to them. We have already seen the advent of MRSA and antibiotic-resistant salmonella. The most obvious fix for this is to only prescribe antibiotics when absolutely necessary, which doctors are beginning to do. Humans, however, only use 20 percent of the antibiotics manufactured. The rest are consumed constantly by animals waiting for slaughter in massive feeding operations. Lance Price, an expert on bacteria resistant “superbugs”, claims that our food system’s predication on a constant use of antibiotics for animals is a recipe for disaster, because it uses antibiotics in a way that will inevitably lead to antibiotic resistance.

As with almost all recent disease outbreaks – like Swine-flu, MERS and SARS – COVID-19 is zoonotic, meaning that it originated in animals. Not only did these diseases originate in animals but in a particular species of animals that inhabit unnatural conditions for the sake of humans: including Swine-flu from pigs, MERS from camels, as well as SARS and COVID-19 likely originating from bats. While viruses are not the same problem as is antibiotic resistance, overlap between them indicates that top priority global health issues are stemming from our failure to have a healthy relationship with animals. We get zoonotic diseases as a result of exploitative and unnatural relationships with animals.

We need to use the fear generated by COVID-19 to jump start legitimate action in order to mitigate the fallout from catastrophes right around the corner. The fact that we turn a blind eye to pandemics that are becoming more and more inevitable is a sign that we shouldn’t trust our natural tendency to just “deal with it later.” Dealing with it later, dealing with the pandemics that are coming, doesn’t work. We should be scared – but of much more than COVID-19.

#### Narrowing Parker immunity empowers the FTC to challenge anticompetitive business sanctioned by state regulatory schemes. Those stifle innovation – incumbent regulations are outdated and block new entrants.

Crane 19 [Daniel A. Crane, Frederick Paul Furth Sr. Professor of Law, University of Michigan, 60 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1175, 2019, Lexis]

INTRODUCTION

This Article's intended audience holds a common view that state and local governments frequently adopt anticompetitive regulations for the benefit of economic special interests and that these acts of cronyism are pernicious to democracy, consumers, and economic efficiency. 1 In other words, the costs to society of these regulations far outweigh any reasonable benefits. A wise, beneficent, and all-knowing Platonic guardian of the state would have little trouble in striking down such regulations.

A further point of general consensus might relate to the particularly pernicious effect of anticompetitive state and local regulation in stifling new production innovation. In a variety of ways, our constitutional order is stodgy. Its conservatism lends a hand to the beneficiaries of incumbent technologies as they seek to deploy state power to block or to slow the advent of new technologies that may eventually displace the old, thereby preventing a realignment of wealth and position. In recent years, innovative technologies developed by companies such as Tesla, Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb have encountered determined opposition from purveyors of predecessor technologies, who have often used state and local regulation to thwart innovation. 2

So much for the common ground. Where consensus quickly fragments is on the question of what, if anything, to do about such regulations given that wise, beneficent, and all-knowing Platonic guardians of the state are in short supply. In the imperfect messiness that is liberal democracy, we frequently accept a host of comparatively petty inconveniences--political and economic--in order to preserve larger values. Just as we tolerate many market failures because the attempt at a regulatory fix might aggravate matters, we may have to tolerate some political failures on the same grounds.

[\*1178] Much of the difficulty has to do with the fact that while there might be a broad consensus that state and local governments enact many unjustifiable anticompetitive regulations, there is not a clear consensus on which ones they are. The experience with economic substantive due process in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, epitomized in Lochner v. New York, 3 has left the American political psyche gun-shy about permitting judges to strike down protectionist economic regulations on constitutional grounds. Shortly after getting out of the Lochner business, the Supreme Court announced that it would not get into the same business under the guise of the antitrust laws. 4 Over time, the development of the Parker state action doctrine allowed the courts to play a somewhat expanded role with respect to anticompetitive state and local regulations, but the zone of judicial review remains relatively constricted. 5

The purpose of this Article is to compare the deployment of constitutional and antitrust tools to scrutinize potentially anticompetitive state and local regulations against the backdrop of the ubiquitous concern about "Lochnerizing" under the auspices of either constitutional or statutory authority. Here is the question in a nutshell: If one believes that courts (or perhaps federal administrative agencies) should do somewhat more than they currently do to scrutinize and potentially invalidate anticompetitive state and local regulations, which lever should they pull--constitutional doctrines, antitrust preemption, or both? Because there are some overlapping, and some separate, institutional constraints and potential pathologies between constitutional and antitrust law, it is important to compare the two tools before deploying them.

This Article is organized as follows: Part I diagnoses the underlying features of democratic government that produce anticompetitive regulation. Some of this story is quite familiar, but I present some new observations with respect to the role of technological incumbency as a strong factor in invoking regulation to thwart innovation.

[\*1179] Part II explores the historical, ideological, and institutional foundations of the current legal doctrines with respect to constitutional and antitrust scrutiny of anticompetitive regulations. It shows that, despite the narrowing of Parker immunity in recent decades and some recent revival of equal protection and substantive due process as constraints on anticompetitive regulation, a good deal of anticompetitive state and local regulation remains impervious to legal challenge.

Part III compares the potential efficacy and pitfalls of deploying constitutional or antitrust doctrines as checks on anticompetitive state and local regulations. It considers: (1) the reach and domain of constitutional and antitrust theories; (2) the ways in which each theory could accommodate genuine and sufficient justifications for the challenged regulations; (3) ways in which the antitrust and constitutional tools differ substantively and procedurally; and (4) ways in which the two theories might interact.

I. WHY ANTICOMPETITIVE REGULATION SUCCEEDS

This Article opened with the assumption that a wide universe of unjustified state and local anticompetitive regulation exists that a benevolent Platonic guardian of the state would instantly nullify. Given this conceit, the presence of such regulations necessarily represents democratic failures, as democracy should, in principle, strive for laws that confer positive, rather than negative, public benefit. What, then, accounts for the pervasive existence of these undesirable regulations? The answer comes in two parts--a generic (and largely familiar) story concerning anticompetitive regulations as a whole, and a more specific story concerning the battle between incumbent and innovative technologies.

A. The Generic Story

The generic story is largely familiar from public choice theory and the literature on the Parker state action doctrine. Democratic processes systematically fail to overcome two embedded hurdles to matching regulatory schemes to broad public preferences: (1) the asymmetrical distribution of costs and benefits of anticompetitive [\*1180] regulations, and (2) the externalization of costs on populations outside the boundaries of the relevant democratic unit. 6 In tandem, these hurdles to democratic correction of cronyistic dispensations of monopoly power by governmental regulators perpetuate regulatory schemes that a broad majority of citizens would vote to overturn if they understood the issue and were sufficiently motivated to invest political energy in correcting it. 7 The first democratic deficit, well documented in public choice literature, arises because producers typically receive a much more concentrated benefit from anticompetitive regulations in comparison to the relatively unconcentrated cost imposed on consumers. 8 A small band of producers may lobby aggressively to enact or maintain an anticompetitive scheme that permits the producers to collect significant monopoly rents. 9 Those rents, in turn, may be spread across thousands or millions of consumers, each one paying a relatively small increase in rent. 10 Collective action constraints--the cost of mobilizing consumer sentiment and action to oppose the regulation--give the producers a systematic advantage in maintaining the regulation. 11 As John Shepard Wiley explained in bringing public choice theory literature to bear on Parker immunity questions: [I]f the group [of consumers] is large, individual members have little incentive to participate because participation is personally costly and contributes little to the group's chances for successful joint action. Small groups encounter fewer of such problems. If group members behave in this rational self-interested manner, then "there is a systematic tendency for exploitation of the great by the small"; less numerous, more intensely concerned special [\*1181] interests can predictably outmatch more numerous, more mildly concerned consumer or "public" interests in legislative or regulatory fora--even though the actions of special interests impose a net loss on society. 12 The second deficit arises when governmental units--whether state or local--externalize the costs of the anticompetitive regulation outside their jurisdiction. The classic example is Parker itself, in which 90 percent of the raisins subject to California's agricultural cartel mandate were sold outside of California. 13 Out-of-state consumers could not be counted on to mobilize democratically to oppose the California regulation, as they had no political voice in California. 14 Many similar examples of jurisdictional cost externalization have been documented. 15 One arose in an important Supreme Court decision on state action immunity, Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire. 16 Hallie, Seymour, Union, and Washington were unincorporated towns adjacent to the city of Eau Claire, Wisconsin. 17 Their citizens could not vote in Eau Claire, but Eau Claire wanted to annex those territories into its boundaries, possibly through coercive means. 18 Eau Claire received federal funds to build a sewage treatment plant in its service area, which covered the four towns, then refused to supply sewage treatment services to the towns. 19 However, the city did agree to provide treatment services to certain homeowners in the towns if a majority of area voters voted by referendum to allow Eau Claire to annex their homes and to commit to use Eau Claire's sewage and transportation services. 20 The towns claimed this scheme was designed to keep the other towns from effectively competing with Eau Claire's sewage collection and transportation services. 21 The scheme also possibly allowed the [\*1182] city to raise costs for nonresidents while at the same time leveraging the higher prices to bring the nonresidents (and presumably their property taxes) into the city. 22 Although the city's motivation was ultimately political rather than narrowly economic, it used an anticompetitive strategy to dump monopoly costs on nonresidents who could not vote to rescind the regulations until they joined the city, at which point the question would be moot. 23 Together, these two deficits--asymmetrical costs and benefits to both producers and consumers and cost externalization--explain why democratic processes often fail to weed out anticompetitive regulations. Without concerted efforts by champions of consumer interests to overcome collective action problems and mobilize support for regulatory reform, the regulatory barriers to competition can linger indefinitely. As discussed next, these failures of democratic self-correction are exacerbated by regulations that entrench incumbent technologies at the expense of innovation.

B. Additional Considerations Affecting Product Market Innovation

Many of the contemporary regulatory battles between old and new technologies (particularly those involving the sharing economy) can be understood as follows. The incumbent regulatory scheme arose many decades ago and may well have been legitimately justified (in the sense of not imposing more costs than benefits) at the time of its adoption. 24 Our hypothesized Platonic guardian might even have approved of it at the time of its adoption. 25 The passage of time and advent of new technologies has now eroded the original basis of the regulation, and our Platonic guardian would therefore want the regulation rescinded or reformed. However, incumbent firms succeed in blocking or slowing innovative competition by circling the wagons around the incumbent regulatory schemes. 26 In [\*1183] these wars, the incumbents have a decisive advantage for at least three structural reasons.

First, if the incumbent regulatory scheme has allowed the incumbent firms to collect monopoly rents, then there may be a sharp asymmetry of incentives between old and new firms. 27 This is the same asymmetry that attends any struggle between incumbent monopolists and new competitive entrants: the monopolist is seeking to protect a large market share at a monopoly price, whereas the new entrant can only hope to gain a smaller market share at a competitive price. 28 Because the incumbent has more to gain than the new entrant has to lose, the incumbent will be willing to spend more to entrench the regulatory monopoly than the new entrant will be to challenge it. 29 This, in turn, discourages potential new entrants from investing in innovative new technologies and mounting political and market-oriented challenges to the incumbents. 30

Second, the incumbents have the advantage of status quo biases and fears about the consequences of technological change. 31 Costs of the existing system--to human safety, for example--may be seen as an inevitable baseline, whereas potential risks from the new technology may be seen as incremental threats. 32 Hence, risks and costs of the existing system may be undercounted or not counted at all, while risks and costs of the new system will be made to bear the full weight of their risks and costs.

For example, in recent months there have been widely reported stories of Uber drivers sexually abusing passengers. 33 These stories rarely report the base rate of abuse by taxi drivers or public transit [\*1184] workers, who might well present similar risks to passengers. 34 Similarly, the news media seem to wait with bated breath to report every accident involving a driverless vehicle 35 --even ones where the vehicle was stationary and hit by another at-fault vehicle--without reporting the base rate of nearly 40,000 deaths a year from human-driven vehicles. 36 The focus of news reporting seems to be on the incremental risks created by automated driving without regard to the baseline number of deaths that automated driving might diminish. 37 In principle, regulators should compare the likely risks of allowing new technologies to those of perpetuating the incumbent technology, but they often default to some version of the precautionary principle, insisting that new technologies prove their safety and efficacy in an absolute rather than comparative sense. 38 Given this baseline asymmetry, proponents of new technologies frequently must overcome significant regulatory hurdles not faced by incumbent technologies. Or, incumbent technologies may persuade regulators to force new technologies to play by rules that favor the incumbent technologies--a form of raising rivals' costs and creating regulatory entry barriers. 39

Finally, incumbents enjoy the generic benefits of incumbency in a structurally conservative constitutional and political system. The multiple "veto gates" to reform legislation--structural factors such as bicameralism, presentment, filibusters, and committee structures 40 --empower technological incumbents to ride the status quo for years or decades after our hypothetical Platonic guardian would have instituted public-minded reforms. 41

[\*1185] In combination, these three factors create additional barriers to the expected flow of democratic processes toward majoritarian equilibria--that is to say, equilibria that favor consumers' interests in competition and innovation over those of producers in capturing monopoly rents. In light of these factors and the collective action and cost externalization factors discussed earlier, 42 it is unsurprising that regulation serves as a barrier to innovation.

C. An Illustration from Automobile Distribution

The ongoing story of Tesla's efforts to break into the American automobile market illustrates the stickiness of incumbent regulations. 43 For a variety of business reasons, when Tesla entered the market in 2012, it decided that it would have to sell its all-electric vehicles (EVs) directly to consumers, meaning that it would have to open its own showrooms and service centers rather than outsourcing that function to franchised dealers. 44 Among other things, Tesla believed that traditional dealerships would be reluctant and ill-positioned to sell EVs and that Tesla therefore could not expect to convince already skeptical customers to buy EVs unless it opened its own retail facilities. 45 Since the mid-twentieth century, however, most states have adopted laws intended to protect dealers from unfair exploitation by manufacturers. 46 Among the provisions in many of these state statutes is a prohibition on a manufacturer opening its own showrooms and service centers. 47 In many states, manufacturers are required to distribute through independent dealers only. 48

Legislatures adopted these direct distribution prohibitions at a time when American car manufacturing was dominated by the "Big Three" (Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors) and many dealers were [\*1186] "mom and pop" businesses. 49 State legislatures were convinced that the dominant manufacturers were taking advantage of their franchisees by selling cars through their company-owned stores at lower prices than the dealers could afford to charge given the wholesale prices charged by the manufacturers. 50 The direct distribution prohibitions were justified as correcting a severe imbalance in bargaining power leading to contracts of adhesion and unfair exploitation in manufacturer-dealer relations. 51

Assuming that dealer protection rationale made sense in circa 1950, its basis has almost entirely vanished today. With the advent of competition from Europe and Asia, the Big Three are no longer dominant. 52 Dealers have many choices of automobile franchisors and hence considerably more power in negotiations over franchise terms. Further, the dealers are no longer mostly mom and pops. 53 Rather, most dealers are organized into multi-dealer groups, many with hundreds of millions or billions of dollars in annual revenue. 54 Indeed, some of the largest dealer groups have more annual revenue than Tesla. 55 Most significantly, the dealer protection rationale has nothing to do with a company such as Tesla that does not seek to distribute through dealers at all. 56 No dealers, no dealer exploitation.

Recognizing that the dealer protection rationale that justified the original statutes no longer works, the dealers have attempted to recast the direct distribution prohibitions as consumer protection decisions. 57 They have argued that forcing consumers to buy automobiles from dealers rather than from manufacturers will lead to more price competition, and hence lower prices, and prevent [\*1187] consumers from manufacturer exploitation. 58 These consumer protection arguments have been roundly rejected by economists, 59 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 60 and major proconsumer groups such as the Consumer Federation of America, Consumer Action, Consumers for Automobile Reliability and Safety, and the American Antitrust Institute. 61 Nonetheless, the dealers have succeeded in using the existing structure of dealer protection laws to block or slow Tesla's direct distribution program in a number of states. 62

The Tesla story evidences most of the factors that contribute to the persistence of anticompetitive regulations. The dealers have a concentrated interest in preserving their protected position, while the costs of that protectionism are spread out over millions of consumers. In the state with arguably the most pernicious record with respect to direct distribution reform--Michigan--there is a record of antireform advocacy by a leading incumbent--General Motors--and acquiescence by the political class to protect an in-state champion against an out-of-state challenger. 63 Even though consumers complain more about car dealers than about any other business, indicating the baseline system is not particularly attractive to them, 64 the dealers have invoked fears about the risks of direct distribution in opposition to legislative reforms. And legislative [\*1188] inertia has slowed the consideration of reform bills in some states, extending the incumbent regulatory scheme long past its reasonable expiration date. 65

The structural factors weighing against proconsumer and pro-innovation reforms will not block Tesla forever. The company has already seen significant successes in some state legislatures and courts and is progressively penetrating the market. 66 Yet it would be misguided to consider the company's eventual success a reason not to worry about the structural factors entrenching anticompetitive regulations, especially those foreclosing innovation. No monopoly is permanent--even the most persistent are eventually eroded. 67 Innovative technologies will almost always find a way out eventually, despite incumbent machinations. 68 What incumbents can buy is not monopoly in perpetuity but in extension. 69 Those years or decades of extension are costly to society. They represent significant overcharges to consumers, misallocations of social resources and, in the extreme, impairment to health and safety-- even lives lost. 70

Not every instance of anticompetitive state or local regulation exhibits the full set of explanatory factors discussed in this Article as cleanly as the ongoing Tesla saga does. Yet the Tesla story is more paradigmatic than idiosyncratic. Across the economy, incumbent technologies are structurally advantaged to deploy regulatory forces to stifle or slow innovation.

[\*1189] II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AS A CHECK ON ANTICOMPETITIVE REGULATION

If democratic processes fail to check anticompetitive state and local regulations on a systematic basis, then what can be done about it? Among the potential tools are institutional efforts to address the quality of legislation and regulation through democratic processes, such as creating governmental competition advocacy bodies within state and local governments or using federal purse strings to incentivize state and local governments to reevaluate their regulations. These democratic options are important, but they often fall prey to the pathologies of democratic decision making identified earlier. 71 Competition advocates--whether in government or in the private sector--often face formidable structural barriers to advancing the procompetition interest: entrenched incumbent monopolies, difficulties in mobilizing consumer support given the often diffuse nature of consumer harm, and institutional biases against change. 72

In addition to the democratic options, there are what could be styled counterdemocratic possibilities, insofar as they involve the use of courts or agencies to strike down anticompetitive statutes and regulations as inconsistent with some overarching norm of federal law, whether statutory or constitutional. 73 These counterdemocratic possibilities often do not run into the same structural status quo biases as the democratic possibilities do. For example, advocates of a legal theory for overruling an anticompetitive state or local regulation do not have to mobilize broad political support for their position or surmount the "veto gates" 74 built into ordinary political processes. Rather, they typically only have to persuade a small set of elite decision makers that their position is legally correct. It is with these counter-democratic possibilities that this Article is primarily interested.

[\*1190] The counterdemocratic or countermajoritarian quality of these deployments of judicial review is what places their use in some doubt, 75 even granting the assumption that they are targeting objectively undesirable regulations. 76 In the arc of American history, the courts have vacillated in their willingness to engage in such judicial review since the mid-twentieth century. Late nineteenth and early twentieth century courts were willing to engage in broad judicial review of economic regulation, 77 but the tide turned strongly against such review in the mid-twentieth century. 78 Only in recent years have glimmers of a return to some form of strong judicial review of anticompetitive regulations made a reappearance. 79

A. Lochner, anti-Lochner, and Parker

The stage for the current constellation of judicial doctrines and attitudes towards federal judicial review of anticompetitive state and local regulations was set through the progression of Lochner-era substantive due process, the anti-Lochner constitutional revolution of 1937, and the extension of anti-Lochner sentiment to federal antitrust law in the creation of Parker's state action immunity doctrine in 1943. 80 In 1905, the Supreme Court in Lochner struck down a New York law regulating bakeshop working hours on substantive due process grounds, 81 over Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's famous objection that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." 82 During the Progressive and New Deal eras, Lochner and Lochnerism were broadly vilified for interfering with progressive reforms and substituting judges' economic views for those of legislatures. 83 In the New Deal constitutional revolution associated with the year 1937 (although spanning a few years in either direction), the Supreme [\*1191] Court announced it was getting out of the Lochner business--that it would not strike down economic legislation simply on the grounds that it was, in the judgment of the court, ill-considered. 84 Over time, it became clear that the anti-Lochner jurisprudence extended to nakedly anticompetitive regulations adopted to favor economic special interests to the detriment of the consuming public. In cases such as Williamson v. Lee Optical 85 and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 86 there was a fairly apparent record that the regulations in question had been adopted to stifle competition and benefit economic special interests, but the courts refused to create an exception to the anti-Lochner doctrine on those grounds. 87 In Williamson, the Court acknowledged that the "Oklahoma law may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases," but insisted that the "day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought." 88 Rather, the Court held that "[f]or protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts." 89 In 1943, the Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown also made clear that it would not permit the federal Sherman Act to be used as an end-run around the anti-Lochner cases. 90 Parker involved both dormant commerce clause and Sherman Act challenges to California's Agricultural Prorate Act, which forced farmers into a marketing plan that effectively operated as an output reduction cartel run by farmers. 91 The Supreme Court rejected both challenges. 92 Finding "nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature," 93 the Court created a doctrine of state action immunity for anticompetitive state [\*1192] and local laws. 94 The effect of this ruling was to restrict the Sherman Act's coverage solely to purely private conduct. 95 Anticompetitive schemes orchestrated by the state would be excluded from judicial review. 96 As Judge Merrick Garland has observed, Parker is best understood as a continuation of the post-1937 jurisprudence rejecting Lochner: Parker v. Brown was much less a case about judicial faith in economic regulation than it was a case about judicial respect for the political process. Parker was indeed a child of its times, but the most salient element of that historical context was the Court's recent rejection of the Lochner-era doctrine of substantive due process, under which federal courts struck down economic regulations they viewed as unreasonably interfering with the liberty of contract. Having only just determined not to use the Constitution in that manner, the Court was not about to resurrect Lochner in the garb of the Sherman Act. 97

B. The Potential for an Increased Level of Judicial Scrutiny

As of 1943, one would have been justified in believing that, at least from the perspective of federal judicial review, anticompetitive state and local regulations would receive a free pass unless they [\*1193] committed certain egregious violations, such as disadvantaging "discrete and insular minorities" 98 or discriminating against out-of-state commerce. 99 But the judicial impulse to cast a stern glance at perniciously anticompetitive regulations could not be forever stifled, and before long cracks began to appear in the courts' anti-Lochnerian resolve.

Antitrust law and its state action immunity doctrine were the first to move in a significantly more interventionist direction. By the time of the Midcal decision, the state action immunity doctrine had been narrowed to permit judicial scrutiny unless the state regulation met a two-part test: (1) clear and affirmative expression of the anticompetitive policy by the sovereign state itself, and (2) active supervision of the policy's implementation by state actors. 100 Under this structure, the courts have invalidated a number of anticompetitive state regulatory schemes--most recently the practice of delegating regulatory power to occupational licensing boards staffed with potentially self-interested industry participants. 101

The Midcal test invokes a democracy-reinforcement theory of antitrust judicial review. 102 States may enact anticompetitive regulations so long as they take conspicuous responsibility for them. 103 If the state can be obviously identified with the scheme, then perhaps citizens will "vote out the bums" if the costs to consumers are too high. 104 Alas, many anticompetitive regulations escape Midcal's net because of the systemic factors identified in the previous section. 105 Even when a state conspicuously takes ownership of an anticompetitive scheme, democratic processes may fail to provide a remedy because of the asymmetry of costs and benefits [\*1194] between producers and consumers, the externalization of costs outside the voting jurisdiction, and the entrenched advantage of technological incumbency. 106

In light of the limited efficacy of Midcal's regime, one could consider additional ways to increase the level of antitrust scrutiny of anticompetitive state and local regulations. Commentators have proposed various such doctrinal approaches to invigorate antitrust preemption. For example, courts might adopt a cost-externalization test, which would invalidate regulatory schemes that externalize a disproportionate share of monopoly overcharges outside the boundaries of the political district enacting the regulation. 107 Or, as I have proposed elsewhere, they might read the Parker doctrine as entirely inapplicable to enforcement actions by the FTC--a legal question that the Supreme Court has held is still open. 108 In the event that the courts hold Parker inapplicable to the FTC, the Commission might play a significantly enhanced role in checking anticompetitive abuses by state and local governments.

Despite calls for a broader use of federal antitrust law to police anticompetitive state and local regulations, the Supreme Court continues to refine the Parker doctrine with an eye on Lochner. Then-Justice Rehnquist once worried that the Court should not "engage in the same wide-ranging, essentially standardless inquiry into the reasonableness of local regulation that th[e] Court … properly rejected" in terminating Lochnerism. 109 In his dissenting opinion in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, Justice [\*1195] Rehnquist warned about the risks of opening up antitrust review of municipal regulations in a way that would require cities to justify their regulations, and the courts, in turn, to weigh those justifications. 110 Rehnquist wrote:

If the Rule of Reason were "modified" to permit a municipality to defend its regulation on the basis that its benefits to the community outweigh its anticompetitive effects, the courts will be called upon to review social legislation in a manner reminiscent of the Lochner era. Once again, the federal courts will be called upon to engage in the same wide-ranging, essentially standardless inquiry into the reasonableness of local regulation that this Court has properly rejected. Instead of "liberty of contract" and "substantive due process," the procompetitive principles of the Sherman Act will be the governing standard by which the reasonableness of all local regulation will be determined. Neither the Due Process Clause nor the Sherman Act authorizes federal courts to invalidate local regulation of the economy simply upon opining that the municipality has acted unwisely. The Sherman Act should not be deemed to authorize federal courts to "substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws." The federal courts have not been appointed by the Sherman Act to sit as a "superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation." 111

Also in the shadow of Lochner, recent years have shown glimmers of a reinvigoration of constitutional doctrines checking anticompetitive abuses by state and local governments. The negative or dormant commerce clause--limited by the Parker Court on anti-Lochner grounds--has occasionally been deployed to invalidate not only anticompetitive regulatory schemes 112 that discriminated against out-of-state interests, but also, on occasion, those that impose significant burdens on interstate commerce without a sufficient justification. 113 As of this writing, Tesla is testing the limits of these [\*1196] doctrines in its challenge to Michigan's direct distribution law. 114 Its complaint for injunctive relief asserts:

[Michigan's] [p]articularly egregious protectionist legislation … blocks Tesla from pursuing legitimate business activities and subjects it to arbitrary and unreasonable regulation in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; subjects Tesla to arbitrary and unreasonable classifications in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and discriminates against interstate commerce and restricts the free flow of goods between states in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. 115

Thus far, Tesla has survived a motion to dismiss in federal court and won a key discovery motion seeking automobile dealers' communications concerning the Michigan ban on direct distribution. 116

Perhaps even more significant have been a handful of court of appeals decisions applying equal protection principles to invalidate anticompetitive regulations designed solely to protect a discrete group of economic actors from competition--although there remains a circuit split over this practice. Morbidly, the most significant cases have all been related to funeral parlors and casket sales.

In 2004, the Tenth Circuit in Powers v. Harris rejected a constitutional challenge to an Oklahoma statute that limited casket sales to licensed funeral parlors. 117 The court accepted the premise that the statute had no genuine health and safety rationale and was "a classic piece of special interest legislation designed to extract monopoly rents from consumers' pockets and funnel them into the coffers of a small but politically influential group of business people--namely, Oklahoma funeral directors." 118 Nonetheless, the court held its hands were tied by the anti-Lochner cases--particularly [\*1197] Williamson and Ferguson, which also involved (arguably) nakedly parochial anticompetitive regulations. 119

On the other hand, in their own casket cases, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits invalidated the anticompetitive schemes on equal protection grounds, holding that "protecting a discrete interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate governmental purpose" and therefore fails even rational basis review. 120 This exercise of what Judge Ginsburg calls "rational basis with economic bite" could grow into a significant check on anticompetitive state and local regulation if utilized more expansively. 121 If this Article's premise is valid--that regulations designed solely to protect "discrete interest group[s] from economic competition" 122 are pervasive--then the federal courts have their work cut out for them if they take up the casket maxim with seriousness.

However, it is far from certain that they will or should. Despite the movement towards enhanced scrutiny of anticompetitive economic cronyism just described, the ghosts of Lochner continue to loom large. Even judges unsympathetic to the casket regulations may be concerned about the prospect of unelected judges substituting their own economic preferences for those of democratically elected representatives. In Powers, the Tenth Circuit listed a series of classically anti-Lochner rationales (including a rejection of the role of the Platonic guardian hypothesized in this Article) for refusing to embrace the Sixth Circuit's antiparochialism principle:

First, in practical terms, we would ~~paralyze~~ state governments if we undertook a probing review of each of their actions, constantly asking them to "try again." Second, even if we assumed such an exalted role, it would be nothing more than substituting our view of the public good or the general welfare for that chosen by the states. As a creature of politics, the definition of the public good changes with the political winds. There simply is no constitutional or Platonic form against which [\*1198] we can (or could) judge the wisdom of economic regulation. Third, these admonitions ring especially true when we are reviewing the regulatory actions of states, who, in our federal system, merit great respect as separate sovereigns. 123

So here is the question for those who accept this Article's central premise regarding the prevalence of anticompetitive state and local regulation and yet worry, like the Powers court, about a return to Lochner: If one is interested in pulling additional judicial levers to scrutinize anticompetitive state and local regulations, but worried about returning to Lochnernism, how do the constitutional and antitrust levers compare? Are both equally susceptible to misuse and abuse, is one less risky than the other, and are there limits that could be placed on both to cabin their potential risks? This Article's final Part compares the constitutional and antitrust tools as potential foils to anticompetitive state and local regulation to help answer these questions.

III. COMPARING THE RISKS AND LIMITS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ANTITRUST TOOLS

A. Limiting the Scope of Judicial Review to Regulations Affecting Competition

The fear of a return to Lochnerism is in large part a fear that judicial review of economic regulatory decisions is a Pandora's box that, once open, would quickly unleash a full-scale movement toward a substitution of judicial economic philosophies for those of the democratically responsive branches. 124 Hence, in the current constellation of Lochner-phobia, it is important to explain how any doctrine that invites increased judicial scrutiny of economic regulation would be cabined or restrained by a workable limitation principle. Both the antitrust and constitutional tools under consideration embody such a limitation principle insofar as they do not propose universal federal scrutiny of all undesirable state economic regulation. Instead, they limit the scrutiny to regulations that harm [\*1199] competition for the benefit of identifiable special interests. In other words, the prima facie case in either event requires demonstration of competitive harm as opposed to merely social undesirability. 125 The "competitive harm" limitation principle excludes from judicial review a wide set of regulations and hence limits the range of judicial interference with state regulatory schemes. Many cronyist regulations line the pockets of politically connected special interests without necessarily impairing competition. Consider, for example, a city ordinance that required disposal of a certain kind of medical waste at a pharmacy. Assume further that the waste in question could be safely disposed of through ordinary garbage collection, and the sole purpose of the scheme in question was to provide pharmacies with an opportunity to charge a fee for collecting the waste. Our hypothesized Platonic guardian would wish to overturn that regulation but could not do so on the constitutional or antitrust grounds under consideration because the regulation in question does not limit competition in any important sense. Rather than stifling competition in a legitimate market, it creates a new market for an undesired and unnecessary service. Lochner-phobes may wonder whether this limitation principle is limited enough. Although the limitation carves off a large swath of cronyist regulations from review, it still includes a relatively large universe of regulations, creating the possibility that judges will have a free hand to strike down many important state regulatory programs in the name of enhanced competition. Those less worried about Lochner and more willing to encourage judicial review of economic regulation may worry that the limitation principle is too limited and that it would allow a vast universe of cronyist regulation to escape judicial scrutiny on the same grounds that much cutthroat business behavior escapes antitrust scrutiny today--it may be unethical or undesirable, but does not fall within the purview of the antitrust laws because it does not impair general market competitiveness. 126 [\*1200] Limiting the scope of judicial review to economic regulations impairing competition also raises a question of legal principle. As to antitrust, it is easy to justify such a principle. Notwithstanding Oliver Wendell Holmes's protestation that the Sherman Act "says nothing about competition," 127 a century of judicial construction has oriented the antitrust laws towards a singular focus on competition. 128 On the other hand, it is not obvious that constitutional scrutiny should rise or fall on the effects a cronyist regulation has on competition. It may be true that "protecting a discrete interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate governmental purpose," 129 but it seems equally true that dispensing economic rents to favored discrete interest groups more generally is also not a legitimate government purpose. In either case, the argument for limiting judicial review is not that the set of targeted regulations is constitutionally legitimate, but that the process of separating sheep from goats is fraught with the potential for judicial usurpation.

B. Considering Governmental Justifications for Restraints on Competition

Assuming that judicial review of anticompetitive state and local regulations is to occur with some degree of bite, the fighting question may often become how to evaluate the state's proffered justifications for the restraint on competition. Both antitrust and constitutional tools would need to allow ample room for the state to demonstrate verifiable justifications for the challenged regulations. To put this point in antitrust parlance, there are no per se unlawful state restraints on competition--the state's reasons for regulating will always be up for review in judicial or administrative proceedings challenging their validity. [\*1201] The critical question is how much interrogation into the state's proffered justifications a court or reviewing agency would, could, or should undertake. In conventional post-Lochner terms, economic regulations were subjected to no more than rational basis review--an exceedingly deferential standard of review. 130 The state did not have to advance any empirical support for its proffered justifications and, indeed, did not have to advance any justifications at all. 131 Judges were supposed to uphold the regulation if they could conceive of any justification that might plausibly support it: A State, moreover, has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification. "[A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data." A statute is presumed constitutional, and "[t]he burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it," whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record. Finally, courts are compelled under rational-basis review to accept a legislature's generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends. A classification does not fail rational-basis review because it "is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality." 132 That sort of rational basis review is far from the sort of review conducted by the Craigmiles and St. Joseph Abbey courts in striking down the Tennessee and Louisiana casket rules. 133 Those courts required evidentiary support for states' claimed justifications and subjected the states' claims to rigorous cross-examination for logical consistency. 134 In the Sixth Circuit case--Craigmiles--the court rejected the state's arguments that the casket regulation protected casket quality and public health, made it more feasible for casket sellers to advise bereaved families about which casket was most suitable for their needs, and protected against sharp business [\*1202] dealing. 135 The court found these arguments inconsistent with the state's own regulatory practices and unsupported by any record evidence. 136 Similarly, in the Fifth Circuit case--St. Joseph Abbey--the court repeated the familiar proposition that "rational basis review places no affirmative evidentiary burden on the government," but quickly added that "plaintiffs may nonetheless negate a seemingly plausible basis for the law by adducing evidence of irrationality." 137 The court then inquired into evidentiary support for the state's proferred "rational bases." 138 For example, on the ostensible consumer protection rationale for prohibiting casket sales except by licensed funeral parlors, the court observed that the FTC had largely rejected this argument as an empirical matter, noting that the FTC found "insufficient evidence that … third-party sellers of funeral goods are engaged in widespread unfair or deceptive acts or practices" and that the empirical "record [is] 'bereft of evidence indicating significant consumer injury caused by third-party sellers.'" 139 This form of review resembles antitrust litigation, where once a plaintiff raises a prima facie case of anticompetitive effect (outside of per se rules, where no justifications are allowed), the defendant typically can proffer procompetitive justifications but bears the burden of offering evidentiary support. 140 Although giving lip service to the norms of rational basis review, these courts were in fact taking a hard look at the states' proffered justifications once the regulation in question appeared prima facie to meet the description of a measure designed to protect "discrete interest group[s] from economic competition." 141 Inquiries into offsetting justifications for prima facie suspect conduct raise two doctrinal-analytical questions: (1) how tight must the fit between means and ends be in order for the conduct in question to survive scrutiny, and (2) once the conduct has been shown to advance legitimate ends, should its harms be balanced against its [\*1203] benefits, or should it simply be deemed lawful without any balancing? 142 Both constitutional and antitrust tools for addressing anticompetitive regulation would need to address these questions. As to the first question--the required tightness of means-ends fit--both constitutional and antitrust law already contain suitable doctrines. Moving up the ladder of scrutiny from rational basis review, intermediate scrutiny in constitutional law (such as that applicable to content-neutral restrictions on speech) requires that the restriction in question advance important governmental interests and not burden the protected interest (speech in the speech cases, competition in competition cases) more than necessary to further these interests. 143 The fit between means and ends need be only "reasonable," not strictly necessary or essential. 144 Unless the constitutional limitation on anticompetitive cronyism should fall into the more stringent strict scrutiny category--a very doubtful possibility--this sort of fit between regulatory means and ends would seem applicable. Antitrust law shares a similar approach to the less restrictive alternative analysis under the rule of reason, and it too would presumably apply to government restraints on competition under an expanded form of judicial review. 145 As explained in the Justice Department and FTC competitor collaboration guidelines, a reasonable, but not essential, fit between means and ends is required to credit proffered justifications for prima facie anticompetitive agreements: The Agencies consider only those efficiencies for which the relevant agreement is reasonably necessary. An agreement may be "reasonably necessary" without being essential. However, if the participants could have achieved or could achieve similar efficiencies by practical, significantly less restrictive means, then the Agencies conclude that the relevant agreement is not [\*1204] reasonably necessary to their achievement. In making this assessment, the Agencies consider only alternatives that are practical in the business situation faced by the participants; the Agencies do not search for a theoretically less restrictive alternative that is not realistic given business realities. 146 A potential difference between constitutional and antitrust analysis might arise on the second important means-ends question--whether to balance harms against benefits of the regulatory restriction. For example, suppose that a regulation limiting ride-sharing services resulted in some small safety benefit to customers but an arguably much greater harm to customers in the form of diminished choice of service options and higher prices. Should a reviewing court or agency balance the safety enhancements against the harms to competition, or should it rather conclude that, having shown a legitimate reason for its existence, the regulation should stand? Although intermediate scrutiny in constitutional law is often described as a "balancing test," courts do not generally engage in explicit balancing after passing the less restrictive alternatives inquiry. 147 Some degree of value judgment must be embedded in the inquiry into whether the state's interest is sufficiently "important," but it is rare to see a court say, in effect, that although the state's interest is concededly important and the regulation at stake is reasonably related to it, the harms caused by the regulation outweigh its benefits. 148 For purposes of the principle against protecting "discrete interest group[s] from economic competition," it seems apparent that there is no room for balancing at all, as a state [\*1205] regulation that serves some legitimate end by definition is not "simple economic protectionism." 149 By contrast, antitrust law is, in principle, supposed to require open-ended balancing at this final step: "if the monopolist's procompetitive justification stands unrebutted, then the plaintiff must demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs the procompetitive benefit." 150 If followed in state action doctrine cases, this sort of balancing could precipitate serious accusations of Lochnerizing, as it would put judges in the position of substituting their own preferences for market outcomes over the state's legitimate regulatory objectives. Fortunately, although antitrust law nominally calls for balancing, courts typically do not engage in it. 151 Even in Microsoft--the case that most explicitly and authoritatively called for final-stage balancing--the D.C. Circuit engaged in very little, if any, true balancing. 152 Perhaps because of the incommensurability between anticompetitive or procompetitive effects or concern about chilling procompetitive conduct, courts tend to exonerate competitive behavior that is necessary to procompetitive effects without asking whether the harms outweigh the benefits. 153 In order to stave off Lochnerizing concerns, any expanded antitrust review of state and local regulations might need to formalize this practice doctrinally: Once a state demonstrates that the regulation in question is reasonably tailored to achieve some legitimate governmental objective, [\*1206] antitrust does not require balancing of the harms to competition against the legitimate governmental objectives. A final question unique to antitrust review is whether, when it comes to means-ends review, the catalogue of permissible ends is limited to those recognized by antitrust law as "procompetitive." One of the important doctrinal and policy structures of antitrust law is a division of the world into virtues that are said to be "procompetitive" and those that are not. 154 To count as a legitimate virtue in the antitrust domain, an effect must be "procompetitive," meaning that it must work to enhance or improve market competition. 155 Supposed benefits of a restraint that assume that competition is itself the problem in need of curtailment are labeled with the epithet of "ruinous competition" theories and are dismissed as inconsistent with the Sherman Act's procompetition policy. 156 While this single-minded devotion to competition may make sense as to the world of private restraints, it is less clear that it can be applied sensibly to governmental regulation. Do governments not have the right to take the view that competition of certain types causes social evils that should be curtailed? For example, many regulatory restrictions on alcohol and tobacco distribution are designed to decrease competition and hence reduce output as compared to that which would be obtained in a competitive market. 157 While it may be undesirable for private actors to limit harmful output through private means, the state's police power surely includes the right to do so, including by limiting competition. 158 This suggests that the range of regulatory interests [\*1207] states might legitimately advance in support of challenged regulations would be broader than those deemed "procompetitive" in conventional antitrust analysis. Opening the door to a wider scope of justifications in cases where the restraint on competition is imposed by governmental rather than private actors would appear on first impression to favor the government. Such a widening of the rule of reason, however, raises precisely the Lochnerizing concern raised by Justice Rehnquist in his previously quoted City of Boulder dissent. 159 If courts were called upon to balance health and safety benefits against traditional competition concerns around prices and innovation, then they might well slip into a Lochnerizing mold. But perhaps such concerns could be abated by limiting the reviewing court or agency's role to determining whether the regulation in question actually supported the state's proffered goals. As long as the goals were permissible (that is, not simply protecting discrete interest groups from competition as a form of political patronage) and the regulations were reasonably related to the goals, the reviewing court or agency would not inquire more broadly into the regulation's overall desirability.

C. Institutional and Procedural Distinctions

Antitrust preemption and constitutional review are differently situated in one significant way: Constitutional equal protection, substantive due process, and dormant commerce clause principles are privately enforceable by any party that meets the Article III standing requirements--which, in this context, means at least anyone directly affected by a regulation impairing competition. 160 Antitrust has its own private right of action standing rules, 161 as well as an additional institutional feature that might significantly limit some of the abuses associated with Lochnerizing. One proposed route for increasing the preemptive scope of federal antitrust law over anticompetitive state and local regulation is to hold the [\*1208] Parker doctrine inapplicable to the FTC. 162 This would give the FTC enhanced power to challenge anticompetitive state and local regulations. Not only would this limit the incidence of challenges to state regulation (the FTC Act is not privately enforceable and only the Commission can initiate an action under the Act), 163 but it would also put the Commission itself, rather than an Article III court, in the position of making an initial decision on the case. An Article III court could ultimately become involved, as adverse Commission decisions are appealable to any federal court of appeal in which the case could have been initially brought. 164 However, lodging the antitrust review function in the FTC would grant the Commission an initial regulatory review function and the power to make factual findings subject to "substantial evidence" review. 165

### 1AC---Plan

#### The United States Federal Government should substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector shielded by state action immunity.

### 1AC---Federalism

#### Advantage Two is Federalism:

#### Scenario 1 is Tech:

#### Nextgen tech is emerging at an exponential rate – effective state regulatory experimentation avoids downsides and maximize the benefits of AI and nano

McGinnis 11 (John, George C. Dix Professor of Law, Northwestern Law School, “LAWS FOR LEARNING IN AN AGE OF ACCELERATION,” <http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3404&context=wmlr>)

The twenty-first century’s information age has the potential to usher in a more harmonious and productive politics. People often disagree about what policies to adopt, but the cornucopia of data that modern technology generates can allow them to better update their beliefs about policy outcomes on the basis of shared facts. In the long run, convergence on the facts can lead incrementally to more consensus on better policies. More credible factual information should over time also help make for a less divisive society, because partisans cannot as easily stoke social tensions by relying on false facts or exaggerated claims to support conflicting positions. Thus, a central task of contemporary public law is to accelerate a politics of learning whereby democracy improves a public reason focused on evaluating policy consequences. Government should be shaped into an instrument that learns from the analysis of policy consequences made available from newly available technologies of information.1 Greater computer capacity is generating more empirical analysis.2 The Internet permits the rise of prediction markets that forecast policy results even before the policies are implemented.3 The Internet also creates a dispersed media that specializes in particular topics and methodologies, gathers diverse information, and funnels salient facts about policy to legislators and citizens.4 But a public reason focused on policy consequences will improve only if our laws facilitate it. For instance, constitutional federalism must be reinvigorated to permit greater experimentation across jurisdictions, because with the rise of empiricism, decentralization has more value for social learning today than ever before.5 Congress should include mandates for experiments within its own legislation making policy initiatives contain the platforms for their own selfimprovement.6 Creating a contemporary politics of democratic updating on the basis of facts is a matter both of great historical interest and of enormous importance to our future. In the historical sweep of ideas, a government more focused on learning from new information moves toward fulfilling the Enlightenment dream of a politics of reason—but a reason based not on the abstractions of the French Revolution, but instead on the hard facts of the more empirical tradition predominating in Britain. By displacing religion from the center of politics, the Enlightenment removed issues by their nature not susceptible to factual resolution, permitting a focus on policies that could be improved by information.7 The better democratic updating afforded by modern technology can similarly increase social harmony and prosperity by facilitating policies that actually deliver the goods. For the future, a more consequentially informed politics is an urgent necessity. The same technological acceleration that potentially creates a more information-rich politics also generates a wide range of technological innovation—from nanotechnology to biotechnology to [AI] artificial intelligence. Although these technologies offer unparalleled benefits to mankind, they may also create catastrophic risks, such as rapid environmental degradation and new weapons of mass destruction.8 Only a democracy able to rapidly assimilate the facts is likely to be able to avoid disaster and reap the benefits inherent in the technology that is transforming our world at a faster pace than ever before. Every industry that touches on information—book publishing, newspapers, and college education to name just a few—is undergoing a continuous series of revolutionary changes as new technology permits delivery of more information more quickly at lower cost. The same changes that are creating innovation in such private industries can also quickly create innovation in social governance. But the difference between information-intensive private industries and political institutions is that the latter lack the strong competitive framework for these revolutions to occur spontaneously. This Essay thus attempts to set out a blueprint for reform to make better use of some available information technologies. Part I describes the reality of technology acceleration as the acceleration both creates the tools for democratic updating and prompts its necessity. Technological acceleration is the most important development of our time—more important even than globalization. Although technologists have described and discussed its significance, its implications for law and political structure have been barely noticed. Part II briefly discusses how better social knowledge can change political results. A premise of the claim is that some political disagreements revolve about facts, not simply values. As a result, better social knowledge can help democracies design policies to achieve widely shared goals. Social knowledge energizes citizens to act on those encompassing interests, like improved public education, because they come to better recognize the policy instruments to advance those interests. Better social knowledge provides better incentives for citizens to vote on these interests. Part III considers the mechanisms for creating a contemporary politics of democratic updating that begins to meet the needs of the age of accelerating technology. It focuses on two of the new resources that can have substantial synergies in improving social common knowledge and shows how an increase in common knowledge can systematically improve political results by providing better incentives for citizens to work for encompassing social goods. First, Part III considers the improvement in empirical analysis of social policy that flows from increasing computational capacity. It then discusses how specialized and innovative media does much more than disseminate opinions: it widely distributes facts and factual analysis. The combination of these technologies can better discipline experts and representatives, providing stronger incentives for them to update on the basis of new facts. Part IV discusses the information-eliciting rules that will maximize the impact of new technologies of information. These steps include a program of restoring, where possible, governmental structures that permit appropriate decentralization for experimentation, empirical testing, and learning. Congress and regulatory agencies should structure legislation and regulations to include social experiments when such experiments would help resolve disputed matters of policy. The Supreme Court should generally refrain from imposing new substantive rights for the nation so that it is easier to evaluate the consequences of different bundles of rights chosen by the states. But it should also protect the dispersed media, like blogs, from discriminatory laws, because this dispersed media plays a crucial role in modern policy evaluation. In short, the Supreme Court needs to emphasize a jurisprudence fostering social discovery and the political branches need to create frameworks for better social learning. Constitutive structures encouraging and evaluating experimentation become more valuable in an age where better evaluation of social experiments is possible. I. TECHNOLOGICAL ACCELERATION It is the premise of this Essay that technological acceleration is occurring and that our political system must adapt to the world it is creating. The case for technological acceleration rests on three mutually supporting kinds of evidence. First, from the longest-term perspective, epochal change has sped up: the transitions from hunter-gatherer society to agricultural society to the industrial age each took progressively less time to occur, and our transition to an information society is taking less time still. Second, from a technological perspective, computational power is increasing exponentially, and increasing computational power facilitates the growth of other society-changing technologies like biotechnology and nanotechnology. Third, even from our contemporary perspective, technology now changes the world on a yearly basis both in terms of hard data, like the amount of information created, and in terms of more subjective measures, like the social changes wrought by social media. From the longest-term perspective, it seems clear that technological change is accelerating and, with it, the basic shape of human society and culture is changing.9 Anthropologists suggest that for 100,000 years, members of the human species were hunter-gather- ers.10 About 10,000 years ago humans made a transition to agricultural society.11 With the advent of the Industrial Revolution, the West transformed itself into a society that thrived on manufacturing.12 Since 1950, the world has been rapidly entering the information age.13 Each of the completed epochs has been marked by a transition to substantially higher growth rates.14 The period between each epoch has become very substantially shorter.15 Thus, there is reason to extrapolate to even more and faster transitions in the future. This evolution is consistent with a more fine-grained evaluation of human development. Recently, the historian Ian Morris has rated societies in the last 15,000 years on their level of development through objective benchmarks, such as energy capture.16 The graph shows relatively steady, if modest, growth when plotted on a log linear scale, but in the last 100 years development has jumped to become sharply exponential.17 Morris concludes that these patterns suggest that there may be four times as much social development in the world in the next 100 years than there has been in the last 14,000.18 The inventor and engineer Ray Kurzweil has dubbed this phenomenon of faster transitions “the law of accelerating returns.”19 Seeking to strengthen the case for exponential change, he has looked back to the dawn of life to show that even evolution seems to make transitions to higher organisms ever faster.20 In a more granulated way, he has considered important events of the last 1000 years to show that the periods between extraordinary advances, such as great scientific discoveries and technological inventions, have decreased.21 Thus, both outside and within the great epochs of recorded human history, the story of acceleration is similar. The technology of computation provides the second perspective on accelerating change. The easiest way to grasp this perspective is to consider Moore’s Law. Moore’s Law—named after Gordon Moore, one of the founders of Intel—is the observation that the number of transistors that can be fitted onto a computer chip doubles every eighteen months to two years.22 This prediction, which has been approximately accurate for the last forty years,23 means that almost every aspect of the digital world—from computational calculation power to computer memory—is growing in density at a similarly exponential rate.24 Moore’s Law reflects the rapid rise of computers to become the fundamental engine of mankind in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.25 The power of exponential growth is hard to overstate. As the economist Robert Lucas has said, once you start thinking about exponential growth, it is hard to think about anything else.26 The computational power in a cell phone today is a thousand times greater and a million times less expensive than all the computing power housed at MIT in 1965.27 Projecting forward, the computing power of computers twenty-five years from now is likely to prove a million times more powerful than computing power today. To be sure, many people have been predicting the imminent death of Moore’s Law for a substantial period now,29 but it has nevertheless continued. Intel—a company that has a substantial interest in accurately telling software makers what to expect—projects that Moore’s Law will continue at least until 2029.30 Ray Kurzweil shows that Moore’s Law is actually part of a more general exponential computation growth that has been gaining force for over a 100 years.31 Integrated circuits replaced transistors that previously replaced vacuum tubes that in their time had replaced electromechanical methods of computation.32 Through all of these changes in the mechanisms of computation, its power increased at an exponential rate.33 This perspective suggests that other methods under research—from carbon nanotechnology to optical computing to quantum computing—are likely to continue growing exponentially even when silicon-based computing reaches its physical limits.34 Focusing on the exponential increase in hardware capability may actually understate the acceleration in computational capacity in two ways. First, a study considering developments in a computer task using a benchmark for measuring computer speed over a fifteen-year period suggests that the improvements in software algorithms improved performance even more than the increase in hardware capability.35 Second, computers are interconnected more than ever before through the Internet, and these connections increase collective capacity, not only because of the increasing density among computer connections, but because of the increasing density of connections among humans made possible by computers. The salient feature of computers’ exponential growth is their tremendous range of application compared to previous improvements. Almost everything in the modern world can be improved by adding an independent source of computational power. That is why computational improvement has a far greater social effect than improvements in technologies of old. Energy, medicine, and communication are now being continually transformed by the increase in computational power.36 As I will discuss in Part II, even the formulation of new hypotheses in natural and social science will likely be aided by computers in the near future. The final perspective on accelerating technology is the experience that the contemporary world provides. Technology changes the whole tenor of life more rapidly than ever before. At the most basic level, technological products change faster.37 Repeated visits to a modern electronics store—or even a grocery store—reveal a whole new line of products within very few years. In contrast, someone visiting a store in 1910 and then again in 1920—let alone in 1810 and 1820—would not have noticed much difference. Even cultural generations move faster. Facebook, for instance, has changed the way college students relate in only a few years,38 whereas the tenor of college life would not have seemed very different to students in 1920 and 1960. Our current subjective sense of accelerating technology is also backed by more objective evidence from the contemporary world. Accelerating amounts of information are being generated.39 Information, of course, is a proxy for knowledge. Consistent with this general observation, we experience exponential growth in practical technical knowledge, as evidenced by the rise in patent applications.40 Thus, the combination of data from our present life, together with the more sweeping historical and technological perspectives, makes a compelling case that technological acceleration is occurring. It is this technological acceleration that creates both the capacity and the need for improving collective decision making. As technology accelerates, it creates new phenomena, from climate change to biotechnology to artificial intelligence of a human-like capacity. These technologies may themselves have very large positive or negative externalities and may require government decisions about their prohibition, regulation, or subsidization to forestall harms and capture their full benefits. They may also cause social dislocations, from unemployment to terrorism, that also require certain collective decisions. Society can best handle these crises not only by making better social policy to address them directly but by improving social policy more generally to create both more resources and more social harmony to endure them. Thus, society must deploy information technology in the service of democratic updating if it is to manage technological acceleration

#### Effective regulations solve extinction

Matus 14 [Kira Matus, PhD, Havard University. Associate Head and Associate Professor, Division of Public Policy, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. "Existential risk: challenges for risk regulation." Risk and Regulation (Winter 2014). https://futureoflife.org/data/documents/Existential%20Risk%20Resources%20(2015-08-24).pdf?x93895]

There is a trend in many areas towards attention to ‘big’ risks. Financial regulation has become increasingly concerned with so‐called systemic risks. Others, and not just Hollywood blockbusters, have been attracted to the study of civilization‐destroying catastrophic risks. Indeed, the OECD has become increasingly interested in ‘high level’ risks and ways in which different national governments seek to prepare for and manage actual events, such as the aftermath of major earthquakes, or the response to a terrorist attack. The notion of ‘existential’ risk might be adding to the cacophony of emerging ‘big’ risk concerns. However, existential risk deserves special attention as it fundamentally adds to our understanding of particular types of risks, and it also challenges common wisdom regarding actions designed to support continued survival.

What is existential risk? We can approach this question by looking at several attributes. The first attribute is what, in fact, is at risk. One set of existential risks are those that threaten survival. These are the acute catastrophes, i.e. the idea that particular events’ impacts are likely to extinguish civilization. Such risks have been identified when it comes to asteroids, nuclear war, and other largescale events that undermine the possibility for survival in general, or, at least, in large regions. A second set is based on the idea that existential risks are not just about physical survival, but about the survival of ways of life. In other words, certain risks are seen as threatening established ways of doing things, cultures, social relationships, and understandings of the ‘good life’. There is, of course, much disagreement about what the good life constitutes, and therefore there will always be disagreement as to what exactly an existential risk constitutes.

A second attribute is the degree to which an existential risk is triggered by a single catastrophic incident. Existential risks arise not merely from one‐off large incidents, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, nuclear meltdowns or, indeed, asteroid hits. Rather, existential risks are about complex, inter‐related processes that result in cascading effects that move across social systems. The overall impact of these system changes could result in the types of physical or cultural destruction that is the focus of the first two perspectives.

Whether triggered by catastrophic events or complex cascades, standard operating procedures are unlikely to be sufficient for dealing with existential risks; instead, this is a space in which improvisation and creativity are required. A third attribute of existential risks is the challenge they present to standard approaches to risk regulation. Existential risks are defined by their cross‐systematic nature; a failure within one system (say, finance) has not just catastrophic implications for the sector in question, but threatens the survival of another system (say, the environment, as funding for particular measures dries up). In other words, the focus of existential risks is not just on the systemic level, it focuses on the cross‐ systemic dimension that is even more difficult to predict and assess than attempts aimed at establishing activities that are of ‘systemic’ relevance by regulatory systems that tend to be narrowly focused and independent from each other. Existential risks are characterized by a fourth feature, namely the idea that existential risks lead to responses based upon fear. Individuals are confronted with fears about their survival (death) and about the meaning of their lives. This aspect of existential risk is particularly troublesome in an age of low trust in authority and, consequently, a political style that is intolerant of ‘blame free’ spaces. In the absence of confidence in public authority, few options remain. For some, the solution will rely on framework plans, pop intellectuals and other fashionable ideas that seem to offer redemption from the fear of extinction. Others will prefer to ‘go it alone’ and seek to develop their own plans for survival, noting that risk taking is, after all, an individual choice. Others, again, will deny the legitimacy of public authority and veer towards those choices that have been legitimized by their own communities. Finally, some will deny that existential risks exist in the first place. In other words, individual responses to existential risks vary considerably and pose challenges for any risk management and communication strategy.

#### Unregulated tech diffuses globally---acquisition by omnicidal non-state actors risks extinction via super-pathogens, eco-terrorism, and planetoid bombs.

Torres 21 (Phil Torres, Former writer for Future of Life Institute, Former Affiliate Scholar at the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, M.A. in Neuroscience from Brandeis University, Ph.D. candidate at Leibniz Universität Hannover; “International Criminal Law and the Future of Humanity: A Theory of the Crime of Omnicide;” 03-08-21, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3777140>, TM)

3.2 The Greatest Threats Arise from Nonstate Actors. Since the Neolithic Revolution some 12,000 years ago, groups of people—tribes, city-states, kingdoms, countries, and empires—have invariably possessed a greater potential to cause harm than individuals or small collections of individuals within those groups. For example, the Roman Empire considered as a cohesive entity was more powerful than any Roman citizen, just as Nazi Germany had more resources to leverage against the Jewish people than any single antisemite. (This idea finds expression in Max Weber’s famous characterization of the state as possessing a “monopoly of the legitimate use of violence within a given territory.”70) But this dynamic is quickly changing: the difference in “violence capacity” between state and nonstate actors is narrowing as a result of the growing power and accessibility of dual-use emerging technologies, which are almost universally being developed at an exponential or superexponential pace, in accordance with the so-called Law of Accelerating Returns, which subsumes more specific tends like Moore’s Law, Huang’s law, the Carlson curve, Dennard scaling, Keck’s law, Kryder’s law, and so on. As the “power and accessibility” locution 71 implies, there are two crucial features of such technologies, namely:

(i) Omniviolence thesis. The growing power of emerging technologies means a lower ratio of “killers to killed,” or “K/K ratio,” per incident, a phenomenon that Daniel Deudney neologizes as “omniviolence.” Consider a non-lethal recent case that exemplifies this trend: the 2016 Dyn 72 cyberattack. This distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack may have been perpetrated by a single “angry gamer.”73 Yet an extraordinary number of major websites were disrupted: Airbnb, Amazon, BBC, The Boston Globe, CNN, Comcast, FiveThirtyEight, Fox News, The Guardian, iHeartRadio, Imgur, National Hockey League, Netflix, The New York Times, PayPal, Pinterest, Pixlr, Reddit, SoundCloud, Squarespace, Spotify, Starbucks, Storify, the Swedish Government, Tumblr, Twitter, Verizon Communications, Visa, Vox Media, Walgreens, The Wall Street Journal, Wired, Yelp, and Zillow. This is a non-exhaustive list of the websites affected, which numbered more 74 than 60 in total. Thus, the “affecter-to-affected ratio,” so to speak, of this attack was extremely low: one person managed to take down a vast constellation of websites that hundreds of millions of people visit and depend upon every day. The point is that this trend of mass empowerment can be found within virtually every domain of emerging technology, including biotechnology, synthetic biology, nanotechnology, drone technology, and artificial intelligence. Whereas in the past, bioterrorism took the form of poisoning wells with carcasses contaminated with the plague, soon it could take the form of synthesizing a super-pathogen that combines the lethality of rabies, the incurability of Ebola, the contagiousness of the common cold, and the long incubation period of HIV. Whereas in the 75 past, destroying an enemy civilization required a physical attack involving tens or hundreds of thousands of soldiers, today a nuclear electromagnetic pulse (NEMP) could fry the electrical infrastructure of an entire country. Whereas in the past, annihilating Earth’s biosphere was technically impossible, future self-replicating nanobots could potentially disassemble all organic matter around the world, thus resulting in a lifeless, barren planet. And so on.

(ii) Democratization thesis. This refers to the phenomenon of dual-use emerging technologies becoming increasingly accessible to the demos. When combined with (i), it implies that omniviolence is being distributed among state and nonstate actors—i.e., the K/K ratio is falling while the number of potential “killers” that instantiate the first “K” is growing.

Historically speaking, the first actor—a state—to acquire the technological ability to unilaterally destroy the world was the United States, sometime around 1948 or 1949, when the United States stockpiled enough nuclear weapons, about 100 in total, to have single-handedly initiated a worldwide nuclear winter. I choose the number “100” here because a 2008 study found that a regional “nuclear exchange involving 100 Hiroshima-size bombs (15 kilotons) on cities in the subtropics” could effectively “lower temperatures regionally and globally for several years, open up new holes in the ozone layer protecting the Earth from harmful radiation, reduce global precipitation by about 10 percent, and trigger massive crop failures.” Thus, bracketing the nontrivial 76 fact that many weapons built since World War II have a far greater explosive yield than 15 kilotons of TNT, we can crudely estimate when countries acquired the capacity to unilaterally cause a global nuclear winter by identifying the years during which their arsenals exceeded 100 nuclear weapons. On this criterion—for perspective, consider that the United State’s “Castle Bravo” weapon was equivalent to 15 megatons of TNT, while the Soviet Union’s “Tsar Bomba” had an extraordinary 58 megaton yield—the Soviet Union joined the club of potential world-destroyers at least by 1952, the United Kingdom at least by 1962, China at least by 1971, France at least by 1973, and other countries like Pakistan, India, and Israel perhaps by the 2010s, depending on the make-up of their arsenals.77 Thus, since World War II, the number of entities with doomsday capabilities has grown from zero to eight.

But the democratization of dual-use emerging technologies is rapidly transforming this predicament by multiplying the number of not only state but, far more importantly, nonstate actors having the capacity to unilaterally destroy the world. As I have previously discussed, there are four axes along which this trend, which I have elsewhere dubbed the “threat of universal unilateralism,” is unfolding. In brief, these are:

(i) The intelligence threshold that must be exceeded to effect large-scale destruction is lowering. This fact is humorously, but accurately, captured by Eliezer Yudkowsky’s so-called “Moore’s Law of Mad Science,” which states that “every eighteen months, the minimum IQ necessary to destroy the world drops by one point.” (ii) The information threshold that one must exceed to use 78 a wide range of emerging technologies in a competent manner is also falling. For example, the genomes of many of the most dangerous pathogens, including Ebola and smallpox, are readily accessible online, thus making such information easy to copy-paste onto one’s computer. (iii) The skill threshold that one must exceed to convert one's know-that into actionable know-how is dropping as well. Perhaps the most conspicuous example comes from synthetic biology, which is “explicitly devoted to the minimization of the importance of tacit knowledge.” The BioBricks 79 Foundation’s standardization of biological entities and devices like digital-to-biological converters are also relevant here. Yet the irrelevance of tacit knowledge may be especially salient with respect to molecular nanotechnology—e.g., nanofactories that can manufacture virtually any technical product for virtually zero cost given a digital blueprint, source of energy, and feedstock molecule like acetone or acetylene.81 And finally, (iv) the materials and equipment necessary for omniviolence are rapidly becoming more widely available and affordable. For example, the advent of nanofactories would make it possible to produce super-high-quality technical products of all sorts at almost no cost, and third-generation laser enrichment technologies such as SILEX (whereby uranium isotopes are separated by laser excitation) could enable small groups or lone individuals to produce weapons-grade uranium without the need for costly, large centrifuges.82

To couch the implications of these four trends in terms of the 2016 Dyn cyberattack, it is no longer unreasonable to ask in the wake of a major incident spanning multiple countries and affects millions of people whether the perpetrator is a state actor like Russia or North Korea, or someone in [their] ~~her or his~~ basement, with limited knowledge of computer systems or how to initiate a DDoS attack, using a $1,000 computer. To underline this point, consider the following two scenarios that could potentially cause the extinction of humanity. Both illustrate the fact that, as Benjamin Wittes and Gabriella Blum observe, greater technological capabilities entail greater susceptibility to harm; in their words, “technologies that expand the power to attack necessarily expand vulnerability to attack.”83 However, for reasons relating to “information hazards,”84 I have not chosen the most effective ways of bringing about human extinction that scholars in the nascent field of “existential risk studies” have privately devised (and kept secret within the community for information-hazard reasons), nor will I go into much detail about the logistics of actually realizing these scenarios. The simple point is merely to emphasize that we are, indeed, entering a new era of unprecedentedly distributed destructive capabilities.

Scenario 1: The CRISPR/Cas9 system consists of a segment of DNA from bacterial immune systems—CRISPR—and a protein that acts as “molecular scissors” capable of cutting DNA at target sequences—Cas9—which are specified by an RNA guide molecule. This system has enabled scientists to alter the genomes of organisms with unprecedented precision. Now consider “gene drives,” or genetic mechanisms that enable a segment of DNA to be inherited by an organism’s offspring at a probability of greater than 50 percent, even when the allele expressed by the gene is deleterious to the organism. Gene drives are found in nature, but advancements in synthetic biology are enabling scientists to create them artificially. Combining these two technologies: CRISPR/Cas9 and gene drives will enable the synthesis of genes that propagate through and decimate entire populations of organisms. At the extreme, so-called “suppression drives” that “reduce the population of the target species (for example by damaging a gene with a function essential to survival or reproduction)” could precipitate the extinction of the affected species.85

Now imagine that a terrorist sets up a “biohacker” lab with some basic synthetic biology capabilities. It will soon be feasible for a group or lone wolf to create suppression drives that target, for example, the primary pollinators: bees, wasps, moths, butterflies, and beetles. If these short-generation species were to perish, the result would be a cascade of disasters that E.O. Wilson adumbrates as follows, to quote him at length:

A majority of flowering plants, upon being deprived of their pollinators, cease to reproduce. Most herbaceous plant species among them spiral down to extinction. Insect-pollinated shrubs and trees hang on for a few more years, in rare cases of up to centuries. The great majority of birds and other land vertebrates, now denied the specialized foliage, fruits, and insect prey on which they feed, follow the plants into oblivion. The soil remains largely unturned, accelerating plant decline, because insects, not earthworms as generally supposed, are the principal turners and renewers of the soil. Populations of fungi and bacteria explode and remain at a peak over a few years while metabolizing the dead plant and animal material that piles up. Wind-pollinated grasses and a handful of fern and conifer species spread over much of the deforested terrain, then decline to some extent as the soil deteriorates. The human species survives, able to fall back on wind-pollinated grains and marine fishing. But amid widespread starvation during the first several decades, human populations plunge to a small fraction of their former level. The wars for control of the dwindling resources, the suffering, and the tumultuous decline to dark-age barbarism would be unprecedented in human history.86

In sum, CRISPR/Cas9 plus gene drives will open the door to unprecedentedly effective omnicidal attacks.

Scenario 2: The human expansion into space has historically coincided with the militarization of space. That is to say, the very first human-made artifact to reach space was the V2 ballistic missile built by Nazi Germany. The militarization of space continues today, with President Donald Trump, for example, announcing in 2018 the creation of a “United States Space Force” branch of the Armed Forces by 2020. But the situation is becoming more complicated as space simultaneously becomes increasingly privatized. Private companies are already delivering supplies to the International Space Station (ISS), and some plan to deliver satellites and offer tourists trips up to 50 miles above the ground, where the mesosphere becomes the thermosphere. Even more, molecular nanotechnology, which would enable one to manipulate matter with absolute atomic precision, could open up the space frontier to most everyone.87 In particular, nanofactories might enable groups and even individuals with no prior knowledge of rocket science and no manufacturing skills to build their own orbital spacecraft.88

The implications of this are unsettling, not just because more objects in space would increase the probability of an accidental Kessler syndrome (whereby shrapnel initiates a positivefeedback cascade that destroys all satellites in the Lower Earth Orbit), but because of the so-called “deflection dilemma.” This arises from the fact that technologies capable of redirecting larger asteroids or comets away from Earth could also be used to direct them toward Earth, a possibility taken seriously by many astronomers. The idea is simply that Earth is not safe from extraterrestrial impacts, a view that scientists almost unanimously rejected until the Alvarez hypothesis was vindicated by tests on the Chicxulub crater in 1990. In other words, there have been major impact events in the past and there will be more in the future. Hence, it is critical that humanity designs and builds spacecraft that could nudge incoming celestial bodies past Earth. But the dual usability of such technologies would also enable [malevolent actors] “~~madmen~~”—to borrow Sagan’s preferred term90—to potentially annihilate humanity by converting otherwise non-threatening asteroids or comets into “planetoid bombs” that smash into Earth and, in doing so, initiate a global impact winter of the sort that killed-off the non-avian dinosaurs 66 million years ago. Given the democratization of space technologies, this scenario could become increasingly probable in the coming decades.

These two scenarios illustrate the proposition that nonstate actors could plausibly bring about an omnicidal catastrophe with existing and emerging dual-use technologies. Indeed, state actors are far less likely to attempt to cause human extinction than nonstate actors, since states generally value their continued existence. For example, if humanity were to go extinct, then aspiring global autocrats (perhaps Vladimir Putin or Kim Jung-un) would be unable to fulfill their megalomaniacal ambitions. Similarly, if Hitler had destroyed the world in 1941, his vision of a Thousand Year Reich would not have been realizable. Yet Sagan notes that

in the winter and spring of 1945, Hitler ordered Germany to be destroyed—even “what the people need for elementary survival”—because the surviving Germans had “betrayed” him, and at any rate were “inferior” to those who had already died. If Hitler had nuclear weapons, the threat of a counterstrike by Allied nuclear weapons, had there been any, is unlikely to have dissuaded him. It might have encouraged him.91

The point is that under normal circumstances, states are pro-human-survival; they are much less likely to attempt an omnicidal attack than nonstate actors, who may be motivated by a range of “kill everyone” ideologies. In previous papers, I have outlined a six-part typology of groups/individuals that engender what I call “agential risks,” which are defined as follows:

Agential risk: the risk posed by any agent who could initiate an existential catastrophe in the presence of sufficiently powerful dual-use technologies either on purpose or by accident.92

Not all of the six agential risk types are germane to the present discussion, since this discussion is limited to the particular existential risk of human extinction (see section 4 for additional scenarios outlined by Bostrom ). These are the three agential risk types that are relevant: 93

(1) Omnicidal ecoterrorists, or individuals who believe that the biosphere, or Gaian system, would be better off if humans were to disappear entirely.

(2) Omnicidal ethicists, or individuals who believe that humanity should go extinct for moral reasons and that this should happen involuntarily (“pro-mortalism”).

(3) Omnicidal idiosyncratic actors, a catch-all category that subsumes individuals who harbor a death wish for humanity for idiosyncratic reasons, which might arise from sadistic, anti-humanist, misanthropic, etc. proclivities.

Although no scientific surveys have yet been conducted to assess the prevalence of omnicidal ideologies in society (such surveys would likely encounter the problem known as “Lizardman’s Constant” ), I have elsewhere catalogued a number of historical groups and individuals who almost 94 certainly would have brought about human extinction if only the means had been available.95 Convincing the reader of this point goes beyond the scope of this paper; I will thus refer them to previous work. For the nonce, I will proceed on the assumption that a nontrivial number of omnicidal agents exist in the world—that is to say, while the percentage of the global population with omnicidal urges is quite small, the absolute number is worrisomely large. This fact is enough to take the issue seriously, since as John Sotos calculates, the probability of any single individual successfully causing human extinction need be only minuscule for this to accumulate over space and time to more or less guarantee doom on timescales relevant to contemporary civilization. More 96 specifically, Sotos shows that a 1-in-100 chance of only a few hundred agents releasing a speciesdestroying pathogen yields virtually certain doom within just 100 years or so.97

#### U.S. model is key to stable nano---checks gray goo, super-weapons, and eco-collapse

Dennis 6 (Lindsay V., JD Candidate – Temple University School of Law, “Nanotechnology: Unique Science Requires Unique Solutions”, Temple Journal of Science, Technology & Environmental Law, Spring, 25 Temp. J. Sci. Tech. & Envtl. L. 87, Lexis)

Nanotechnology, a newly developing field merging science and technology, promises a future of open-ended potential. [6](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n6) Its scientific limits are unknown, and its myriad uses cross the boundaries of the technical, mechanical and medical fields. [7](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n7) Substantial research [8](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n8) has led scientists, [9](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n9) politicians [10](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n10) and academicians [11](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n11) to believe that nanotechnology has the potential to profoundly change the economy and to improve the national standard of living. [12](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n12) In addition, nanotechnology may touch every facet of human life because its products cross the boundaries of the most important industries, including electronics, biomedical and pharmaceutical  [\*89]  industries, and energy production. [13](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n13) In the future, nanotechnology could ensure longer, healthier lives with the reduction or elimination of life-threatening diseases, [14](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n14) a cleaner planet with pollution remediation and emission-free energy, [15](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n15) and the innumerable benefits of increased information technology. [16](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n16) However, certain uses, such as advanced drug delivery systems, [17](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n17) have given rise to an ethical debate similar to that surrounding cloning and stem cell research. [18](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n18) Moreover, some analysts have theorized that nanotechnology may endanger humankind with more dangerous warfare and weapons of terrorism, [19](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n19) and that nanotechnology may lead to artificial intelligence beyond human control. [20](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n20) The widespread use of nanotechnology far in the future threatens to alter the societal framework and create what has been called "gray goo." [21](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n21) Because nanotechnology has the potential to improve the products that most of us rely on in our daily lives, but also imperil society as we know it, we should research, monitor and regulate nanotechnology for the public good with trustworthy systems, and set up pervasive controls over its research, development, and deployment. In addition, its substantial impacts on existing regulations should be ascertained, and solutions incorporated into the regulatory framework. This paper addresses these concerns and provides potential solutions. Part I outlines the development of nanotechnology. Parts II and III explore the current and theoretical future applications of nanotechnology, and its potential side-effects. Then, Part IV analyzes the government's current role in monitoring nanotechnology, and the regulatory mechanisms available to manage or eliminate the negative implications of nanotechnology. Part V considers the creation of an Emerging Technologies Department as a possible solution to maximize the benefits and minimize the detrimental effects of nanotechnology. Lastly, Part VI examines certain environmental regulations to provide an example of nanotechnology's impact on existing regulatory schema.  [\*90]  Part I: Nanotechnology Defined   Nanoscience is the study of the fundamental principles of molecules and structures with at least one dimension roughly between 1 and 100 nanometers (one-billionth of a meter, or 10[su'-9']), otherwise known as the "nanoscale." [22](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n22) Called nanostructures, these are the smallest solid things possible to make. [23](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n23) Nanofabrication, or nanoscale manufacturing, is the process by which nanostructures are built. [24](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n24) Top-down nanofabrication creates nanostructures by taking a large structure and making it smaller, whereas bottom-up nanofabrication starts with individual atoms to build nanostructures. [25](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n25) Nanotechnology applies nanostructures into useful nanoscale devices. [26](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n26) The nanoscale is distinctive because it is the size scale where the properties of materials like conductivity, [27](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n27) hardness, [28](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n28) or melting point [29](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n29) are no longer similar to the properties of these same materials at the macro level. [30](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n30) Atom interactions, averaged out of existence in bulk material, give rise to unique properties. [31](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n31) In  [\*91]  nanotech research, scientists take advantage of these unique properties to develop products with applications that would not otherwise be available. [32](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n32) Although some products using nanotechnology are currently on the market, [33](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n33) nanotechnology is primarily in the research and development stage. [34](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n34) Because nanoparticles are remarkably small, tools specific to nanotechnology have been created to develop useful nanostructures and devices. [35](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n35) Two techniques exclusive to nanotechnology are self-assembly, and nanofabrication using nanotubes and nanorods. [36](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n36)  [\*92]  In self-assembly, particular atoms or molecules are put on a surface or preconstructed nanostructure, causing the molecules to align themselves into particular positions. [37](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n37) Although self-assembly is "probably the most important of the nanoscale fabrication techniques because of its generality, its ability to produce structures at different length-scales, and its low cost," [38](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n38) most nanostructures are built starting with larger molecules as components. [39](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n39) Nanotubes [40](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n40) and nanorods, [41](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n41) the first true nanomaterials engineered at the molecular level, are two examples of these building blocks. [42](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n42) They exhibit astounding physical and electrical properties. [43](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n43) Certain nanotubes have tensile strength in excess of 60 times high-grade steel while remaining light and flexible. [44](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n44) Currently, nanotubes are used in tennis rackets and golf clubs to make them lighter and stronger. [45](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n45) Part II: Nanotechnology's Uses   Researching and manipulating the properties of nanostructures are important for a number of reasons, including, most basically, to gain an understanding of how matter is constructed, and more practically, to use these unique properties to develop unique products. [46](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n46) Nanoproducts can be divided into four general categories: [47](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n47) smart materials, [48](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n48) sensors, [49](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n49) biomedical applications, [50](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n50) and optics and electronics. [51](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n51)  [\*93]  A "smart" material incorporates in its design a capability to perform several specific tasks. [52](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n52) In nanotechnology, that design is done at the molecular level. [53](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n53) Clothing, enhanced with nanotechnology, is a useful application of a smart material at the nanoscale. Certain nano-enhanced clothing contains fibers that have tiny whiskers that repel liquids, reduce static and resist stains without affecting feel. [54](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n54) Nano-enhanced rubber represents another application of a nanoscale smart material. [55](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n55) Tires using nanotech-components increase skid resistance by reducing friction, which reduces abrasion and makes the tires last longer. [56](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n56) The tires may be on the market "in the next few years" according to the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI). [57](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n57) Theoretically, this rubber could be used on a variety of products, ranging from tires to windshield wiper blades to athletic shoes. [58](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n58) A more complex nanotechnology smart material is a photorefractive polymer. [59](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n59) Acting as a nanoscale "barcode," these polymers could be used as information storage devices with a storage density exceeding the best available magnetic storage structures. [60](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n60) Nano-sensors may "revolutionize much of the medical care and the food packaging industries," [61](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n61) as well as the environmental field because of their ability to detect toxins and pollutants at fewer than ten molecules. [62](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n62) As the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recognizes: Protection of human health and ecosystems requires rapid, precise sensors capable of detecting pollutants at the molecular level. Major improvements in process control, compliance monitoring, and environmental decision-making could  [\*94]  be achieved if more accurate, less costly, more sensitive techniques were available. Nanotechnology offers the possibility of sensors enabled to be selective or specific, detect multiple analytes, and monitor their presence in real time. [63](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n63) Examples of research in sensors include the development of nano-sensors for efficient and rapid biochemical detection of pollutants; sensors capable of continuous measurement over large areas; integration of nano-enabled sensors for real-time continuous monitoring; and sensors that utilize "lab-on-a-chip" technology. [64](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n64) All fundamental life processes occur at the nanoscale, making it the ideal scale at which to fight diseases. [65](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n65) Two quintessential examples of biomedical applications of nanotechnology are advanced drug delivery systems and nano-enhanced drugs. [66](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n66) The promise of advanced drug delivery systems lies in that they direct drug molecules only to where they are needed in the body. [67](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n67) One example is focusing chemotherapy on the site of the tumor, instead of the whole body, thereby improving the drug's effectiveness while decreasing its unpleasant side-effects. [68](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n68) Other researchers are working to develop nanoparticles that target and trick cancer cells into absorbing certain nanoparticles. [69](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n69) These nanoparticles would then kill tumors from within, avoiding the destruction of healthy cells, as opposed to the indiscriminate damage caused by traditional chemotherapy. [70](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n70) Nano-enhanced suicide inhibitors [71](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n71) limit enzymatic activity by forcing naturally occurring enzymes to form bonds with the nanostructured molecule. [72](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n72) This may treat conditions such as epilepsy and depression because of the enzyme action component involved in these conditions. [73](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n73) Lastly, nanotechnology has the potential to revolutionize the electronics and optics fields. [74](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n74) For instance, nanotechnology has the potential to produce clean,  [\*95]  renewable solar power. [75](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n75) Through a process called artificial photosynthesis, solar energy is produced by using nanostructures based on molecules which capture light and separate positive and negative charges. [76](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n76) Certain Swiss watches and bathroom scales are illuminated through a nanotech procedure that transforms captured sunlight into an electrical current. [77](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n77) In the electronics field, nanostructures offer many different ways to increase memory storage by substantially reducing the size of memory bits and thereby increasing the density of magnetic memory, increasing efficiency, and decreasing cost. [78](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n78) One example is storing memory bits as magnetic nanodots, which can be reduced in size until they reach the super-paramagnetic limit, the smallest possible magnetic memory structure. [79](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n79) Advances in electronics and computing brought on by nanotechnology could allow reconfigurable, "thinking" spacecraft. [80](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n80) Some uses of nano-products already on the market include suntan lotions and skin creams, tennis balls that bounce longer, faster-burning rocket fuel additives, and new cancer treatments. [81](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n81) Solar cells in roofing tiles and siding that provide electricity for homes and facilities, and the prototypic tires, supra, may be on the market in the next few years. [82](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n82) The industry expects advanced drug delivery systems with implantable devices that automatically administer drugs and sensor drug levels, and medical diagnostic tools such as cancer-tagging mechanisms to be on the market in the next two to five years. [83](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n83) It is nearly impossible to foresee what developments to expect in nanotechnology in the decades to come. [84](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n84) Nonetheless, the book Engines of Creation presented one vision of the possibilities of advanced nanotechnology. [85](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n85) Nano-machines could be designed to construct any product, from mundane items such as a chair, to exciting items such as a rocket engine. [86](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n86) These "assemblers" could also be programmed to build copies of themselves. [87](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n87) Known as "replicators," these nano-machines could alter the world by producing an exponential quantity of themselves that are to be put to work as assemblers. [88](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n88) The development of assemblers could advance the space  [\*96]  exploration program, [89](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n89) biomedical field, [90](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n90) and even repair the damage done to the world's ecological systems. [91](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n91) Over time, production costs may sharply decrease because the assemblers will be able to construct all future products from an original blueprint at virtually no additional cost. [92](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n92) Part III: Nanotechnology's Side-Effects   With the good, however, comes the bad. The "gray goo problem," the most well-known unwanted potential consequence of the spread of nanotechnology, [93](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n93) arises when replicators and assemblers produce almost anything, and subsequently spread uncontrolled, obliterating natural organisms and replacing them with nano-enhanced organisms. [94](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n94) A more foreseeable issue is environmental contamination. [95](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n95) The EPA noted   As nanotechnology progresses from research and development to commercialization and use, it is likely that manufactured nanomaterials and nanoproducts will be released into the environment... . The unique features of manufactured nanomaterials and a lack of experience with these materials hinder the risk evaluation that is needed to inform decisions about pollution prevention, environmental clean-up and other control measures, including regulation. Beyond the usual concerns for most toxic materials ... the adequacy of current toxicity tests for chemicals needs to be assessed ... . To the extent that nanoparticles  [\*97]  ... elicit novel biological responses, these concerns need to be accounted for in toxicity testing to provide relevant information needed for risk assessment to inform decision making. [96](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n96)   In addition, nanotechnology could change the face of global warfare and terrorism. [97](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n97) Assemblers could be used to duplicate existing weapons out of superior materials, and chemical and biological weapons could be created with nano-enhanced components. [98](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n98) Modern detection systems would be inadequate to detect nano-enhanced weapons built with innocuous materials such as carbon. [99](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n99) Luckily, nanotechnology offers responses to these problems, and researchers are already tackling these issues. [100](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n100) "Labs-on-a-chip," a sensor system the size of a microchip, could be woven into soldiers' uniforms to detect toxins immediately. [101](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n101) Adding smart materials could make soldiers' uniforms resistant to certain chemical and biological agents. [102](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n102) Nanotechnology also enhances threats against citizens. Drugs and bugs (electronic surveillance devices) could be used by police states to monitor and control its citizenry. [103](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n103) Viruses could be created that target specific genetic characteristics. [104](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n104) Not only is the development of technologically advanced, devastating weaponry itself a hazardous effect of nanotechnology, but also, millions of dollars have already been spent researching potential uses of nanotechnology in the military sphere, [105](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n105) thus diverting funds from more beneficial uses such as biomedical applications and clean energy. However, these negative effects are not inevitable. By analyzing the scope of potential drawbacks accompanying these research investments, lawmakers can institute regulatory controls that could mitigate these problems.  [\*98]  Part IV: Maximizing Benefits, Minimizing Catastrophe   To minimize or eliminate the problems associated with nanotechnology, while maximizing the beneficial effects, nanotechnology research and development should be monitored and regulated by "trustworthy systems." [106](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n106) Currently, the federal government oversees a massive funding and research program with the purpose of "ensuring United States global leadership in the development and application of nanotechnology." [107](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n107) Nonetheless, as nanotechnology becomes more prevalent, more thorough regulation may be necessary. [108](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n108) Nanotechnology may greatly impact some of the largest revenue producing industries in the United States, such as the pharmaceutical and medical fields, utilities and power generation, and computer electronics. [109](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n109) Thus, it is clear that nanotechnology will likely touch every facet of human life. In addition, these powerful industries have been known to promote profits over human safety, [110](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&brand=&_m=82ab008e42cdd5d1d23cfd1d96b430bb&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAb&_md5=f86737f923f2df1de12147f84a019421&focBudTerms=Nanotechnology%3A+Unique+Science+Requires+Unique+Solutions&focBudSel=all#n110) one of the reasons for their stringent regulation.  [\*99]

#### Unregulated nanotech risks extinction.

Behreandt 22 (Dennis Behreandt, MA from St. Norbert’s College, BA from Ripon College, cites Luis Del Monte, Award-winning physicist, author of *Nanoweapons: A Growing Threat to Humanity*, CEO of Del Monte & Associates, Inc.,; “Nanotechnology: A Double-Edged Sword;” 01-31-22, The New American, Vol. 38, No. 02, <https://thenewamerican.com/nanotechnology-a-double-edged-sword/>, TM) [language modified, denoted by brackets]

“Gray goo” is not a current threat, and likely won’t be, at least for the near-term future. More likely is that nanotech innovations could be used for evil purposes. “Unfortunately, as with nuclear technology, it is far easier to create destructive uses for nanotechnology than constructive ones,” wrote famed computing pioneer and Sun Microsystems co-founder Bill Joy in a now-famous essay for Wired magazine in April 2000. In that essay, titled “Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us,” Joy wrote, “Nanotechnology has clear military and terrorist uses, and you [can] ~~need not be suicidal to~~ release a massively destructive nanotechnological device — such devices can be built to be selectively destructive, affecting, for example, only a certain geographical area or a group of people who are genetically distinct.”

Scientists and researchers concerned with “existential risks” continue to point to nanotechnology as one innovation that poses distinctly significant threats to the survival of human civilization.

Physicist and author Luis Del Monte, who reports he was previously “a Honeywell Executive Director,” states that during his career “he led hundreds of physicists, engineers, and technology professionals engaged in micro to nanotechnology development for the Department of Defense (DoD) and commercial applications.” In 2017 he authored the book Nanoweapons: A Growing Threat to Humanity.

According to Del Monte, the first “singularity” of the sort envisioned by Ray Kurzweil — when general AI exceeds human cognitive capabilities — will lead to a second singularity involving self-replicating nanobots. Writing for HuffPost in 2017, Del Monte argued, “Given the strong symbiotic relationship between computer power and nanotechnology, we may see both technologies progressing faster than their historical trends. My rationale is that an advance in one technology fosters advances in the other.” He continued, “I judge this synergy may accelerate the advancement of both technologies.”

On his own website, Del Monte described what he foresaw as the outcome of the development of self-replicating nanobots. His vision differs from Drexler’s gray goo (which Drexler in recent years has backed away from a bit), but is likely more realistic.

“Self-replicating nanobots are the ultimate invention,” Del Monte said, pointing out that they would help solve problems on one hand, while proving extremely dangerous on the other. “In medicine,” he pointed out, “they will flow through our blood preventing diseases and curing injuries. In military applications, they will have the capability to completely destroy an adversary, from its populace to its structures.”

Unfortunately, he noted, nanobots could escape control, presenting considerable risks as artificial analogues to biological microbes such as bacteria and viruses. More complex biological systems, including mammals such as humans, have developed sophisticated immune systems in parallel with the existence of biological pathogens, and thus have an innate ability to protect themselves — if not always successfully — from them. There would be no such protection from artificial microbes — nanobots — if they escaped control.

Enter the extra-factual: In Total Recall, the blockbuster film adaptation of the Philip K. Dick short story We Can Remember It for You Wholesale, a future technology was used to implant realistic memories into the human mind. With nanotechnologies such as those being explored by several DARPA-funded labs, such a future might not be far off.

“Strategic nanoweapons, like their nuclear counterparts, pose a threat to humanity,” Del Monte argues. “The major issue is control. Will we be able to deploy strategic nanoweapons and maintain control over them? If, for example, we lost control of self-replicating nanobots, we would face a technological plague, one that we currently have no way of stopping.”

Nanotechnology is used widely today in many diverse applications, and continuing research promises near-term future innovation resulting in outcomes likely to be similar to forecasts from early innovators and researchers in the technology. Tied directly to AI and enabled by advanced 5G communications technologies, nanotechnologies are both a boon and a danger to mankind. While they will allow fabulous advances — especially in medicine and in materials science — they also have direct application to reality-distorting and reality-obliterating outcomes such as the metaverse plan outlined by Facebook.

#### Unregulated AI risks extinction---defense doesn’t assume interactions of multiple simultaneous threats

Pamlin, 15 -- Dennis Pamlin, Executive Project Manager of the Global Risks Global Challenges Foundation, and Stuart Armstrong, James Martin Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute of the Oxford Martin School at University of Oxford, Global Challenges Foundation, February, http://globalchallenges.org/wp-content/uploads/12-Risks-with-infinite-impact.pdf

If a safe artificial intelligence is developed, this provides a great resource for improving outcomes and mitigating all types of risk.585 Artificial intelligence risks worsening nanotechnology risks, by allowing nanomachines and weapons to be designed with intelligence and without centralised control, overcoming the main potential weaknesses of these machines586 by putting planning abilities on the other side. Conversely, nanotechnology abilities worsen artificial intelligence risk, by giving AI extra tools which it could use for developing its power base.587 Nanotechnology and synthetic biology could allow the efficient creation of vaccines and other tools to combat global pandemics.588 Nanotechnology’s increased industrial capacity could allow the creation of large amounts of efficient solar panels to combat climate change, or even potentially the efficient scrubbing of CO2 from the atmosphere.589 Nanotechnology and synthetic biology are sufficiently closely related 590 (both dealing with properties on an atomic scale) for methods developed in one to be ported over to the other, potentially worsening the other risk. They are sufficiently distinct though (a mainly technological versus a mainly biological approach) for countermeasures in one domain not necessarily to be of help in the other. Uncontrolled or malicious synthetic pathogens could wreak great damage on the ecosystem; conversely, controlled and benevolent synthetic creations could act to improve and heal current ecological damage.

#### Scenario 2 is Nuclear Security:

#### Emerging tech regulatory experimentation is vital to nuclear security – new tech simultaneously increases and decreases the risk – only effective regulation solves

Roth 21 [Nickolas Roth is director of the Stimson Center’s Nuclear Security Program and International Nuclear Security Forum, Master of Public Policy from the University of Maryland, 10-5-2021 https://www.stimson.org/2021/a-multilevel-approach-to-addressing-emerging-technologies-in-nuclear-security/]

Risks and opportunities

Emerging technologies present a range of unique risks and opportunities for the security of radiological and nuclear materials, both from operational and institutional points of view. In some cases, technologies that mature and become more easily accessible to adversaries can close capability gaps that would otherwise prevent material theft or sabotage. Others have the potential to strengthen physical protection capabilities, but only after development, implementation and integration into existing plans and procedures. Because the potential impacts of these technological developments are not yet fully understood, they must compete for resources and attention with more immediate and well-defined priorities.

The most immediately apparent risk is that of technological surprise: a novel application of an emerging technology that presents a threat to radiological and nuclear R/N material security that planners and regulators fail to anticipate, suddenly leaving material vulnerable to theft or sabotage and operators without a way to address it. For example, recent attacks using Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) such recent attacks against oil processing facilities in Saudi Arabia demonstrate the vulnerability of even well-defended targets against a new adversary capability for which they lack effective countermeasures.3 4 Technological surprise is an ever- present risk in emerging technologies because they often result from the convergence of multiple lines of technical development into an application whose effectiveness may not become apparent until used by an adversary.

Another related risk that emerging technologies present is the introduction of new vulnerabilities as emerging technologies are adopted at various points in R/N material production, storage and use. Technologies that enable increased digitalization, connectivity and automation can improve the efficiency of nuclear power plants, but they also underscore the challenge that new attack surfaces represent. Although there have been no known successful cyberattacks that successfully compromised the operational controls of nuclear power plants, malware and software malfunctions have previously rendered key monitoring systems inaccessible5 and infected internal networks at nuclear plants.6 Other cyberattacks against non- nuclear infrastructure, such as the May 2021 ransomware attack against Colonial Pipeline’s billing system, demonstrate that attackers need not access operational technology systems to severely impact operations.7

The risk of missed opportunities to harness positive effects of emerging technologies remains an important one for the R/N security mission space, particularly because of safety and security concerns and implementation procedures that may inhibit technology adoption and integration into physical protection systems (PPS) or other security infrastructure. Longstanding challenges to R/N security, such as the effect of cognitive stress and fatigue on security personnel,8 insider threats,9 and the challenge of providing realistic training for low-frequency security events, may lessen as emerging technologies provide more potential solutions, but only if those solutions are identified and implemented effectively. Similarly, opportunities to use UAS in security applications are growing along with the technology’s capabilities,10 but the pace and scope of adoption will ultimately determine the impact of this development on global R/N security. Failure to apply these innovations to nuclear security will leave material at unnecessary risk.

#### Single terrorist use is likely and even a crude device kills a million people, causes nuc war and collapses the international order

Bunn 17 [Matthew Bunn is a professor of practice at the Harvard Kennedy School. A former advisor in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy 9-28-2017 https://thebulletin.org/2017/09/the-effects-of-a-single-terrorist-nuclear-bomb/]

The escalating threats between North Korea and the United States make it easy to forget the “nuclear nightmare,” as former US Secretary of Defense William J. Perry put it, that could result even from the use of just a single terrorist nuclear bomb in the heart of a major city.

At the risk of repeating the vast literature on the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—and the substantial literature surrounding nuclear tests and simulations since then—we attempt to spell out here the likely consequences of the explosion of a single terrorist nuclear bomb on a major city, and its subsequent ripple effects on the rest of the planet. Depending on where and when it was detonated, the blast, fire, initial radiation, and long-term radioactive fallout from such a bomb could leave the heart of a major city a smoldering radioactive ruin, killing tens or hundreds of thousands of people and wounding hundreds of thousands more. Vast areas would have to be evacuated and might be uninhabitable for years. Economic, political, and social aftershocks would ripple throughout the world. A single terrorist nuclear bomb would change history. The country attacked—and the world—would never be the same.

The idea of terrorists accomplishing such a thing is, unfortunately, not out of the question; it is far easier to make a crude, unsafe, unreliable nuclear explosive that might fit in the back of a truck than it is to make a safe, reliable weapon of known yield that can be delivered by missile or combat aircraft. Numerous government studies have concluded that it is plausible that a sophisticated terrorist group could make a crude bomb if they got the needed nuclear material. And in the last quarter century, there have been some 20 seizures of stolen, weapons-usable nuclear material, and at least two terrorist groups have made significant efforts to acquire nuclear bombs.

Terrorist use of an actual nuclear bomb is a low-probability event—but the immensity of the consequences means that even a small chance is enough to justify an intensive effort to reduce the risk. Fortunately, since the early 1990s, countries around the world have significantly reduced the danger—but it remains very real, and there is more to do to ensure this nightmare never becomes reality.

Brighter than a thousand suns. Imagine a crude terrorist nuclear bomb—containing a chunk of highly enriched uranium just under the size of a regulation bowling ball, or a much smaller chunk of plutonium—suddenly detonating inside a delivery van parked in the heart of a major city. Such a terrorist bomb would release as much as 10 kilotons of explosive energy, or the equivalent of 10,000 tons of conventional explosives, a volume of explosives large enough to fill all the cars of a mile-long train. In a millionth of a second, all of that energy would be released inside that small ball of nuclear material, creating temperatures and pressures as high as those at the center of the sun. That furious energy would explode outward, releasing its energy in three main ways: a powerful blast wave; intense heat; and deadly radiation.

The ball would expand almost instantly into a fireball the width of four football fields, incinerating essentially everything and everyone within. The heated fireball would rise, sucking in air from below and expanding above, creating the mushroom cloud that has become the symbol of the terror of the nuclear age. The ionized plasma in the fireball would create a localized electromagnetic pulse more powerful than lightning, shorting out communications and electronics nearby—though most would be destroyed by the bomb’s other effects in any case. (Estimates of heat, blast, and radiation effects in this article are drawn primarily from Alex Wellerstein’s “Nukemap,” which itself comes from declassified US government data, such as the 660-page government textbook The Effects of Nuclear Weapons.)

At the instant of its detonation, the bomb would also release an intense burst of gamma and neutron radiation which would be lethal for nearly everyone directly exposed within about two-thirds of a mile from the center of the blast. (Those who happened to be shielded by being inside, or having buildings between them and the bomb, would be partly protected—in some cases, reducing their doses by ten times or more.)

The nuclear flash from the heat of the fireball would radiate in both visible light and the infrared; it would be “brighter than a thousand suns,” in the words of the title of a book describing the development of nuclear weapons—adapting a phrase from the Hindu epic the Bhagavad-Gita. Anyone who looked directly at the blast would be blinded. The heat from the fireball would ignite fires and horribly burn everyone exposed outside at distances of nearly a mile away. (In the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum, visitors gaze in horror at the bones of a human hand embedded in glass melted by the bomb.)

No one has burned a city on that scale in the decades since World War II, so it is difficult to predict the full extent of the fire damage that would occur from the explosion of a nuclear bomb in one of today’s cities. Modern glass, steel, and concrete buildings would presumably be less flammable than the wood-and-rice-paper housing of Hiroshima or Nagasaki in the 1940s—but many questions remain, including exactly how thousands of broken gas lines might contribute to fire damage (as they did in Dresden during World War II). On 9/11, the buildings of the World Trade Center proved to be much more vulnerable to fire damage than had been expected. Ultimately, even a crude terrorist nuclear bomb would carry the possibility that the countless fires touched off by the explosion would coalesce into a devastating firestorm, as occurred at Hiroshima. In a firestorm, the rising column of hot air from the massive fire sucks in the air from all around, creating hurricane-force winds; everything flammable and everything alive within the firestorm would be consumed. The fires and the dust from the blast would make it extremely difficult for either rescuers or survivors to see.

The explosion would create a powerful blast wave rushing out in every direction. For more than a quarter-mile all around the blast, the pulse of pressure would be over 20 pounds per square inch above atmospheric pressure (known as “overpressure”), destroying or severely damaging even sturdy buildings. The combination of blast, heat, and radiation would kill virtually everyone in this zone. The blast would be accompanied by winds of many hundreds of miles per hour.

The damage from the explosion would extend far beyond this inner zone of almost total death. Out to more than half a mile, the blast would be strong enough to collapse most residential buildings and create a serious danger that office buildings would topple over, killing those inside and those in the path of the rubble. (On the other hand, the office towers of a modern city would tend to block the blast wave in some areas, providing partial protection from the blast, as well as from the heat and radiation.) In that zone, almost anything made of wood would be destroyed: Roofs would cave in, windows would shatter, gas lines would rupture. Telephone poles, street lamps, and utility lines would be severely damaged. Many roads would be blocked by mountains of wreckage. In this zone, many people would be killed or injured in building collapses, or trapped under the rubble; many more would be burned, blinded, or injured by flying debris. In many cases, their charred skin would become ragged and fall off in sheets.

The effects of the detonation would act in deadly synergy. The smashed materials of buildings broken by the blast would be far easier for the fires to ignite than intact structures. The effects of radiation would make it far more difficult for burned and injured people to recover. The combination of burns, radiation, and physical injuries would cause far more death and suffering than any one of them would alone.

The silent killer. The bomb’s immediate effects would be followed by a slow, lingering killer: radioactive fallout. A bomb detonated at ground level would dig a huge crater, hurling tons of earth and debris thousands of feet into the sky. Sucked into the rising fireball, these particles would mix with the radioactive remainders of the bomb, and over the next few hours or days, the debris would rain down for miles downwind. Depending on weather and wind patterns, the fallout could actually be deadlier and make a far larger area unusable than the blast itself. Acute radiation sickness from the initial radiation pulse and the fallout would likely affect tens of thousands of people. Depending on the dose, they might suffer from vomiting, watery diarrhea, fever, sores, loss of hair, and bone marrow depletion. Some would survive; some would die within days; some would take months to die. Cancer rates among the survivors would rise. Women would be more vulnerable than men—children and infants especially so.

Much of the radiation from a nuclear blast is short-lived; radiation levels even a few days after the blast would be far below those in the first hours. For those not killed or terribly wounded by the initial explosion, the best advice would be to take shelter in a basement for at least several days. But many would be too terrified to stay. Thousands of panic-stricken people might receive deadly doses of radiation as they fled from their homes. Some of the radiation will be longer-lived; areas most severely affected would have to be abandoned for many years after the attack. The combination of radioactive fallout and the devastation of nearly all life-sustaining infrastructure over a vast area would mean that hundreds of thousands of people would have to evacuate.

Ambulances to nowhere. The explosion would also destroy much of the city’s ability to respond. Hospitals would be leveled, doctors and nurses killed and wounded, ambulances destroyed. (In Hiroshima, 42 of 45 hospitals were destroyed or severely damaged, and 270 of 300 doctors were killed.) Resources that survived outside the zone of destruction would be utterly overwhelmed. Hospitals have no ability to cope with tens or hundreds of thousands of terribly burned and injured people all at once; the United States, for example, has 1,760 burn beds in hospitals nationwide, of which a third are available on any given day.

And the problem would not be limited to hospitals; firefighters, for example, would have little ability to cope with thousands of fires raging out of control at once. Fire stations and equipment would be destroyed in the affected area, and firemen killed, along with police and other emergency responders. Some of the first responders may become casualties themselves, from radioactive fallout, fire, and collapsing buildings. Over much of the affected area, communications would be destroyed, by both the physical effects and the electromagnetic pulse from the explosion.

Better preparation for such a disaster could save thousands of lives—but ultimately, there is no way any city can genuinely be prepared for a catastrophe on such a historic scale, occurring in a flash, with zero warning. Rescue and recovery attempts would be impeded by the destruction of most of the needed personnel and equipment, and by fire, debris, radiation, fear, lack of communications, and the immense scale of the disaster. The US military and the national guard could provide critically important capabilities—but federal plans assume that “no significant federal response” would be available for 24-to-72 hours. Many of those burned and injured would wait in vain for help, food, or water, perhaps for days.

The scale of death and suffering. How many would die in such an event, and how many would be terribly wounded, would depend on where and when the bomb was detonated, what the weather conditions were at the time, how successful the response was in helping the wounded survivors, and more. Many estimates of casualties are based on census data, which reflect where people sleep at night; if the attack occurred in the middle of a workday, the numbers of people crowded into the office towers at the heart of many modern cities would be far higher. The daytime population of Manhattan, for example, is roughly twice its nighttime population; in Midtown on a typical workday, there are an estimated 980,000 people per square mile. A 10-kiloton weapon detonated there might well kill half a million people—not counting those who might die of radiation sickness from the fallout. (These effects were analyzed in great detail in the Rand Corporation’s Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack and the British Medical Journal’s “Nuclear terrorism.”)

On a typical day, the wind would blow the fallout north, seriously contaminating virtually all of Manhattan above Gramercy Park; people living as far away as Stamford, Connecticut would likely have to evacuate.

Seriously injured survivors would greatly outnumber the dead, their suffering magnified by the complete inadequacy of available help. The psychological and social effects—overwhelming sadness, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, myriad forms of anxiety—would be profound and long-lasting.

The scenario we have been describing is a groundburst. An airburst—such as might occur, for example, if terrorists put their bomb in a small aircraft they had purchased or rented—would extend the blast and fire effects over a wider area, killing and injuring even larger numbers of people immediately. But an airburst would not have the same lingering effects from fallout as a groundburst, because the rock and dirt would not be sucked up into the fireball and contaminated. The 10-kiloton blast we have been discussing is likely toward the high end of what terrorists could plausibly achieve with a crude, improvised bomb, but even a 1-kiloton blast would be a catastrophic event, having a deadly radius between one-third and one-half that of a 10-kiloton blast.

These hundreds of thousands of people would not be mere statistics, but countless individual stories of loss—parents, children, entire families; all religions; rich and poor alike—killed or horribly mutilated. Human suffering and tragedy on this scale does not have to be imagined; it can be remembered through the stories of the survivors of the US atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the only times in history when nuclear weapons have been used intentionally against human beings. The pain and suffering caused by those bombings are almost beyond human comprehension; the eloquent testimony of the Hibakusha—the survivors who passed through the atomic fire—should stand as an eternal reminder of the need to prevent nuclear weapons from ever being used in anger again.

Global economic disaster. The economic impact of such an attack would be enormous. The effects would reverberate for so far and so long that they are difficult to estimate in all their complexity. Hundreds of thousands of people would be too injured or sick to work for weeks or months. Hundreds of thousands more would evacuate to locations far from their jobs. Many places of employment would have to be abandoned because of the radioactive fallout. Insurance companies would reel under the losses; but at the same time, many insurance policies exclude the effects of nuclear attacks—an item insurers considered beyond their ability to cover—so the owners of thousands of buildings would not have the insurance payments needed to cover the cost of fixing them, thousands of companies would go bankrupt, and banks would be left holding an immense number of mortgages that would never be repaid.

Consumer and investor confidence would likely be dramatically affected, as worried people slowed their spending. Enormous new homeland security and military investments would be very likely. If the bomb had come in a shipping container, the targeted country—and possibly others—might stop all containers from entering until it could devise a system for ensuring they could never again be used for such a purpose, throwing a wrench into the gears of global trade for an extended period. (And this might well occur even if a shipping container had not been the means of delivery.)

Even the far smaller 9/11 attacks are estimated to have caused economic aftershocks costing almost $1 trillion even excluding the multi-trillion-dollar costs of the wars that ensued. The cost of a terrorist nuclear attack in a major city would likely be many times higher.

The most severe effects would be local, but the effects of trade disruptions, reduced economic activity, and more would reverberate around the world. Consequently, while some countries may feel that nuclear terrorism is only a concern for the countries most likely to be targeted—such as the United States—in reality it is a threat to everyone, everywhere. In 2005, then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that these global effects would push “tens of millions of people into dire poverty,” creating “a second death toll throughout the developing world.” One recent estimate suggested that a nuclear attack in an urban area would cause a global recession, cutting global Gross Domestic Product by some two percent, and pushing an additional 30 million people in the developing world into extreme poverty.

Desperate dilemmas. In short, an act of nuclear terrorism could rip the heart out of a major city, and cause ripple effects throughout the world. The government of the country attacked would face desperate decisions: How to help the city attacked? How to prevent further attacks? How to respond or retaliate?

Terrorists—either those who committed the attack or others—would probably claim they had more bombs already hidden in other cities (whether they did or not), and threaten to detonate them unless their demands were met. The fear that this might be true could lead people to flee major cities in a large-scale, uncontrolled evacuation. There is very little ability to support the population of major cities in the surrounding countryside. The potential for widespread havoc and economic chaos is very real.

If the detonation took place in the capital of the nation attacked, much of the government might be destroyed. A bomb in Washington, D.C., for example, might kill the President, the Vice President, and many of the members of Congress and the Supreme Court. (Having some plausible national leader survive is a key reason why one cabinet member is always elsewhere on the night of the State of the Union address.) Elaborate, classified plans for “continuity of government” have already been drawn up in a number of countries, but the potential for chaos and confusion—if almost all of a country’s top leaders were killed—would still be enormous. Who, for example, could address the public on what the government would do, and what the public should do, to respond? Could anyone honestly assure the public there would be no further attacks? If they did, who would believe them? In the United States, given the practical impossibility of passing major legislation with Congress in ruins and most of its members dead or seriously injured, some have argued for passing legislation in advance giving the government emergency powers to act—and creating procedures, for example, for legitimately replacing most of the House of Representatives. But to date, no such legislative preparations have been made.

In what would inevitably be a desperate effort to prevent further attacks, traditional standards of civil liberties might be jettisoned, at least for a time—particularly when people realized that the fuel for the bomb that had done such damage would easily have fit in a suitcase. Old rules limiting search and surveillance could be among the first to go. The government might well impose martial law as it sought to control the situation, hunt for the perpetrators, and find any additional weapons or nuclear materials they might have. Even the far smaller attacks of 9/11 saw the US government authorizing torture of prisoners and mass electronic surveillance.

And what standards of international order and law would still hold sway? The country attacked might well lash out militarily at whatever countries it thought might bear a portion of responsibility. (A terrifying description of the kinds of discussions that might occur appeared in Brian Jenkins’ book, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?) With the nuclear threshold already crossed in this scenario—at least by terrorists—it is conceivable that some of the resulting conflicts might escalate to nuclear use. International politics could become more brutish and violent, with powerful states taking unilateral action, by force if necessary, in an effort to ensure their security. After 9/11, the United States led the invasions of two sovereign nations, in wars that have since cost hundreds of thousands of lives and trillions of dollars, while plunging a region into chaos. Would the reaction after a far more devastating nuclear attack be any less?

In particular, the idea that each state can decide for itself how much security to provide for nuclear weapons and their essential ingredients would likely be seen as totally unacceptable following such an attack. Powerful states would likely demand that others surrender their nuclear material or accept foreign troops (or other imposed security measures) to guard it.

That could well be the first step toward a more profound transformation of the international system. After such a catastrophe, major powers may feel compelled to more freely engage in preventive war, seizing territories they worry might otherwise be terrorist safe havens, and taking other steps they see as brutal but necessary to preserve their security. For this reason, foreign policy analyst Stephen Krasner has argued that “conventional rules of sovereignty would be abandoned overnight.” Confidence in both the national security institutions of the country attacked and international institutions such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations, which had so manifestly failed to prevent the devastation, might erode. The effect on nuclear weapons policies is hard to predict: One can imagine new nuclear terror driving a new push for nuclear disarmament, but one could also imagine states feeling more certain than ever before that they needed nuclear weapons.

#### The Court has recently narrowed Parker immunity to limit deference to the states in antitrust law

Allensworth 16 [Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School; J.D., Harvard Law School; M.Phil, University of Cambridge; B.A., Yale University, October 2016, ARTICLE: THE NEW ANTITRUST FEDERALISM, 102 Va. L. Rev. 1387]

Introduction

IN just three relatively obscure antitrust cases, 1

[Footnote 1] N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) [hereinafter NC Dental]; FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013); FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992).

the U.S. Supreme Court has quietly revolutionized how states and the federal government share power. These cases addressed a doctrine - unfamiliar to those outside of the field of antitrust law - that grants "state action" immunity from federal antitrust liability 2 and thus marks the thin line that insulates state regulation from wholesale invalidation through federal antitrust lawsuits. 3 For decades, the Court conceived of this line, and the "antitrust federalism" it effected, as a formal question about where the state ended and antitrust liability began. This was the old antitrust federalism: a boundary-drawing exercise that gave strong deference to state regulation. The Court's state action revolution ushers in a new antitrust federalism, one that all but dispenses with the notion of separate spheres in favor of something less deferential to the states - procedural review of state regulation.

Antitrust federalism may be less familiar than its constitutional cousin, but it is just as important - if not more so - to the state-federal balance of power. The Sherman Act forbids anticompetitive restraints of trade and monopolization of markets, and it does not seem to limit these prohibitions to private citizens and corporations. 4 Because regulation often tinkers with the free market economy and tends to create competitive winners and losers, Sherman Act liability for state conduct would severely restrict a state's ability to regulate within its borders. 5 So when [\*1390] the Court extended the reach of the Sherman Act - along with all federal regulation passed under the Commerce Clause - during the New Deal, 6 it became necessary to define an exemption for "state action" or risk the demise of state regulatory autonomy altogether. And state action immunity from the Sherman Act was born. 7

#### But, the current interpretation fails to account for interstate spillovers. Limiting Parker is crucial to establish federal role limiting regulatory externalities

Sack 21 [John Sack, J.D., Duke Law School, Class of 2022, B.S. University of Michigan, 2019, 2021 https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1196&context=djclpp\_sidebar]

III. DOCTRINAL CRITICISM

Although the Court has continued to re-affirm Parker v. Brown’s central holding, many have criticized the Parker doctrine. Both scholars and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have highlighted problems with the doctrine and offered a number of solutions for how to remedy its faults.63

The first common critique of the doctrine is that it does not account for out-of-state economic effects. Unless a regulation runs afoul of another constitutional barrier, no consideration of interstate spillovers applies.64 One need not look farther than Parker itself to see how the state action doctrine can impose costs on out-of-state residents, even though those residents have diminished political capital in the state. At the time Parker was decided, between 90 and 95 percent of raisins produced in California entered interstate commerce and California provided almost all of the nation’s raisins.65 Most American raisin consumers lived outside of California and had no political means to oppose the state’s legislative program, yet they bore the costs of California’s state-sanctioned monopoly.66

Second, similar concerns about political representation animate critiques of Parker immunity. The policy at issue in Parker restricted output and artificially raised prices, two results federal antitrust law generally seeks to prohibit.67 Although the benefits of such a program were borne almost exclusively by California, the costs of the program were incurred by raisin consumers across the nation.68 The political incentives to promote such a program follow closely with economic costs and benefits.69 California raisin producers have a strong incentive to lobby their own government to install such a program, but it would be nearly impossible for non-California residents to challenge such a policy through the normal political channels.70 The government of California is not the appropriate body to properly weigh the benefits to in-state raisin producers with the costs to out-of-state consumers, yet the Parker doctrine grants California per se immunity on federalism grounds.71 Although the California program was implicitly endorsed by Congress, one is just as likely to find similar programs with no similar implicit endorsement.72

The U.S. Constitution embodies a system of federalism where the federal government is sovereign in some respects, and the several states are sovereign in others.73 This system of federalism gives states the power to regulate local matters and the federal government the power to regulate issues that states are less suited to regulate.74 When costs spill over into other states, the national government becomes the appropriate body to regulate the costs and benefits of such a program.75 The Court has recognized such spillover effects, and how political actors, even government entities, can act solely in self-interest.76 Such state self-interest can directly harm consumers outside of its territorial jurisdiction.77

Parker immunity, as it stands, runs counter to longstanding ideals of national unity that harken back to the Founding era. The law has long prohibited states from imposing excessive costs on the nation as a whole, solely for the purpose of furthering its own intrastate policy interests. McCulloch v. Maryland illustrates the Court’s wariness of self-serving state action.78 In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall held that states may not tax the national bank, as they would be wielding power against the whole of the United States, even though the whole of the United States is not represented by each state.79 Similar to a state tax being problematic since it is the part acting on the whole, anticompetitive restraints by the states would unduly impose costs on the nation. The people of the United States, acting through Congress, christened competition and free markets through the Sherman Act.80 Just as one state could not tax the resources of the United States, one state should not be allowed to use state policy to burden the national economy. Because the potential costs to state-created monopolies are so high,81 federal policy should prohibit states from allocating those costs beyond their borders. Any state that wishes to impose monopoly costs outside of its borders to benefit itself and undermine competition should be carefully scrutinized when it does so. This scrutiny would not be fatal-in-fact for the legislation, but it should be enough for states to second-guess an attempt to enrich itself to the detriment of its sister states.

IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

The Sherman Act, and specifically Parker immunity, should be interpreted in light of the above concerns. After all, the Sherman Act is the standard-bearer for the U.S. free market system, and so our interpretation of it should evolve with our understanding of constitutional principles and economic conditions.82 Justice Burger’s concurrence in City of Lafayette elaborates on this point:

Our conceptions of the limits imposed by federalism are bound to evolve, just as our understanding of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause has evolved. Consequently, since we find it appropriate to allow the ambit of the Sherman Act to expand with evolving perceptions of congressional power under the Commerce Clause, a similar process should occur with respect to “state action” analysis under Parker. That is, we should not treat the result in the Parker case as cast in bronze; rather, the scope of the Sherman Act’s power should parallel the developing concepts of American federalism.83

As states impose costs on each other through state-sanctioned monopolies, the Court’s understanding of federalism and the Commerce Clause counsels scrutiny of the Parker doctrine. An entirely new doctrine is not necessary to curtail Parker immunity. Rather, the issue can be resolved by applying Parker immunity in light of the American dual system of federalism and the Commerce Clause. Modern scholarship critiques the lack of concern for interstate spillovers. By that token, the modern Parker doctrine fails to account for economic efficiency and undermines political representation values meant to be protected by federalism.84 So while scholars almost universally recognize that interstate economic spillovers are problematic, there is no consensus on what remedy is most appropriate.

#### Failure to hold states accountable for spillovers destroys optimal state experimentation – correctly “right sizing” regulation impossible without accounting for externalities in interjurisdictional competition

Adler 20 [Jonathan H. Adler, Case Western University School of Law, 2020 <https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3058&context=faculty_publications>]

The race-to-the-bottom theory presumes that interjurisdictional competition creates a prisoner’s dilemma for states. Each state wants to attract industry for the economic benefits that it provides. Each state also wishes to maintain an optimal level of environmental protection. However, in order to attract industry, the theory holds, states will lower environmental safeguards so as to reduce the regulatory burden they impose upon firms. This competition exerts downward pressure on environmental safeguards as firms seek to locate in states where regulatory burdens are the lowest, and states seek to attract industry by lessening the economic burden of environmental safeguards. Because the potential benefits of lax regulation are concentrated among relatively few firms, these firms can effectively oppose the general public’s preference for environmental protection regulation. This will lead to social welfare losses even if environmental harm does not spill over from one state to another. The result, according to the theory, is the systematic under-regulation of environmental harms, and a need for federal intervention.26

The race-to-the-bottom theory may have had some basis in the 1960s and 1970s, but there is little reason to believe that this dynamic inhibits state regulatory efforts today, particularly given how aggressive many states are in environmental policy. Empirical evidence that states race to relax their environmental regulations in pursuit of outside investment is decidedly lacking. If the prospect of interstate competition discourages state-level environmental regulation, it is hard to explain why state environmental regulation often preceded federal intervention and why many states adopt more stringent measures than federal regulations require. Numerous studies have been conducted attempting to determine whether a race-to-the-bottom can be observed in the context of environmental regulation, and they have generally failed to find any evidence that environmental quality worsens when states are given more flexibility to set their own priorities.27 Indeed, some studies have \found precisely the opposite: that when states have more flexibility to set their own environmental priorities they increase their efforts.28

None of the above should be taken as an argument against all federal environmental regulation. For just as the federal government is overly interventionist in localized environmental concerns, the federal government is unduly absent in areas where a federal presence is most necessary. That is, the undue centralization of some environmental concerns co-exists with substantial federal abdication from concerns the federal government should be addressing. The federal government devotes relatively little of its regulatory resources on those matters for which the federal government possesses a comparative advantage and abdicates its responsibility to provide the data and knowledge base necessary for successful environmental regulation at all levels of government.

It is often remarked that environmental problems do not respect state borders. This is unquestionably true, and the observation provides ample justification for federal measures to address transboundary pollution problems.29 Where pollution or other environmental problems span jurisdictional borders there is less reason to believe state and local jurisdictions will respond adequately.

Consider a simple transboundary pollution problem involving two states, A and B. When economic activity in State A causes pollution in State B, State A is unlikely to adopt measures to prevent the resulting environmental harm because it would bear the primary costs of any such regulatory measures, without capturing the primary benefits. Put simply, State A is unlikely to impose costs on itself to benefit State B. Absent some external controls or dispute resolution system, the presence of interstate spillovers can actually encourage polices that externalize environmental harms, such as subsidizing development near jurisdictional borders so as to ensure that environmental harms fall disproportionately “downstream.” Policymakers in State B may wish to take action, but they will be unable to control pollution created in State A without State A’s cooperation. Even where polluting activity imposes substantial environmental harm within State A, the externalization of a portion of the harm is likely to result in the adoption of less optimal environmental controls.

#### No link turns – knee-jerk defenses of Parker on federalism grounds are under-theorized – the aff’s links are more robustly aligned with federalism

Meese 21 [Alan J. Meese, Ball Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School and Co-Director, William & Mary Center for the Study of Law and Markets. 16 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 115, Fall 2021, Lexis]

The Court has repeatedly and unanimously claimed that considerations of "federalism and state sovereignty" justify state action immunity and thus counsel against Sherman Act preemption of state-imposed or state-authorized restraints. Numerous scholars agree. In particular, the Court and its academic defenders claim that applying the Act to state-imposed restraints would unduly interfere with states' ability to serve as laboratories of democracy, choosing how to regulate their own economies, contrary to the principles of federalism. The vast post- Wickard reach of the Sherman Act reinforces this argument, by facilitating application of the Act to local restraints - including those imposed by state governments - that produce no interstate harm. Indeed, aside from Parker itself, all state action controversies that have reached the Supreme Court, including the Court's most recent pronouncement on the topic, involve local restraints that produce harm confined to a single state. 17 Thus, some have claimed that, given the expansive scope of the Sherman Act, application of the Act to state-imposed restraints would implicitly resurrect the Lochner era, during which the Court invalidated state legislation that unduly restricted private economic autonomy. The state action doctrine, it is said, leaves regulatory choices over local economic activity where they belong, with the people's elected representatives instead of federal judges.

Although the Court decided Parker more than seven decades ago, the "federalism and state sovereignty" rationale for state action immunity remains under-theorized. Some academic articulations of this rationale invoke the Constitution itself, suggesting that preemption of state-imposed restraints [\*121] would be unconstitutional. Other articulations by the Court and scholars vaguely invoke "federalism," "state sovereignty," or both, without claiming that the Constitution prevents Sherman Act preemption of state-imposed restraints. Some scholars have suggested that Parker reflects the application of a federalism canon, albeit without identifying any particular canon. Thus, objective evaluation of Parker's state action defense requires scholars to identify the doctrinal vehicles through which federalism and state sovereignty might influence the meaning of the Act and to determine whether Parker and its progeny constitute faithful application of such principles.

This article evaluates and rejects the claim that considerations of federalism and state sovereignty somehow rebut the strong case for Sherman Act preemption of state-imposed restraints. Instead, consistent application of federalism principles bolsters the case for preemption of state-imposed restraints, like those in Parker, that directly burden interstate commerce and impose interstate harm. At the same time, considerations of federalism also counsel retraction of the scope of the Act and concomitant allocation to the states of exclusive authority over restraints that produce only intrastate harm. The resulting allocation of authority over trade restraints would nearly eliminate the potential conflicts between local regulation and the Sherman Act, conflicts that many claim justify the state action doctrine.

The article identifies two broad categories of arguments that supposedly support the state action doctrine. First, Parker's proponents could claim that one or more constitutional doctrines that protect federalism or state sovereignty somehow prohibit outright Sherman Act preemption of state-imposed restraints. Second, these proponents could argue that such considerations find expression in one or more canons of statutory construction and thereby militate against reading the Sherman Act to preempt such restraints, despite Congress's admitted authority to do so.

The article evaluates the arguments in each category and finds all such arguments wanting. Beginning with the first category, the article demonstrates that no doctrine of constitutional law requires Parker's state action doctrine. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly concluded that the Framers and Ratifiers adopted the Commerce Clause precisely because of their experience with state-imposed restraints that unduly burdened interstate commerce and imposed harm on out-of-state citizens. According to this historical account, the Clause was designed to empower Congress to prohibit such parochial state legislation, thereby removing barriers to a well-functioning national market and establishing free trade as the rule governing interstate commercial activity.

[\*122] While affirmative statutory preemption was relatively rare during the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries, the Supreme Court read the Commerce Clause to authorize implied preemption of otherwise valid state legislation that directly burdens interstate commerce. Moreover, as the scope of the power has expanded over the past several decades, Congress has repeatedly exercised this authority to preempt state laws regulating local matters in numerous settings. To be sure, independent considerations of state sovereignty can constrain Congress's exercise of the commerce power. However, Sherman Act preemption of state-imposed restraints does not interfere with a state's organization or regulation of itself, officers, or employees and thus does not interfere with any cognizable aspect of state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment, Eleventh Amendment, or inferred from the structure of the Constitution. Thus, preemption of state-imposed restraints like those challenged in Parker is a garden-variety exercise of Congress's commerce power.

To evaluate arguments in the second category, the article identifies three canons of statutory construction that could serve as vehicles for implementing concerns regarding federalism and state sovereignty: (1) the avoidance canon; (2) the federal-state balance canon, and (3) the anti-preemption canon. None of these canons, it is shown, supports Parker's state action doctrine. The article concludes that Sherman Act preemption of state-imposed restraints is so plainly constitutional that the avoidance canon is simply inapposite. The article then applies the federal-state balance and anti-preemption canons. Both canons protect traditional state regulatory spheres from inadvertent national intrusion, whether by regulation of local private conduct or preemption of state exercise of historic police powers. Far from bolstering the state action doctrine, the application of these two canons reveals that Parker's invocation of federalism and state sovereignty is selective, purporting to solve a problem that the Court itself created. Consistent application of these canons and the federalism principles that inform them actually strengthens the case for Sherman Act preemption, albeit within a much narrower sphere than the Sherman Act currently operates. The federal-state balance canon addresses statutory regulation of private conduct and thus does not speak directly to state action cases such as Parker, where a state itself displaced free competition. 18The canon could, however, apply to hybrid restraints, private agreements encouraged or enforced by the [\*123] state. Academic and judicial proponents of the state action doctrine have expressed concern about possible Sherman Act preemption of state and municipal regulation, including hybrid restraints, of local activities that produce no interstate harm. Such federal oversight, they say, would deprive state and local governments of their status as laboratories of democracy that try out novel solutions, such as hybrid restraints, to local problems. Application of the federal-state balance canon to prevent preemption of laws authorizing such restraints would apparently vindicate these concerns. However, such concerns have much wider application than Sherman Act treatment of state-imposed or state-encouraged restraints. If states are to be sovereign laboratories that experiment with novel solutions to economic problems, they must also retain discretion regarding how to regulate all private restraints - not just hybrid restraints - that produce no interstate harm. Indeed, principled application of the federal-state balance canon would have required the Court to reject the post- Wickard expansion of the Sherman Act to reach all private restraints that produce no interstate harm. The Court instead ignored this canon, vastly expanding the reach of the Act vis a vis private restraints the state has not authorized. This expansion raised the prospect of Sherman Act preemption of local regulation, including regulation authorizing hybrid restraints. Parker and its progeny thwarted such preemption, protecting - to this extent anyway - traditional state regulatory prerogatives. Consistent application of the federal-state balance canon offers a different and more principled solution, namely, restoration of the pre- Wickard boundary between state and federal power over trade restraints and retraction of the scope of the Sherman Act. Such revision of the boundaries between state and federal authority over such activity would nearly eliminate the potential clash between the Sherman Act and local regulation that purportedly induced Parker and its progeny to announce and maintain the state action doctrine. States would remain free to act as laboratories with respect to such restraints, unmolested by the Sherman Act. Restoration of the original federal-state balance in the antitrust context would not eliminate the prospect of Sherman Act preemption of state-imposed or state-encouraged restraints. States could authorize hybrid restraints that directly burden interstate commerce, thereby injuring out-of-state consumers. However, Sherman Act invalidation of such restraints would in fact protect the original federal-state balance, by interdicting the sort of direct burdens on interstate commerce preempted by the Court's pre- Wickard Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The anti-preemption canon fares no better as a justification for the state action doctrine. To be sure, this canon establishes a presumption against [\*124] applying federal statutes in a manner that supersedes the exercise of "historic police powers" over "an area traditionally regulated by the states." However, this canon would not protect the scheme in Parker itself. The scheme in no way exercised historic police powers but instead regulated a domain - interstate commerce - over which Congress traditionally possessed exclusive authority. California's regulation of the price of interstate raisin sales produced substantial interstate harm and thus would not have survived the doctrine of implied preemption in place when Congress enacted the Sherman Act. Preemption of the Parker scheme would have restored the traditional federal-state balance, by invalidating self-interested legislation that directly burdened interstate commerce and imposed substantial harm on out-of-state citizens. What, though, about Parker-like regulation that produces only intrastate harm? Sherman Act preemption of such restraints would certainly interfere with the exercise of historic police powers. Here again, however, application of the anti-preemption canon would solve a problem the Court itself created when it ignored the federal-state balance canon and applied the Sherman Act to private restraints that produced no interstate harm. As noted above, however, principled application of federalism concerns as reflected in the federal-state balance canon would preclude application of the Sherman Act to such restraints - public or private. Restoration of the Sherman Act to its original and more limited scope would eliminate the putative conflict between federal antitrust law and local regulation producing no interstate harm and thus obviate any need to apply the anti-preemption canon. Application of both federalism canons reveals that federalism in this context should be an all-or-nothing proposition. Consistent regard for federalism requires uniform treatment of private contracts "in restraint of trade" and state-imposed restraints that produce the same results. There are two possible forms of consistent treatment: (1) invalidation of all such local restraints, public or private, "across the board," or (2) reducing the scope of the Sherman Act, so that the Act only reaches those restraints - public or private - that produce interstate harm. Recognition that the Court's Sherman Act jurisprudence reflects inconsistent regard for federalism does not itself reveal which consistent approach the Court should take. The article ends by identifying several considerations suggesting that the Court should resolve the modern inconsistency in favor of federalism. Consistent reduction in the scope of the Sherman Act would produce a regime governing interstate commerce that best replicates the regulatory framework that the 1890 Congress - jealous to protect free competition from all threats - anticipated. Proponents of Parker [\*125] who see states as laboratories for economic experimentation should welcome such reform, which, ironically, would result in less preemption of state-created restraints than current law. Part I of this article reviews the content and scope of the Sherman Act during the pre- Wickard era, when the Supreme Court enforced meaningful limits on the scope of the commerce power and the Sherman Act. Part II describes the facts and holding of Parker as well as subsequent decisions elaborating on the scope of state action immunity. This part also details the considerations of federalism and state sovereignty that both the Court and academic proponents of Parker have invoked. Part III reviews the federalism-based objections to Sherman Act preemption that several scholars have raised. Part IV evaluates and rejects the constitutional arguments against such preemption. Part V evaluates and rejects claims that certain canons of statutory construction counsel in favor of Parker's state action immunity. This part concludes that Parker and its progeny rest on a selective respect for federalism and concludes that a principled Sherman Act jurisprudence would consistently enforce or ignore federalism considerations. Part VI briefly contends that the Court should resolve modern doctrinal inconsistency in favor of federalism and reform the scope of the Sherman Act accordingly.

I. The Commerce Power and the Sherman Act: 1890-Present

Passed in 1890, Section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids "contracts, combinations ... and conspiracyies in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States ..." 19Section 2 prohibits monopolization of any "part of the trade or commerce among the several States." 20Each Sherman Act controversy thus requires courts to resolve two questions. Under Section 1, courts must ask: (1) Is the challenged agreement "in restraint of trade" and (2) does the agreement also restrain "commerce among the several States." 21Under Section 2, courts must ask: (1) does the challenged conduct "monopolize" a relevant market and (2) is that monopolized market "part of the trade or commerce among the several States." 22 [\*126] The Sherman Act was an exercise of the commerce power, and Congress drafted the Act against the backdrop of a well-developed jurisprudence defining the scope and nature of that authority. 23While Congress rarely exercised this power before 1890, the Supreme Court had enforced what became known as the "dormant" Commerce Clause. 24The Court constructed a quasi-statutory framework that invalidated all state legislation that regulated "inherently national" subjects of interstate commerce, even absent Congressional action. 25These decisions inferred from Congressional silence that Congress intended that such subjects be "free and untrammeled" from state regulation. 26 State legislation "regulated" such commerce and thus exercised an exclusive power of Congress if it imposed a "direct burden" on such commerce. 27Impacts were "direct" if they imposed economic harm on citizens in other states, raising the prospect that state regulation would produce self-interested results. 28Legislation that impacted such commerce only "indirectly" exceeded the scope of the commerce power and thus survived this regime. 29The result was the allocation of regulatory authority into mutually exclusive spheres, enforced by a doctrine of implied preemption that invalidated state enactments exercising authority reserved for Congress. 30 [\*127] The Court's earliest Sherman Act decisions drew upon this jurisprudence to answer both questions necessary to resolve Sherman Act controversies. 31Agreements were "in restraint of trade" if they directly impacted commerce by producing supracompetitive prices. 32Such agreements only restrained "commerce among the several States" if these direct impacts injured out-of-state consumers. 33Indeed, in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, the Court opined that the Commerce Clause authorized Congress to regulate private agreements producing such direct effects because these restraints produced the same impact on interstate commerce as analogous state-imposed restraints deemed invalid under the Court's Commerce Clause precedents. 34 In 1911, the Court famously reformulated its interpretation of "restraint of trade," in Standard Oil v. United States. 35There the Court held that the Sherman Act only reaches agreements or conduct that restrain trade "unreasonably." 36Soon thereafter, the Court announced that this same standard governed Section 2 analysis. 37Although a different verbal formulation, this Rule of Reason, like the direct/indirect standard, focused on the propensity of a restraint or conduct to produce monopoly or the consequences of monopoly, namely, higher prices, reduced output, or inferior quality. 38However, the Court retained the direct/indirect standard for [\*128] answering the second question posed in Sherman Act controversies, that is, whether a contract in restraint of trade or monopolistic conduct also restrained "commerce among the several States" or monopolized any "part" of "trade or commerce among the several States." 39Thus, the Act reached only those unreasonable restraints or monopolistic conduct that also directly burdened interstate commerce by exercising market power to the detriment of out-of-state consumers. 40 By 1911, then, the Rule of Reason, combined with the direct/standard governing the Act's scope, protected "the free movement of trade ... in the channels of interstate commerce" 41or, as the Court soon put it, "free competition in interstate commerce," from private restraints. 42At the same time, the Court's quasi-statutory Commerce Clause jurisprudence invalidated state legislation that imposed "direct burdens" on interstate commerce. 43This coherent legal regime protected free interstate trade from threats posed by the self-interested public and private actors. 44Implementation of each regime required the Court to ask the same economic question when applying the direct/indirect standard, viz., did the challenged private conduct or legislation directly obstruct or burden interstate commerce. This regime left states and private parties free to adopt regulations or restraints that imposed [\*129] indirect burdens on such commerce, as such provisions posed no threat to out-of-state consumers. This unified competition-protecting regime survived into the 1930s, invalidating private and public direct burdens on interstate commerce. 45Indeed, the Court had no occasion to consider whether the Sherman Act preempted state legislation that directly burdened interstate commerce precisely because the Court's quasi-statutory Commerce Clause jurisprudence itself preempted such restraints, rendering any Sherman Act involvement superfluous. The Court adjusted application of the direct/indirect standard over time in light of changed facts that suggested the existence of interstate harm that prior Courts had not perceived. 46For instance, early decisions, such as United States v. E.C. Knight, held that the Sherman Act did not reach intrastate monopolies, even if such firms sold products across state lines. 47However, beginning with Standard Oil, the Court read the Act (and the commerce power) to reach activities that, while nominally local, "directly" affected interstate commerce by exercising market power to the detriment of out-of-state consumers, narrowing E.C. Knight accordingly. 48While the effective reach of the commerce power and the Sherman Act changed, the interstate harm principle that governed the boundary between state and national power - and the concomitant economic inquiry - remained fixed and unchanging. 49A robust regime of competitive federalism generated regulatory policy, including antitrust policy, governing economic activity that [\*130] produced no interstate harms and thus fell within the exclusive authority of states. This coherent regime and resulting allocation of regulatory power did not survive the 1940s. In Wickard v. Filburn, the Supreme Court famously jettisoned the direct/indirect test as the standard governing the scope of the commerce power, claiming that the standard was mechanical, formalistic and unduly restricted the authority of Congress. 50Instead, the Court said: the Commerce Clause empowered Congress to reach any activity that produced a "substantial economic effect" on interstate commerce, even if the effect was incidental or indirect. 51This novel standard empowered Congress to regulate conduct that produced no interstate harm and thus could not prompt legislation favoring a state's citizens over those of other states. 52 Wickard also implied that state and federal power over local activity was coextensive and thus not mutually exclusive, as the Court had previously maintained for several decades. 53 Wickard was not an antitrust case. However, before the decade was out, in Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar, the Court engrafted Wickard's substantial effects test onto the Sherman Act, overruling five decades of precedent. 54As a result, the Act reached any restraint of trade that induced a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce, even if the restraint's harms were confined to a single state. The Court has applied the Act to intrastate conspiracies between liquor wholesalers, 55a monopolistic scheme to prevent expansion of a single hospital, 56an agreement between lawyers setting title search fees in one county, 57and a trade association's conspiracy to restrict entry by subcontractors working on local building projects. 58 [\*131] Most recently, the Court affirmed the Federal Trade Commission's condemnation of an agreement excluding some individuals from the practice of teeth whitening in one state. 59The Commission had found that the challenged conduct substantially impacted interstate commerce because some affected firms purchased out-of-state equipment and supplies. 60Numerous other decisions have also involved restraints that produced harmless but fortuitous interstate effects. 61 Mandeville Island Farms read a novel principle into the Act, a principle that authorized application of the statute to restraints that threatened no interstate harm. While initially developed to govern private restraints, Mandeville Island Farms' substantial effects test created broad potential to interdict state-imposed restraints of local trade previously deemed beyond the commerce power. 62

II. Parker and its Progeny

Parker v. Brown evaluated the post- Wickard claim that the Sherman Act preempted anti-competitive state regulation. This part describes the facts and holding of Parker as well as subsequent decisions expanding the scope of state action immunity and elaborating upon its rationale. The part ends by detailing the considerations of federalism and state sovereignty that both the Court and academic proponents of Parker have invoked. A. Parker v. Brown Decided shortly after Wickard but before Mandeville Island Farms, Parker v. Brown considered a challenge to California's "Agricultural Prorate Act," as applied to the state's raisin industry. 63The Court properly described the Act as an effort to "restrict competition among growers and maintain prices in the distribution of their commodities to packers[.]" 64The statute empowered a State Agricultural Prorate Commission to propose to growers so-called "pro-rate marketing plans" limiting output and thus raising the prices of agricultural commodities. Proposals became law if 65 percent of growers owning 51 percent or more of acreage devoted to a particular crop voted to approve it. California farms produced 100 percent of the nation's raisin output, and imports accounted for one-sixth of one percent of national raisin consumption. 65Growers generally sold their output to local "packers," who packaged the raisins and sold 90-95 percent to out-of-state purchasers. 66In 1940, the Commission proposed and producers adopted a raisin pro-rate plan. The plan required the state's growers to deliver 70 percent of their output of "standard raisins" to a "program committee" which could only sell raisins at "prevailing market prices" or hold them off the market indefinitely. 67Growers were free to sell the remaining crop through "ordinary commercial channels" at whatever price they wished, albeit only after purchasing a "marketing certificate" authorizing such sales. 68The Act imposed civil penalties, fines and/or imprisonment for violation. 69Thus, the Act coercively replaced the pre-existing regime of free competition between private individuals with market outcomes determined by the State. A dissenting farmer who was both a grower and a packer challenged the program under the Commerce Clause and the Sherman Act. 70The plaintiff [\*133] sought to enjoin officials from enforcing the Act against him, thereby allowing him to continue setting whatever price and output maximized his profits in a free market. 71He argued that such equitable relief was necessary because the Act's "unusual, oppressive and unreasonable" criminal penalties deterred him from waiting to be prosecuted under state law before invoking the Commerce Clause and Sherman Act as "defensive tactics," i.e., as affirmative defenses. 72In short, the plaintiff invoked two possible sources of federal preemption: the Sherman Act and the Commerce Clause. 73 Writing before Wickard, a three-judge district court enjoined the Act. 74The court held that the Prorate Act, while regulating local activity, directly burdened interstate commerce and thus contravened the quasi-statutory regime of implied preemption derived from the Commerce Clause. 75The court invoked with approval various decisions implementing the pre- Wickard regime dividing authority over commercial subjects between states and the national government. 76Given the court's Commerce Clause holding, it did not address the Sherman Act. 77 California appealed to the Supreme Court, which, after oral argument, ordered re-argument and additional briefing, including from the United States [\*134] as Amicus Curiae, on the possible application of the Sherman Act. 78In a brief co-authored by antitrust hawk Thurmond Arnold, the United States argued that both the Sherman Act and the quasi-statutory regime derived from the Commerce Clause preempted California's scheme. The whole point of the Act, the government said, was to ensure that "competition, not combination, should be the law of trade." 79The "end sought," the government continued, was "the prevention of restraints of free competition in business and commercial transactions, which tended to restrict production, raise prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers of goods or services." 80While the Sherman Act did not expressly refer to state enactments, the Court's precedents established that a federal statute preempted any state law "that stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 81 Invoking pre- Wickard antitrust decisions applying the direct/indirect standard, the government contended that California's regulation of local activity, in fact, monopolized the national raisin market and thus increased ( i.e. regulated) the price of raisins sold in interstate commerce. 82There was "no doubt," the government said that "the plan involved in this case controls the market price," which increased thirty percent one year after the adoption of the scheme. 83It did not matter that the growers sold their output to California packers. 84Sherman Act precedent established that agreements to "restrain or control the supply ... entering and moving in interstate commerce" were "a "direct violation'" of the Act. 85Because the plan reduced output and increased the prices paid by packers, the scheme would "undoubtedly directly affect and restrain the supply and price of raisins in interstate commerce." 86The pro-rate plan was "inconsistent with the policy embodied in the Sherman Act" and thus preempted. 87 [\*135] The government's Commerce Clause argument echoed similar themes. "Inherently national subjects" of interstate commerce, the government said, were subject to exclusive congressional control. 88The Court's precedents "regarded as a matter of great consequence whether the burden of a statute fell primarily upon persons outside of the regulating state." 89"If anything was of national commercial importance," the government continued, "the supply and price level of a commodity moving in interstate commerce falls into that category." 90Moreover, the program plainly regulated that subject, granting to a state agency the power to "monopolize the entire national supply of raisins, determine the quantity to be shipped in interstate commerce, and to control the interstate price structure." 91The benefits of the scheme "accrued to California Producers," with the result that "the action of the state is not likely to be subjected to the normal political restraints upon legislation." 92The program did not merely govern a matter of local concern but instead "determined the quantity of raisins which may go to market - and the market is the national interstate market." 93Based on these and other considerations, the government concluded, "the California raisin program is unconstitutional." 94 A unanimous Court rejected both challenges. The Court properly assumed that the Sherman Act would condemn such a program if adopted and enforced solely by private agreement. 95While the scheme limited the output of "local" crops, the resulting harm fell almost entirely on out-of-state [\*136] citizens. These direct and predictable interstate harms justified application of the Act to nominally "local" conduct, even under pre- Wickard precedents. 96 Beginning with the Sherman Act, the Court conceded for the sake of argument that Congress could preempt state-imposed restraints like California's plan. 97In particular, the Court noted with approval several decisions holding that Congressional legislation had occupied a "legislative field" and thus "suspended" state laws. 98Suspension, of course, was synonymous with preemption, and such decisions exemplified what the Court now calls "field preemption." 99The Court did not mention decisions invoked by the United States recognizing "conflict preemption," which invalidated state laws creating obstacles to the accomplishment of federal objectives. 100 Still, the Court found that the Sherman Act did not "suspend" California's pro-rate plan. The plan was not, the Court said, a private agreement but "derived its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of the state, and was not intended to operate or become effective without that command." 101Neither the Act's language nor its legislative history, the Court said, evinced any purpose "to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature." 102 [\*137] The Court expressly invoked federalism considerations to support this conclusion, contending that the Constitution's division of sovereignty between national and state governments counseled against application of the Sherman Act to such restraints: In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress. 103 The statute's legislative history contained no indication that the Act would apply to such state action, the Court said, and the main sponsor of the bill, Senator Sherman, had asserted that it "prevented only "business combinations.'" 104 Having rejected the Sherman Act challenge, the Court went on to reverse the lower court's Commerce Clause holding that invalidated the scheme. 105The Court conceded that California's regulation of "matters of local concern" was "so related to interstate commerce that it also operated as a regulation of that commerce," that is, the interstate sale of raisins. 106Under pre-1890 (and pre- Wickard) case law, this conclusion that a state was regulating the price of interstate transactions or transportation sufficed to invalidate the scheme. 107However, Congress had not, the Court said, exercised its commerce power (given the Court's Sherman Act holding!), with the result that the Court [\*138] should "reconcile[]" Congressional and state power. 108Such "reconciliation," the Court said, required "the accommodation of competing demands of state and national interests involved." 109 Analogizing to Wickard, the Court rejected the direct/indirect standard for assessing the validity of the restraints, signaling that even direct restraints of interstate commerce could survive Commerce Clause scrutiny. 110The inquiry was not, the Court said, whether the restraint was "direct," (as it assuredly was), but instead whether "the matter is one which may appropriately be regulated in the interest of safety, health and well-being of local communities and, because of its local character, and the practical difficulties involved, may never be adequately dealt with by Congress." 111Because of the activity's "local character," the Court said, there might be a "wide scope for local regulation without substantially impairing the national interest in the regulation of commerce by a single authority and without materially obstructing the free flow of commerce." 112The Court did not explain why the impact of California's self-interested control over the nation's entire raisin supply was "immaterial." 113Nor did it mention various decisions invalidating state regulation of the price and output of products subsequently sold across state lines because they "directly impacted" such commerce. 114 The Court confined its Sherman Act holding to state-imposed restraints on market actors. Such restraints coercively restricted the rights of individuals to engage in the sort of free competition the Sherman Act [\*139] ensures. 115By contrast, the Court said, a state could not "give immunity to those [private parties] who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful." 116Nor, Parker said, could a state participate in otherwise unlawful agreements or combinations with private parties. 117The Court thereby conceded that the Act would preempt some state laws, presumably because such state endorsed conduct or conduct of the state itself would nonetheless conflict with federal law. 118 Thus was born antitrust's "state action doctrine," whereby state-imposed restraints of interstate commerce are "immune" from the Sherman Act, regardless of their economic effects. 119 Parker has remained good law without question for more than seven decades, despite the Court's flexible approach to stare decisis in the antitrust context. 120 B. Parker 's Progeny: Hybrid and Municipal Restraints While Parker purported only to immunize restraints imposed by "a state or its officers or agents," subsequent decisions expanded the doctrine. These cases protected restraints that private parties adopted pursuant to otherwise valid state regulatory programs, reasoning that the threat of private antitrust liability would deter parties from participating in such schemes. 121Indeed, [\*140] some such regimes require all parties in a particular industry to adhere to prices set by a subset of the industry's firms. 122For instance, a statute might require liquor dealers to set retail prices equal to wholesale prices plus a specified mark up. 123Some scholars have dubbed such agreements "hybrid restraints," whereby "the government empowers private firms to make choices, or to exercise discretion, as to the nature or level of consumer injury." 124Such restraints "cede[] to private actors "a degree of private regulatory power' that results in a restraint of trade" 125States can immunize such private restraints from the Sherman Act, and thus escape preemption, if: (1) the legislature clearly articulates a policy to restrict competition and (2) the state "actively supervises" the outcomes ( e.g. price and output) of resulting restraints. 126The liquor regulation just described would satisfy the first part of this test because the state has expressly supplanted competition. Thus, the scheme's validity would depend upon how closely the state scrutinized resulting prices. 127 Such "hybrid" restraints are a small subset of the universe of unreasonable private restraints. Indeed, states' own antitrust laws generally ban unreasonable private restraints. 128When it comes to private restraints, hybrid restraints are the exception and not the rule. [\*141] The Court has applied a similar regime to restraints imposed by municipalities, holding that such entities do not possess the sovereignty possessed by states. 129Restraints imposed by municipalities are fully subject to the Sherman Act, unless the state has clearly articulated a policy displacing competition. 130There is, however, no "active supervision" requirement for such restraints. 131 Thus, Parker and its progeny recognize three distinct types of state-created restraints that thwart free competition but may still escape Sherman Act preemption. First, there are cases like Parker itself, where states coercively displace free competition, expressly setting price or output. Such restraints are without exception immune from the Act, and thus escape preemption. Second, there are hybrid restraints, where the state authorizes or compels private actors to engage in anticompetitive behavior. 132These restraints are immune from the Act if the state satisfies the elements of clear articulation and active supervision. Third there are those cases where a municipality coercively displaces free competition. 133Such restraints are immune if the state satisfies the "clear articulation" requirement. 134 Failure to establish the prerequisites of state action immunity for hybrid or municipal restraints results in two legal consequences: (1) Sherman Act liability for private parties who comply with such restraints and (2) preemption of state or local enactments that authorize or compel such agreements. 135It will be useful to distinguish between these categories of [\*142] state action immunity when evaluating the arguments against preemption of state interference with free competition.

C. The Federalism and State Sovereignty Rationales for the State Action Doctrine

The Court has repeatedly reiterated the federalism and state sovereignty rationales for Parker and its progeny , invoking Parker's reference to our "dual system." 136If anything the Court has increased the emphasis on these rationales for the doctrine; modern decisions identify no other normative justification. It is no surprise that jurists supportive of these values in other contexts have invoked such considerations. 137However, jurists hostile to such values in other contexts have also endorsed Parker and its progeny on identical grounds. 138

Numerous scholars have endorsed Parker's understanding of the Sherman Act. 139

[Footnote 139] See, e.g., William H. Page & John E. Lopatka , Parker v. Brown, the Eleventh Amendment, and Anticompetitive State Regulation, 60 WM. L. REV . 1465, 1472 (2019); James R. Saywell, The Six Sides of Federalism in North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 76 OHIO ST. L. J. FURTHERMORE 1, 4-9 (2015); Jean Wegman Burns, Embracing Both Faces of Antitrust Federalism: Parker and ARC America Corp., 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 29, 38 (2000); Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political Process, 96 YALE L. J. 486 (1987); William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and Critique of the State Action Exemption, 61 B.U.L. Rev. 1099, 1101 (1981); Handler, supra note 118, at 19-20; Paul R. Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 328 (1975).

These scholars echo Parker's invocation of the nation's "dual system" [\*143] and contend that Sherman Act preemption of state-created restraints would trench unduly upon what they characterize as "constitutional" values of state sovereignty and federalism. 140

[Footnote 140] See Page & Lopatka , supra note 139, at 1468-69; Saywell, supra note 139, at 4-9; Burns, supra note 139, at 38-39 (invoking Supreme Court decisions recognizing the "fundamental dual-government structure of the Federal Constitution" to justify Parker); id. (contending that the "dual structure of the federal Constitution ... "requires that Congress treat the States in a manner consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the governance of the Nation [sic].'") (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 709 (1999)); id. at 38 ("When applied to antitrust, these [recent federalism] rulings make crystal clear that, as a practical matter, antitrust federalism is here to stay. Even if Congress tried to override or limit the Parker shield, such an attempt likely would fail."); Page, supra note 139, at 1102-1107 (describing and endorsing "constitutional basis of the Parker doctrine"); id. at 1128-30 (contending that "active supervision" requirement for hybrid restraints contravenes Parker's constitutional foundation); James F. Blumstein & Terry Calvani, State Action as a Shield and a Sword in a Medical Services Antitrust Context: Parker v. Brown in Constitutional Perspective, 1978 DUKE L. J. 389, 419-24 n.193 (grounding state action doctrine in Tenth Amendment case law); Mark L. Davidson & Robert D. Butters, Parker and Usery: Portended Constitutional Limits on the Federal Interdiction of Anticompetitive State Action, 31 VAND. L. REV. 575, 597-604 (1978) (same); Handler , supra note 118, at 7 n.35 (contending that preemption of state-imposed restraints would "breach[] the basic tenets of the federalism upon which rests our constitutional form of government."); id. at 15 (contending that Sherman Act scrutiny of such restraints "is plainly at war with the fundamental principles of American federalism"); see also Brief Amicus Curiae for the Am. Dental Ass'n, N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494 (2015) (No. 13-534) (criticizing preemption of state's anticompetitive regulation as "trampling upon the sovereignty of the states in our federal system"); Allensworth , supra note 62, at 1402-04 (discussing academic literature contending that Parker rests on constitutional limits on Congress's authority to override state regulation).

Several have also elaborated upon Parker's rationale, contending that the Constitution contemplates that states should be entitled to "regulate their own economies." 141

Several such scholars argue that post- Wickard expansion of the Act to reach local restraints producing no interstate harm bolsters the case for immunity. 142Reversal of Parker, they say , would ensure federal antitrust [\*144] scrutiny of innumerable garden-variety police power regulations, many governing purely local subjects, because such regulations restrain activity with fortuitous but substantial impacts on interstate commerce. 143Federal judicial scrutiny of local regulation would, it is said, replicate the supervision of state economic regulation under the Due Process Clause during the Lochner era. 144These fears have a strong empirical basis. Aside from Parker itself, every Supreme Court decision applying the state action doctrine has involved regulation of local activity that produced only intrastate harm. 145

According to several proponents of Parker, a well-functioning federal system requires states to serve as laboratories of democracy that experiment with various approaches to local economic problems. 146

[Footnote 146] See Saywell, supra note 139, at 7-8 (invoking laboratory metaphor to contend for relaxed definition of active supervision and broader Parker immunity); Burns, supra note 139, at 44 (contending that antitrust federalism, including Parker, protects the existence of "fifty state laboratories, in which ideas can be implemented and tested."); Handler, supra note 118, at 5-6 & n.26 ("To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.") (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)) ; see also Note, supra note 144, at 2561-62 (arguing that respect for states' role as laboratories militates in favor of respecting diverse state antitrust regimes).

The modern theory [\*145] of competitive federalism predicts that, under certain conditions, rivalry between such sovereigns can produce optimal legislation. 147Preemption, by contrast, would displace these laboratories as sources of novel economic policies responsive to local needs.

Indeed, some have argued that, properly understood, federalism and state sovereignty require more robust immunity from Sherman Act preemption. Some, for instance, have criticized the requirement that states "actively supervise" private parties' implementation of anticompetitive agreements. 148

[Footnote 148] See Saywell, supra note 139, at 6 ("The federal government must respect [state] sovereignty - not redefine it by requiring active supervision of a state's own agencies."); Page, supra note 139, at passim (criticizing this requirement as inconsistent with federalism); Handler, supra note 118, at 9 n.45 and 18 (criticizing proposals that would condition immunity on sufficient "state supervision").

Others contend that restraints imposed by municipalities should enjoy absolute immunity. 149These scholars contend that states should remain free to allocate authority between their respective subdivisions as they see fit, without satisfying procedural requirements imposed under the aegis of the Sherman Act. 150If Parker rests on respect for "federalism and state sovereignty," they say, the Court should respect the otherwise constitutional process that states employ to authorize localities and private parties to impose anticompetitive restraints. 151These arguments would immunize any restraint on competition that a state or its subdivision authorizes under a state's own [\*146] constitutional processes and shield such authorization from Sherman Act preemption. 152

Parker's proponents recognize that anticompetitive state legislation may sometimes impose economic harm on other states. 153Some contend that dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence will interdict such enactments, obviating any need for Sherman Act intervention, while leaving states free to regulate local activity nominally within the scope of the Act. 154Any succor from the Commerce Clause appears illusory, however. Parker itself rejected the plaintiff's dormant Commerce Clause challenge, even though nearly all the harm produced by the challenged program fell on out-of-state consumers. 155None of these scholars has questioned that holding or identified any decision invalidating Parker-type restraints. Given Parker's deferential Commerce Clause review of state-imposed restraints, the Sherman Act is the only plausible source of preemption. 156Thus, these scholars effectively contend that each state's internal democratic processes should constitute the sole remedy for such wealth-destroying regulation, even when out-of-state voters bear most of the resulting harm. 157

[Footnote 157] See, e.g., Saywell , supra note 139, at 7-8 (contending that Sherman Act preemption of squelches local experimentation and innovation a deprives states of their position as laboratories); Page, supra note 139, at 1107 ("Deference to considered state economic choices thus constitutes the touchstone of the Parker doctrine. This approach draws doctrinal support from the Madisonian model of representative government and dictates judicial restraint as long as the "process of representation' affords interested parties an opportunity to influence the formulation of policy."); Handler, supra note 118, at 19 ("There are democratic processes by which unwarranted laxity of the states can be rectified."); id. at 20 ("I would not substitute preemption for substantive due process to achieve a federal censorship of state legislation; I would turn to the states as the forum for the correction of the mischief[.]").

III. Federalism-Based Objections to Sherman Act Preemption

As the United States explained in its Parker brief, state-imposed restraints of interstate commerce pose obstacles to achieving the central policy of the Sherman Act, namely, reliance upon free competition to allocate the nation's economic resources. 158To be sure, California's scheme imposed significant economic harm on out-of-state citizens, unlike nearly all other state-created restraints. 159However, Mandeville Island Farms expanded the object of the Act to include protecting free competition from local restraints producing no interstate harm. Straight-forward application of the Court's preemption doctrine would thus seem to establish that the Sherman Act preempts all state-created unreasonable restraints - regardless of interstate harm - that produce a substantial effect on interstate commerce, because they pose obstacles to achieving this objective. 160

However, some scholars and the Court contend that principles of constitutional federalism and state sovereignty bolster if not require Parker's rejection of Sherman Act preemption. 161Invocation of "federalism," or "state sovereignty," does not resolve concrete cases. Presumably such considerations must manifest themselves within some doctrinal frameworks, and not as a judicial talking point. The Sherman Act, after all, is a statute, and only the Constitution can restrict its reach.

Still, despite repeated claims that considerations of federalism and state sovereignty justify Parker's state action doctrine, neither the Court nor most of Parker's academic proponents have specified the nature of their federalism or state sovereignty concerns with doctrinal precision. 162

[Footnote 162] See, e.g., Handler, supra note 118, at passim (endorsing Parker without identifying any constitutional doctrine militating against preemption); id. at 7 n.35 (contending that preemption of state economic regulation would "breach[] basic tenets of federalism upon which rests our constitutional form of government is based.").

At best, some proponents have invoked the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments as possible [\*148] sources of such immunity, usually without elaboration. 163

[Footnote 163] See, e.g., Page & Lopatka , supra note 139, at 1468 (the Court has derived the Parker doctrine "from the principle of sovereign immunity"); Burns, supra note 139, at 38 (invoking Supreme Court's then-recent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence as supporting Parker); Page, supra note 139, at 1105 n.36 (suggesting that Parker could be interpreted as resting upon "the eleventh amendment or, perhaps, ... the tenth amendment."); Davidson & Butters, supra note 140, at 597-604 (contending that Tenth Amendment case law justifies Parker's state action doctrine).

As a result, academic evaluation of the supposed federalism and state sovereignty rationales for Parker's rejection of preemption requires identification of possible doctrinal bases for such concerns, one or more of which could help justify Parker and its progeny.

Such concerns could manifest themselves in two broad categories. First, federal preemption of state-imposed restraints could be outright unconstitutional. 164

[Footnote 164] See Burns, supra note 139, at 38 (asserting that the Tenth and Eleventh amendments prevent Congress from expressly preempting local state legislation otherwise subject to the commerce power); Davidson & Butters, supra note 140, at 597-604.

Second, preemption of such restraints could contradict one or more canons of construction that courts employ to discern the original meaning of ambiguous texts. The remainder of this article will identify and then evaluate the possible arguments in these two categories that may conceivably militate against Sherman Act preemption of state-imposed restraints. As will be seen, evaluation of arguments in the first category will help inform evaluation of arguments that one or more canons of statutory construction justify Parker's interpretation of the Sherman Act.

#### The aff preserves state authority to enforce antitrust but absent clarification on the transboundary effects from broad Parker immunity turf wars cause enforcement failures

Kobayashi 20 [Bruce H. Kobayashi, George Mason University, Antonin Scalia Law School Professor, 10-4-2020 https://gaidigitalreport.com/2020/10/04/exemptions-and-immunities/#\_ftn92]

B. Spillover Effects and Antitrust Federalism

The current state action doctrine does not enable jurisdictional competition or promote the principles of federalism because it does not account for the spillover effects of anticompetitive state regulation. Judge Easterbrook examined the Court’s state action holdings and found that the Court’s rulings were indifferent as to whether the effects of the regulation were actually internalized by the regulating state.[91] Allowing states to enact anticompetitive legislation reduced the extent and effectiveness of competition among the states, and thereby increased the cost of exit and relocation.[92]

This nature of the spillover effect is exemplified in Parker v. Brown.[93] The state action doctrine was used to uphold a California regulation which authorized a raisin cartel. California raisin growers benefited greatly from that ability to price fix. However, over 90% of the grapes were exported outside of California—nationally and internationally—making the impact of the California raisin regulation reach beyond state lines.[94] The regulation harmed a large number of consumers outside of California while only benefiting a small number of private interest parties within the state.

State action doctrine, although meant to preserve that state’s independence, actually allows the state to reap the benefits of the anticompetitive regulation while displacing the costs onto other states.[95] Therefore, it is worth considering if the current state action doctrine should be thought of differently, in a way that fully takes into accounts issues of federalism. Judge Easterbrook proposes a state action rule which considers the spillover effect of anticompetitive state regulation. Instead of examining clear articulation and active supervision, the Court would uphold an anticompetitive state regulation as long as its anticompetitive effects are internalized by that state’s residents.[96] Aligning state action doctrine with the economics of federalism will not only maintain states’ roles in antitrust, but also ensure that state antitrust exemptions have a diminished negative impact on consumer welfare. Analyzing the anticompetitive overcharge of regulations is also more administrable than attempting to analyze the regulations under the dormant Commerce Clause.[97] Considered under Easterbrook’s approach, Parker’s California raisin prorate program would be subject to antitrust scrutiny because the regulation’s costs were not internalized.

State regulation of seemingly local competition is likely to effect more than just the economy of that specific state. When states grant antitrust immunities in situations involving interstate commerce, the state is exporting the anticompetitive effects of its regulations to citizens outside its own borders. Without accounting for the federal interest in an integrated national economy, state action doctrine far surpasses its narrow purpose of supervising local competition.

C. The Appropriate Role of State Attorneys General in Federal Antitrust Disputes

Federalism most often refers to the vertical relationship between the federal government and the states. Divergent viewpoints among antitrust enforcers can strain the system, thus comity and deference are crucial to efficient antitrust enforcement. A merger or acquisition is often scrutinized by multiple enforcers with multi-dimensional relationships.

For example, the Sprint/T-Mobile merger involved the Antitrust Division and Federal Communications Commission, who share a horizontal relationship, and state attorneys general, with which the federal agencies share a vertical relationship. Disagreement between enforcers may occur at either level.[98] The merger between the two telecommunications firms was cleared by the FCC, the Antitrust Division, and ten state attorneys general.[99] Although a settlement agreement—which required divestitures—was in the process of being approved, several other state attorneys general filed a lawsuit to block the merger anyway.[100] Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim questioned the relief sought by the states,[101] citing the federal agencies’ expertise in the matter.[102] He noted that “a minority of states and the District of Columbia” were “trying to undo [the nationwide settlement],” a situation he believed was “odd.”[103] Delrahim reaffirmed states’ rights to sue for antitrust violations but criticized their attempt to seek relief inconsistent with the federal government’s settlement.[104]

States may also enter settlement agreements with merging parties that are repugnant to sound antitrust enforcement. For example, in UnitedHealth Group/Sierra Health Services, the Nevada Attorney General required the merged firm to submit $15 million in charitable contributions which were not related to any antitrust violation.[105] Similarly, Massachusetts entered a settlement agreement with two hospitals that required increased spending on select programs and the creation of other projects and programs unrelated to antitrust concerns.[106]

On the other hand, state antitrust enforcement can play a useful role in supplementing federal antitrust enforcement. First, the use of state autonomy within a federal system allows state and local governments to act as social “laboratories,” where laws and policies are created and tested at the state level of the democratic system, in a manner similar (in theory, at least) to the scientific method.[107] Thus, even if states enter into agreements with merging parties that the federal authorities view as anticompetitive or that impose ineffective remedies for the anticompetitive effects that would be generated by the merger, the information generated by such actions can be invaluable inputs into retrospective analyses of the competitive effects of mergers. These analyses are based on causal empirical designs which require both observation of post-merger price and quality effects from consummated mergers and the ability to compare these effects with a credible control group.[108] For example, state interventions such as COPA or Certificate on Need Laws that allow hospital mergers that generate competitive effects in local geographic markets facilitate retrospective studies of hospital mergers that can be used to validate and improve the economic models and other tools used to predict merger effects.[109]

Second, in a system of federalism, the state enforcement of both the state and federal antitrust laws can be a valuable complementary resource that supplements scarce federal resources. Conflicts between the federal and state antitrust authorities are generated by the use of a cooperative or “marble cake” approach to federalism, where the tasks of the state and federal agencies are relatively undefined, overlapping, and imperfectly coordinated. In contrast, a “dual” or “layer cake” federalism approach, where power is divided ex-ante between the federal and state governments in clearly defined terms, can mitigate direct conflicts between state and federal authorities discussed above.

#### Enforcement high now and thumps links

Ingrassia 1-4 [John Ingrassia, Proskauer Rose LLP, 1-4-2022 https://www.law360.com/articles/1452119/how-to-navigate-the-coming-antitrust-policy-tests]

2021 will be remembered in antitrust law. Not since the 1970s has there been so much chatter over the fundamental purposes of antitrust policy, or such potential for actual sea change.

Half a century ago, Robert Bork and the Chicago School argued that antitrust law had lost its way and should focus on consumer welfare. Bork's view was that antitrust enforcement was getting in the way of legitimate competition, and the U.S. Supreme Court was quick to embrace the consumer welfare standard.

Now, Federal Trade Commission Chair Lina Khan and the new Brandeisians argue that antitrust law has again lost its way and must shed the constraints of the consumer welfare standard.

Khan's view is that consolidation has gone unchecked in the American economy, resulting in structural harms to competition that the consumer welfare standard is unable to address.

She believes the agency has historically defined markets too narrowly to effectively police broader economic impacts of sustained consolidation, and favored gerrymandered remedies over outright challenges.

Khan has imposed sweeping changes aimed at chilling merger activity and shaping the future of merger enforcement. Against dissents from Republican Commissioners Christine Wilson and Noah Phillips, and charge of going rogue from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the FTC stripped away long-standing exemptions and interpretations that streamlined merger review.

The action came in response to an unprecedented merger wave — 3,845 acquisitions filed with the agencies in the first 11 months of 2021, substantially more than most full years.

The changes are having an impact, making investigations more intrusive, lengthy and less predictable. Still, policy precedes practice, and while the FTC has been heavy on policy, it has yet to test those policies in the courts.

The tests may come in the next year. Meanwhile, we can also expect the FTC and the U.S. Department of Justice under Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter's leadership, to not only continue the trajectory of policy changes but also begin the task of entrenching them in agency practice.

Here, we review the year in FTC policy moves, what they mean and how to navigate the newly laid minefields.

Warning Letters After the Close of HSR Waiting Periods

In an unprecedented move, the FTC recently began issuing letters to parties in transactions the agency may intend to investigate after expiration of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act waiting period. According to the agency in an Aug. 3, 2021, blog, this is the result of "a tidal wave of merger filings that is straining the agency's capacity to rigorously investigate deals ahead of the statutory deadlines." Wilson, however, said on Twitter on Aug. 12, 2021, that she was "gravely concerned that the carefully crafted HSR framework is suffering a death by a thousand cuts," following her Aug. 9 statement that said "For the HSR Act to retain meaning, it cannot be that the FTC will keep merger investigations open indefinitely, as a matter of routine, every time there is a surge in filings." The FTC's jurisdiction to review transactions is independent of the HSR reporting requirements, with the power to investigate any transaction before or after closing, whether subject to reporting or not, and whether the HSR waiting period has expired or not. There are examples of the agencies reviewing nonreportable transactions, and even investigating reportable transactions after expiration of the HSR waiting period, though they are rare. The warning letters do not assert new authority not already existing under law, but notifying parties that an investigation may remain open post-HSR clearance implicates finality and certainty of investigations, but not every transaction gets a warning letter. Those with no issues go through unscathed. Those with clear issues are investigated. The deals that might pose some issues, but not enough to draw an investigation, might trigger the newly minted warning letter. To show the letters have teeth, the FTC will sooner or later have to challenge a deal post-HSR waiting period, putting it to the test before courts, where it is likely to face hurdles to the extent the deal did not warrant a full investigation in the first instance. Still, the practice is ushering a change in how provisions are drafted in deal documents. A buyer asserting that it is not required to close over the — arguably — still-pending investigation may face an uphill battle depending on how the closing conditions are drafted, for they typically point to the expiration of applicable waiting periods and not the absence of potential ongoing investigations or issuance of warning letters. So careful buyers seek closing requirements that no investigations are threatened and that no warning letters have been issued. Recent examples include the 3D Systems Corp.'s agreement to acquire Oqton Inc. and Universal Corp.'s agreement to buy Shank's Extracts Inc. The parties' agreements provided that if a warning letter is issued, the investigation would be treated as closed 30 days after receipt of such letter. Buyers may want to consider similar provisions until more emerges on how the FTC will proceed with warning letter transactions.

More Intensive Merger Investigations

The FTC announced plans on Aug. 3, 2021, to make the second request process both "more streamlined and more rigorous." The changes include the following: Merger investigations will address additional potentially impacted competition, such as labor markets, cross-market effects, and the impact on incentives of investment firms. Modifications to second requests will be more limited. The agency will require parties to provide more information relating to their use of e- discovery in responding to the investigation. Additional information will be required with respect to privilege claims. The FTC said these changes are in recognition that "an unduly narrow approach to merger review may have created blind spots and enabled unlawful consolidation." Possibly in response to such steeped up investigative techniques and resistance to find common ground with merger parties, Sportsman's Warehouse Holdings Inc. and Great Outdoors Group LLC abandoned their proposed merger at the end of 2021, citing indications that the FTC would be unlikely to approve the outdoor sporting goods transaction. The changes, though, do little to streamline the second request process. They make it more complex, burdensome and time-consuming. Perhaps most notable is the use of the process to delve into labor markets. Republicans Wilson and Phillips argued that FTC leadership may have themselves to blame for the merger review crunch, saying in a Nov. 8, 2021 statement: If the agency is lowering thresholds of concern and broadening theories of harm, this certainly would explain why the FTC is unable to conduct merger reviews in a timely manner while our sister agency remains capable of addressing the same increased filing volumes within statutory timeframes.

More Onerous Consent Decree Provisions

Where merger parties settle a challenge rather than litigate, the consent decree process sets out the parties' obligations. Historically, such consent decrees, among other things, required parties to notify the agency prior to certain future acquisitions. The FTC rescinded this long-standing policy, noting that it: Returns now to its prior practice of routinely requiring merging parties subject to a Commission order to obtain prior approval from the FTC before closing any future transaction affecting each relevant market for which a violation was alleged. The agency will also require divestiture buyers to agree to prior approval for any future sale of the assets they acquire. Khan explained the move was to avoid "drain[ing] the already strapped resources of the Commission" on "repeat offenders." The FTC included the new provision in its Oct. 25, 2021, consent decree settling a proposed transaction by DaVita Inc., a dialysis service provider. DaVita is now required to receive prior approval from the FTC of 10 years before any new acquisitions, a dialysis clinic business in Utah being in question. This is a significant change and will chill not only settlements with the FTC, but also M&A transactions at the outset where such provisions are commercially untenable. Wilson and Phillips noted in dissent that "a prior approval requirement imposes significant obligations on merging parties and innocent divestiture buyers." The FTC clearly aims to chill M&A activity, and merger agreements that provide more optionality to abandon deals will become more common, though parties intent on pushing their deal through may see a consent decree with 10-year approval provisions as less palatable than litigating, and force the FTC to cave or go to court.

Withdrawal of the Vertical Merger Guidelines

In another party-line vote, the FTC withdrew the vertical merger guidelines, which were issued just last year. Democratic commissioners criticized the guidelines as based on "unsound economic theories that are unsupported by the law or market realities," and reflecting a "flawed discussion of the purported procompetitive benefits (i.e., efficiencies) of vertical mergers." Vertical transactions are between firms at different levels in the supply chain. Historically, antitrust enforcement of exceptional vertical mergers were rare and difficult given the previously presumed efficiencies. Vertical mergers can eliminate double marginalization, in which firms at each level mark up prices above marginal cost. Elimination of one markup results in lower prices and can be pro-competitive. Khan, however, argues the guidelines' "reliance on [elimination of double marginalization] is theoretically and factually misplaced." Going forward, "the FTC will analyze mergers in accordance with its statutory mandate, which does not presume efficiencies for any category of mergers." This too drew a strong rebuke from the Republican commissioners, who said "The FTC leadership continues the disturbing trend of pulling the rug out under from honest businesses and the lawyers who advise them." The commission's challenges to chipmaker Nvidia Corp.'s $40 billion acquisition of U.K. chip design provider Arm Ltd. alleged the transaction would combine one of the largest chip producers with a firm that has essential design technology — critical inputs. In a Dec. 2, 2021, statement, the FTC said the acquisition "would distort Arm's incentives in chip markets and allow the combined firm to unfairly undermine Nvidia's rivals." The FTC's lawsuit should "send a strong signal that we will act aggressively to protect our critical infrastructure markets from illegal vertical mergers that have far-reaching and damaging effects on future innovations," FTC Bureau of Competition Director Holly Vedova said in the statement. Given that vertical mergers will be closely scrutinized as a matter of course, parties need to consider concerns the FTC may identify and prepare strong counters — other than elimination of double marginalization. For example, parties could argue that the transaction expands access to products and expands consumer choice. Parties willing to go the distance with a vertical merger should also remain mindful that the guidelines have never been cited or relied on by a court, and it is the established jurisprudence on vertical transactions that will carry the day.

Rescinding the Consumer Welfare Standard

In July 2021, the FTC rescinded its policy interpreting its statutory mandate to root out "unfair methods of competition" as coterminous with promoting consumer welfare under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. In a July 19, 2021, statement, the FTC called the rescinded policy was "bind[ing] the FTC to liability standards created by generalist judges in private treble-damages actions under the Sherman Act." Still, the consumer welfare standard has been entrenched in antitrust jurisprudence for decades, and the FTC cannot change that. The immediate impact is thus more likely to be seen in administrative actions in the FTC's own court. In a dissenting statement, Republican commissioners countered that FTC leadership does not propose a replacement standard and "that efforts to distance Section 5 from the consumer welfare standard are a recipe for bad policy and adverse court decisions," adding that, "unlike those in academia, the FTC will have to defend its interpretation of Section 5 in court, where it should expect a hostile reception if it cannot offer clear limiting principles."

Labor Market Scrutiny

Government investigations and private litigation relating to no-poach and wage-fixing agreements are ballooning, and criminal indictments are now a reality. Encouraged by President Joe Biden's executive order on competition, the FTC and the DOJ have doubled down on investigating labor markets. Merger investigations now routinely include requests for employee compensation data, inquiries regarding noncompete and nonsolicit agreements, and are more likely to delve into both the merger's effects on labor, and the parties' prior labor practices. The DOJ's challenge to Penguin Random House LLC's proposed acquisition of Simon & Schuster Inc. focuses on harm to the labor market — for authors. In his first public comments, the DOJ's Kanter said: We will fight for American workers including in connection with illegal mergers that substantially lessen competition for laborers. Going forward, you can expect efforts like these not only to continue but to increase. Khan echoed the sentiment, saying: Competition and conduct can hurt us not just as consumers who buy products from a shrinking number of large firms, but also as workers who are especially vulnerable and subject to the whims of a boss we can't equally or practically escape. Antitrust compliance policies now must extend to addressing practices with respect to employee recruiting and compensation. Antitrust compliance training must extend beyond the sales team, and include HR. Businesses are reviewing and revising their compliance policies, and beginning new antitrust training programs to ensure that they are not subjected to claims of depressed wages and barriers to worker mobility.

Looking Ahead to the Year to Come

The year 2021 has been like no other for antitrust enforcement. While the FTC's various policy pronouncements are clearly intended to chill merger activity, it does not appear to have had the intended outcome.

HSR filings continue at off-the-charts levels. Amid this strong showing of M&A activity, the advice is to keep moving transactions forward, stay ahead of the new tacks the agencies might take, and account for newly injected risk and uncertainty.

Looking ahead, expect another energetic year. So far, the FTC's policy changes have not seemed to slow the pace of merger activity, but the frenzy cannot last forever. Nonetheless, merging parties are now going into the merger review process with eyes open, knowing it is likely to be more intense and uncertain. Parties to vertical transactions will no longer ride easy on double marginalization theories, and parties will be handing over their HR and payroll files.

At the same time, the heavy resistance to these changes will continue, if not strengthen, and will play out not just in courts and the halls of Congress, but will also spill into the political mainstream.

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is planning to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars on an ad campaign across 10 states denouncing what it calls the FTC's overstepping of regulatory authority.

#### Biden’s XO empirically denies any FTC Parker links and more restrictions coming

Bulusu 21 [Siri Bulusu, Reporter Bloomberg Law, 7-12-2021 https://news.bloomberglaw.com/antitrust/worker-license-rules-emerge-as-ftc-competition-oversight-priority]

President Joe Biden’s order, signed Friday, calls on the Federal Trade Commission to boost labor market competition by writing new rules that limit “unnecessary, cumbersome” licensing requirements, often imposed by states’ regulatory boards and quasi-public organizations.

“Some overly restrictive occupational licensing requirements can impede workers’ ability to find jobs and to move between states,” according to the order. The order comes amid a flurry of lawsuits against state or state-backed licensing bodies that accuse them of violating antitrust law by imposing expensive fees or threatening to shut down out-of-state businesses. The text of the order didn’t include specific directions for federal antitrust agencies. But the FTC’s anticipated actions and possible rulemaking could lead to streamlined licensing requirements across states, eliminating demands for worker information unrelated to the job, enforcement of interstate commerce rules, and levying of punitive fines, market watchers say. Licenses are expensive and requirements vary among states, even in the same industry. Reining in the requirements could remove a significant employment barrier, particularly for military families and others who frequently move between states or offer services across state lines. But it also could shift states’ calculations in cracking down on frauds and impostors. Cosmetology licenses can cost up to $15,000 and sometimes years of study, said Dick Carpenter, a senior director of strategic research for the Institute for Justice. Other jobs, ranging from public health and safety positions to interior designers, barbers, and manicurists, also require licensing. “Without any kind of standardization of different licensing requirements—even if you have the same requirements in different jurisdictions—you still have to get a license for each jurisdiction, which impedes an employee’s ability to be mobile,” said Tracey Diamond, a partner at Troutman Pepper LLP’s labor and employment practice.

Potential FTC Moves

The FTC’s options include writing new rules or heightening enforcement of interstate commerce rules in areas where they overlap with antitrust violations, labor market watchers say. Under this principle, restricting labor through onerous licensing requirements would be tantamount to limiting movement of services across borders.

“In the past, occupational licensing was a matter overseen by the Department of Labor, but they don’t quite have the teeth that the Federal Trade Commission has in terms of working in specific locations,” said Morris Kleiner, a University of Minnesota professor of labor policy.

The FTC could turn its limited resources toward scrutinizing occupational licensing programs that narrow the practice scope of a certain profession and limit competition, Kleiner said.

How the commission interprets which licensing requirements are “unnecessary” could be scrutinized. Those could include common requirements such as citizenship and a clean criminal record, said Bobby Chung, a postdoctoral research associate at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign who focuses on licensing. .

“The required training, education and exams should confer the relevant skill sets,” Chung said. “If not, I would regard those requirements as unnecessary.” The agency also may impose specific guidelines that limit fees or frequency of license renewal, Kleiner said. “But more importantly, the FTC’s guidelines could be aimed specifically at states that have ratcheted up their requirements,” he said.

Gaining Attention

Burdensome licensing requirements have increasingly come under federal scrutiny as the labor market has shifted away from manufacturing jobs to service-oriented professions. States began imposing licensing requirements in order to protect consumers from bad actors and standardize services. “Licenses create a monopoly of workers who can provide a service,” Kleiner said. “But if you provide those services without a license, the police powers of the state can arrest and severely fine those individuals.” In 2020, roughly 23% of workers were required to have a license, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Over the years, many states, including Arizona, Connecticut, Nebraska, and Tennessee, have modified their rules to lower what they considered to be burdensome barriers to obtaining licenses. Biden’s move is part of states’ broader push for changes, Carpenter said. “There is a momentum building to raise awareness to the issue.” Advocates for change also cite underemployment and unemployment stemming from the burdensome licensing requirements, as well as allegations that certain industries create occupational licensing to limit competition. Immigrants also can be affected by the licensing requirements, particularly if they hold foreign degrees but are performing lesser-skilled jobs in the U.S., according to a 2017 study by the Migration Policy Institute. Licensing particularly hurts foreign nationals with temporary work visas whose immigration status impedes them from seeking a license to work within their specialty, Chung said. That in turn impedes their path to permanent residency or citizenship, he said.

State Action

The FTC has struggled to rein in licensing practices with antitrust violations partly because public entities, like state-controlled licensing boards, can claim state action immunity. Such immunity authorizes a state to carry out certain legitimate government functions, often in regulated industries that require licensing.

“Many of these state certifications don’t violate antitrust law and that’s because of this doctrine that displaces antitrust law,” said Jesse Markham, a partner at Baker & Miller PLLC’s San Francisco office. “And that’s why these certification requirements exist with impunity.”

In 2015, the Supreme Court ruled in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC that the state board was operated by market participants. Without active supervision from the state, the board couldn’t claim state action immunity from federal antitrust actions.

The ruling unleashed “dozens of lawsuits"—seeking antitrust treble damages—against individual members of licensing boards, according an October 2020 statement from Reps. Mike Conaway (R-Texas), Jamie Raskin (D-Md.), and David Cicilline (D-R.I.) in support of a bill they introduced to shield board members from such suits.

Qualifying for state action immunity largely depends on whether a board is a true government actor or a private market participant. But this delineation becomes more complex if there’s a blurred line between a state agency handling its own actions or a private group acting under state guidance.

How the FTC handles that blurred line will be one issue the agency tackles as it implements the president’s order.

#### Court rulings on Parker empirically deny disad links

Grossman 15 [Jonathan M. Grossman, co-chair at Cozen O’Connor, Harvard Law School, J.D., 2000, 2-25-2015 https://www.cozen.com/news-resources/publications/2015/supreme-court-delivers-another-blow-to-state-action-antitrust-immunity]

Supreme Court Delivers another Blow to State Action Antitrust Immunity

Today’s Supreme Court decision in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission1 is the second time in two years that the Court has spoken on the state action exemption to the federal antitrust laws, and the Court once again has made it clear that the days of an expansive interpretation of that exemption are over.

Under the state action exemption, which is based on the principles of state sovereign immunity, restraints imposed by a state as an act of government are exempt from federal antitrust laws. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Private parties carrying out a state’s regulatory program are also immune as long as the private party: 1) is acting pursuant to a “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed … state policy;” and 2) is “actively supervised by the state itself.” Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980).

Today’s decision in NC Dental and the 2013 Supreme Court decision in Phoebe Putney2 each focused on one of the two prongs of the Midcal test, and each decision will have the effect of making it more difficult to extend the exemption beyond the state itself.

In NC Dental, the Court focused on the “active supervision” requirement and concluded that the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners (the Board) did not meet that test. The controversy began in 2003 when non-dentists in North Carolina began to offer teeth-whitening services. The Board, which is designed as a state agency by statute, consisted of six licensed dentists, one licensed dental hygienist, and one consumer member; with the dentists and dental hygienists elected by their peers and the consumer member appointed by the governor of the state. The Board issued nearly 50 cease-and-desist letters to non-dentist providers that effectively resulted in the end of non-dentists providing teeth-whitening services in the state. In 2010, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued an administrative complaint against the Board alleging that it had violated the FTC Act by excluding the non-dentist teeth-whitening providers. The Board argued that it was acting as a state agency and thus immune from federal antitrust laws. The FTC issued a final order against the Board and enjoined it from issuing further extrajudicial orders to teeth-whitening providers in North Carolina. The 4th Circuit denied the Board’s subsequent petition seeking review of the FTC order.3

In affirming the 4th Circuit decision, the Supreme Court held that a state board on which a controlling number of decision makers are active market participants in the occupation the board regulates must satisfy Midcal’s active supervision requirement in order to invoke antitrust immunity under the state action exemption. The Court noted that “when a State empowers a group of active market participants to decide who can participate in its market, and on what terms, the need for supervision is manifest.” Furthermore, while the Board did not argue that it was actively supervised by the state, the Court concluded its decision by reiterating the requirements of active state supervision: (1) the substance of the anti-competitive decision must be reviewed by a state supervisor; (2) the state supervisor must have the power to veto or modify decisions to ensure that they align with state policy; (3) the “mere potential for state supervision” is not a sufficient substitute for an actual decision by the state; and (4) the state supervisor may not be an active market participant.

The 2013 Phoebe Putney decision focused on the “clear articulation” prong of Midcal. That case arose out of a merger of a for-profit hospital with a hospital owned and operated by a county hospital authority (Authority), which was created by the state legislature but operated independently of the state government. The FTC alleged that the transaction was technically structured as an acquisition of the for-profit by the Authority, in a specific attempt to take advantage of the state action exemption. The 11th Circuit observed that Georgia’s Hospital Authorities Law granted hospital authorities the power to “operate projects” including hospitals, to “make and execute contracts and other instruments necessary to exercise the[ir] powers,” and to “acquire by purchase, lease or otherwise … projects.” Based on this broad language, the 11th Circuit found that the legislation clearly indicated that the Georgia Legislature anticipated that the powers it granted to the Authority would produce anti-competitive effects, and thus were a foreseeable result of the legislation and sufficient to meet the Midcal “clear articulation” test. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Georgia Legislature did not clearly articulate or affirmatively express a state policy to displace competition in the market for hospital services. The Court noted that the Authority needed to show not just that it had been delegated authority to act, but also that it was authorized to act or regulate in an anti-competitive manner.

The combined effect of NC Dental and Phoebe Putney is that any regulatory body that is not clearly part of the executive branch of a state will have a significantly higher burden to take advantage of the state action exemption. This will require state governments to review and reconsider the structure and procedures of such bodies and should force the bodies themselves to carefully consider whether the state action exemption applies before taking any action that might implicate the federal antitrust laws.

It will also mean that industry participants regulated by such quasi-governmental bodies likely will be emboldened to challenge more adverse actions in court. Given the prevalence of quasi-government entities in states – many of which include market participants – and that they regulate a wide variety of industries including energy, professional services, health care, transportation, and many others, these decisions will likely have significant policy and legal implications for years to come.

# 2AC

## Innovation

### Local Cooperatives – 2AC

#### And – they’d just have to comply with requirements – that’s true now too – they DON’T have legal carte blanche

MSU = Blue.

State immunity is key to local cooperatives---those democratize economic growth and offset market power abuses for small businesses.

Vaheesan ’19 [Sandeep and Nathan Schneider; 2019; Legal Director of the Open Markets Institute; Assistant Professor, Department of Media Studies, University of Colorado Boulder; “Cooperative Enterprise as an Antimonopoly Strategy,” https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=pslr]

States can use the state action doctrine to promote the growth of democratically accountable cooperatives. They can pass laws authorizing cooperatives to engage in collaborative activities and subject this joint conduct to active state supervision. By doing so, states can limit the application of federal antitrust laws to cooperatives. Because every state already has a statute for chartering cooperatives,294 states would principally have to work toward establishing regulatory oversight. This oversight could be provided through the executive branch, courts, or regulatory agencies, but importantly not through a state agency “dominated by market participants.”295 Provided they are acting pursuant to state authorization and supervision, cooperatives would have greater freedom to operate. While cooperatives would not enjoy legal carte blanche, they would be free to engage in joint action that may otherwise run afoul of the federal antitrust laws. For instance, a bargaining cooperative composed of small businesses would be immune from federal antitrust law so long as it acts pursuant to state authority and is actively supervised by a state agency. State law and regulation can account for the distinctive needs and objectives of cooperatives, which may not always conform to the prevailing strictures of antitrust law.

VI. CONCLUSION

When Congress saw fit, as Senator Capper put it, “to give to the farmer the same right to bargain collectively that is already enjoyed by corporations,”296 it affirmed the principle that distributed, competitive, and democratic activity ought to have a place in the economy alongside investor-owned corporations. The constituency most endangered by corporate power in 1922, and best organized to counter it, were farmers. For decades they formed cooperative enterprises as a means of counteracting the concentrated market power of bankers, suppliers, and railroads.297 The Capper-Volstead Act was a means of affirming the value of those cooperative enterprises, and the kind of business they enabled, by ensuring that antitrust law did not mistake cooperation between powerless actors for collusion among corporations.

Today, the concerns that motivated Capper-Volstead have spread far beyond just farmers. Throughout the United States economy, especially in the emerging online economy, consolidation has become the norm. Small businesses face growing barriers to market entry and the growing ranks of independent workers find themselves at the mercy of the overwhelming market power of large corporations. As they did a century ago, people are now looking to cooperative ownership designs as a strategy for leveling the playing field with investor-owned corporations, but cooperative firms can face undue barriers and inadequate recognition for their contributions to ensuring a diverse and democratic economy.

---their card ends---

In the context of the renewed interest in antitrust policy, the legacy and promise of cooperative enterprise deserves fresh consideration. Statutes such as the Clayton Act and the Capper-Volstead Act, along with various Supreme Court decisions, have secured a role for cooperatives in the United States antitrust tradition. That role should be no less significant in an age when online platforms are doing the work once done by railroads, when once again nascent kinds of natural-monopoly activity present both opportunities and dilemmas. The ambitions of Senator Capper and his bill’s supporters have economy-wide relevance and should not be limited to agriculture or any other subset of economic activity. Accordingly, antitrust law and policy should protect cooperation outside of agriculture alone. Genuine cooperative enterprise is something that should not only be tolerated but also encouraged.

This Article proposes a series of interventions for how the spirit of Capper-Volstead might find new life today. First, Congress can extend the logic of that precedent to sectors outside of agriculture. Currently, when consolidation has spread to so many sectors, having such recognition limited to agriculture alone looks less like a considered choice than an accident of history. Second, courts can recognize the virtues of cooperative enterprise in their antitrust rulings and use such models as a tool for protecting beneficial economies of scale while retaining competition and diversity in markets. Third, federal agencies can distinguish between cooperation among the powerless and collusion among powerful corporations in their enforcement of antitrust law. Fourth, states can protect and supervise co-ops incorporated under their laws to ensure appropriately democratic practices and participation. Each of these recommendations calls for not just more generous treatment of cooperatives; it is equally necessary to revive a tradition of oversight to ensure that co-op businesses are, in fact, operating cooperatively and in the public interest.

#### Alt causes to coop growth

Vaheesan ’19 [Sandeep and Nathan Schneider; 2019; Legal Director of the Open Markets Institute; Assistant Professor, Department of Media Studies, University of Colorado Boulder; “Cooperative Enterprise as an Antimonopoly Strategy,” https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=pslr]

Despite their advantages, cooperatives face certain challenges. In times past, people might have pooled their resources in a co-op to circumvent the high costs of capital, or outright barriers to capital access. In societies where finance plays a growing role and captures a larger share of the economy,104 the cost of investor capital for new enterprises may be so low that democratic self-organizing is seen as expensive in comparison to investor ownership. Although cooperative financing mechanisms are widespread in certain sectors (such as agriculture and electric utilities) they are almost nonexistent in others (such as software and manufacturing). Historically, success in overcoming such barriers has tended to come through a blend of entrepreneurship and policy support.105

Cooperatives can also struggle with costly and ineffective governance, especially when they endure shifts in scale or member culture that the founders failed to anticipate.106 This is one reason why co-ops frequently depend on regional, national, and international associations to establish standards, best practices, and member-training regimes, as well as to exert pressure in cases of stagnation or mismanagement.107 In addition to such more or less voluntary associations, legal regimes have also played a role in establishing and enforcing standards for cooperative firms.

#### Including squo antitrust enforcement

Vaheesan ’19 [Sandeep and Nathan Schneider; 2019; Legal Director of the Open Markets Institute; Assistant Professor, Department of Media Studies, University of Colorado Boulder; “Cooperative Enterprise as an Antimonopoly Strategy,” https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=pslr]

B. How Current Antitrust Doctrine Impedes Certain

Cooperative Forms and Not Others

Antitrust law, as currently interpreted, presents serious legal risks to certain cooperative activities and forms. Cooperatives and other collectives that only seek to aggregate the power of individual members (whether consumers, workers, or small firms) and do not engage in any integrated activity face significant antitrust obstacles. Federal antitrust agencies and courts have condemned this exercise of collective power as an illegal restraint of trade. In contrast, cooperatives that engage in more than collective bargaining and operate as integrated firms in production, distribution, or retail face much less antitrust risk. Indeed, their risk of antitrust liability is comparable to that faced by investor-owned firms.

## Fism

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### Private Sector – 2AC

#### Parker immunity shields private entities in anticompetitive behavior – it’s not only when state is acting as sovereign

Safvati 16 [Sina Safvati, J.D., University of California, Los Angeles, School of Law, with honors, 2016 B.A., University of California, Los Angeles, summa cum laude, 2012 CLERKSHIPS U.S.C.A., 9th Circuit U.S.D.C., Southern District of Florida, https://www.uclalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Safvati-63-4-update.pdf]

Based in part on the fear that States might “confer antitrust immunity on private persons by fiat,”24 the Supreme Court clarified in later decisions that the automatic exemption from federal antitrust law applies only when the state is acting as a sovereign—when the anticompetitive decision is expressly made by a state legislature or state supreme court.25 In the case of political subdivisions and private entities, the Parker immunity exemption applies only if the entity makes a sufficient showing that the anticompetitive decision was in fact one of the sovereign.26 Through its subsequent jurisprudence, the Court defined three distinct categories in the Parker-immunity inquiry.

The first category is reserved for cases in which the sovereign directly and expressly made the anticompetitive action, limited to actions of the state legislature or state supreme court.27 Parker immunity automatically applies in such cases.28 The second category (“quasi-public”)29 is reserved for cases in which a municipality or a “prototypical state agency”30 has engaged in anticompetitive conduct.31 When municipalities seek Parker immunity, the anticompetitive conduct must have been pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to displace competition.32 The third category is reserved for instances in which private entities have engaged in anticompetitive conduct. When private entities seek Parker state-action immunity, they must show both that the challenged conduct was pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy and that it was actively supervised by the state itself.33 In the 2014–2015 term, the Supreme Court held in North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC that a state occupational licensing board comprised of a “controlling number” of “active market participants” was private and subject to the active supervision requirement.34

[Footnote 33] E.g., Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1980) (holding that the private wine price-setting scheme could not benefit from Parker immunity because although the scheme was pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy, the state did not engage in any “pointed reexamination” of the program and thus did not satisfy the active state supervision prong); see also S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 56–57 (1985).

#### Private sector is not “controlled” by state

**JTP 21** (Java T Point, https://www.javatpoint.com/public-sector-vs-private-sector)

The **public sector** is the sector which includes both **public companies** and **services**. In other words, the public sector is the sector that is under government's control. The public sector includes agencies, enterprises, banks, companies, etc., that are controlled by the government. Some examples of the public sector include infrastructure, sewers, public transit, healthcare, goods, services, etc. The public sector is made of three parts, i.e., the judiciary, legislative, and executive. These three segments combine and make the private sector. One of the major aims of the public sector is to have a balance between economy and wealth. The public sector is under the state control. More or less, the companies and agencies under the public sector are owned by the state. Now, let us look at some contrasting points between these sectors.

Private Sector

The private sector is defined as the **sector** wherein the **economy** is controlled by **private groups**. In layman's terms, a **private sector** is the sector that is **not under the control of the state**. Private sectors are run by companies yielding profits. The private sector can also be called as the citizen sector. Examples of the private sector are ICICI Bank, ITC Limited, HDFC Bank, etc. Apart from the banks, the proprietors, businessmen, accountants, SMEs, etc., are some other examples of the private sector. The major objective of the private sector is to earn maximum profits and have sole ownership or control. The private banks have better management systems, due to which they are able to yield more profits. Some of the private companies include Vitol, Koch Industries, Huawei, etc.

## CIL CP

### Court CP – CIL NB – 2AC

#### Squo gradual incorporation solves but formal obligation fails

Bradley 16 [Curtis A. Bradley, William Van Alstyne Professor, Duke Law School, 2016 http://www.californialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/7-Bradley.pdf]

In his informative and timely book, Justice Breyer repeatedly emphasizes that the Supreme Court is a domestic court, not an international tribunal, and that there is no Supreme Court for the world.1 Against that backdrop, Justice Breyer suggests various functions that the Supreme Court can perform as it faces an increasingly international docket, such as promoting harmonization, fostering collaboration, and helping to promote the rule of law. I do not disagree that the Supreme Court can play these roles in appropriate cases. In this Essay, I will describe another important role that the Supreme Court does and should serve, which is to act as a filter between international law and the American constitutional system. Although not Justice Breyer’s focus, this filtering role is illustrated by a number of the cases that he discusses in his book.

By filter, I do not mean that the Court is or should be some sort of impermeable barrier to international law. Rather, the idea is that the Court should ensure that when international law passes into the U.S. legal system, it does so in a manner consistent with domestic constitutional values. Although this filtering process might in some instances dilute or narrow international law as it is applied within the United States, this is not inevitably the result. Filters can operate to improve and refine something for a particular purpose—think of a filter for coffee, for example—and this is often what happens when U.S. courts attempt to tailor international law to the U.S. domestic system.

This filtering role is needed because international law is generated through processes that often make it ill-suited for direct application in the U.S. legal system, and because it is frequently designed to perform functions different from those demanded of domestic law. The two principal sources of international law are customary international law and treaties. Customary international law arises out of the evolving practices and beliefs of nations.2 Although the United States contributes to its formation and change, this body of law does not require any specific approval process in the United States. Moreover, because customary international law is unwritten and evolving, its content is often uncertain and contested. Indeed, even the types of evidence that should count toward ascertaining its content are the subjects of substantial dispute.3 Because of its contested and evolutionary character, determinations of the content of customary international law implicate not only legal considerations but also considerations of U.S. foreign policy.4

#### No spillover – zero ev that the plan’s one use of CIL will be broadly included

#### CIL not key – international coop is ingrained in multiple institutions

Estreicher 3 Law Professor at NYU, (Samuel, “Rethinking the Binding Effect of Customary International Law,” Virginia Journal of International Law Association, Fall, 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 5)

As for the subsidiary law that an increasingly interdependent world needs in advance of treaties, traditional CIL could not easily play this role as it was essentially backwards looking. The new, instantaneous customary law tries to play this role, but in a way that hardly comports with legitimacy. Without relying on CIL, states, international organizations, and other actors have ample means of identifying problems requiring interstate cooperation, drafting instruments that might command state support, and marshaling the forces of moral suasion. It is hard to see that the "law" aspiration of CIL offers the prospect of a significant incremental gain. In any event, the ultimate question is whether any such benefit warrants the accompanying costs - to which I now turn.

### Court CP – CIL – 2AC

#### Or – doesn’t solve – leaves Parker immunity on the books in context of antitrust laws – providing shield for private entities and chilling states

Squire 6 [Richard Squire Fordham University School of Law Professor, 2006 https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1066&context=faculty\_scholarship]

My proposed rules would be judge-made, which raises a threshold question. The preemptive scope of federal antitrust law is ultimately a question of congressional intent (at least to the extent that Congress does not overreach the Commerce Clause). And Congress unlike courts is not bound under principles of stare decisis to pay deference to previous judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act. Why then do I propose new judge-made rules rather than new legislation?

Despite the superficial merits of a congressional solution, I believe that a judicial fix is both possible and preferable. It is possible because, the dignity of precedent notwithstanding, courts that have tangled themselves in confused doctrine are not permitted simply to sit down and wait for Congress to rescue them. They must soldier on, cutting through thickets of their own creation if necessary. It is for this reason that principles of stare decisis permit courts to depart from precedent that is "badly reasoned," 10 7 marked by "indeterminacy," 1 08 or a "continuing source of confusion.'" 0 9

[Footnote 109] 109. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 710; see also Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 744-45 (1994) (noting that precedent may be overruled if it lacks a "coherent rationale" and creates "confusion in the lower courts").

And there are few surer recipes for confusion and indeterminacy than the Court's violation requirement, which is contradicted by the facts of every state-action immunity case in which the Court has blocked enforcement of state law, and which causes judges to ignore basic questions such as whether a litigant wishes federal or state law declared unenforceable. Also, adherence to precedent is supposed to promote "reliance on judicial decisions,"' 1 0 but no good can come from reliance on jurisprudence that is inherently misleading. State legislators who searched for antitrust cases in which the Supreme Court actually mentions preemption would find only those decisions (such as Rice) in which the Court faithfully applies the violation requirement to uphold the state law in question. The decisions (such as Midcal) that are most relevant to legislators-in which the Court strikes down state law despite the lack of a violation-do not even mention preemption, and thus lie as traps for the unwary. And even these decisions do not announce that the violation requirement is a fiction; legislators can detect this crucial fact only if they also understand the complicated antitrust definition of a vertical price-fixing agreement. Finally, legislators who discover the truth about the violation requirement are not thereby rewarded with clear drafting instructions: not even the best-informed lawmakers could reliably legislate around the type of open-ended judicial analysis seen in Hertz.

## Adv CP

## State Sovereignty

### State Sovereignty DA – 2AC

#### Finishing meese:

#### No link turns – knee-jerk defenses of Parker on federalism grounds are under-theorized – the aff’s links are more robustly aligned with federalism

Meese 21 [Alan J. Meese, Ball Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School and Co-Director, William & Mary Center for the Study of Law and Markets. 16 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 115, Fall 2021, Lexis]

The Court has repeatedly and unanimously claimed that considerations of "federalism and state sovereignty" justify state action immunity and thus counsel against Sherman Act preemption of state-imposed or state-authorized restraints. Numerous scholars agree. In particular, the Court and its academic defenders claim that applying the Act to state-imposed restraints would unduly interfere with states' ability to serve as laboratories of democracy, choosing how to regulate their own economies, contrary to the principles of federalism. The vast post- Wickard reach of the Sherman Act reinforces this argument, by facilitating application of the Act to local restraints - including those imposed by state governments - that produce no interstate harm. Indeed, aside from Parker itself, all state action controversies that have reached the Supreme Court, including the Court's most recent pronouncement on the topic, involve local restraints that produce harm confined to a single state. 17 Thus, some have claimed that, given the expansive scope of the Sherman Act, application of the Act to state-imposed restraints would implicitly resurrect the Lochner era, during which the Court invalidated state legislation that unduly restricted private economic autonomy. The state action doctrine, it is said, leaves regulatory choices over local economic activity where they belong, with the people's elected representatives instead of federal judges.

Although the Court decided Parker more than seven decades ago, the "federalism and state sovereignty" rationale for state action immunity remains under-theorized. Some academic articulations of this rationale invoke the Constitution itself, suggesting that preemption of state-imposed restraints [\*121] would be unconstitutional. Other articulations by the Court and scholars vaguely invoke "federalism," "state sovereignty," or both, without claiming that the Constitution prevents Sherman Act preemption of state-imposed restraints. Some scholars have suggested that Parker reflects the application of a federalism canon, albeit without identifying any particular canon. Thus, objective evaluation of Parker's state action defense requires scholars to identify the doctrinal vehicles through which federalism and state sovereignty might influence the meaning of the Act and to determine whether Parker and its progeny constitute faithful application of such principles.

This article evaluates and rejects the claim that considerations of federalism and state sovereignty somehow rebut the strong case for Sherman Act preemption of state-imposed restraints. Instead, consistent application of federalism principles bolsters the case for preemption of state-imposed restraints, like those in Parker, that directly burden interstate commerce and impose interstate harm. At the same time, considerations of federalism also counsel retraction of the scope of the Act and concomitant allocation to the states of exclusive authority over restraints that produce only intrastate harm. The resulting allocation of authority over trade restraints would nearly eliminate the potential conflicts between local regulation and the Sherman Act, conflicts that many claim justify the state action doctrine.

The article identifies two broad categories of arguments that supposedly support the state action doctrine. First, Parker's proponents could claim that one or more constitutional doctrines that protect federalism or state sovereignty somehow prohibit outright Sherman Act preemption of state-imposed restraints. Second, these proponents could argue that such considerations find expression in one or more canons of statutory construction and thereby militate against reading the Sherman Act to preempt such restraints, despite Congress's admitted authority to do so.

The article evaluates the arguments in each category and finds all such arguments wanting. Beginning with the first category, the article demonstrates that no doctrine of constitutional law requires Parker's state action doctrine. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly concluded that the Framers and Ratifiers adopted the Commerce Clause precisely because of their experience with state-imposed restraints that unduly burdened interstate commerce and imposed harm on out-of-state citizens. According to this historical account, the Clause was designed to empower Congress to prohibit such parochial state legislation, thereby removing barriers to a well-functioning national market and establishing free trade as the rule governing interstate commercial activity.

[\*122] While affirmative statutory preemption was relatively rare during the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries, the Supreme Court read the Commerce Clause to authorize implied preemption of otherwise valid state legislation that directly burdens interstate commerce. Moreover, as the scope of the power has expanded over the past several decades, Congress has repeatedly exercised this authority to preempt state laws regulating local matters in numerous settings. To be sure, independent considerations of state sovereignty can constrain Congress's exercise of the commerce power. However, Sherman Act preemption of state-imposed restraints does not interfere with a state's organization or regulation of itself, officers, or employees and thus does not interfere with any cognizable aspect of state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment, Eleventh Amendment, or inferred from the structure of the Constitution. Thus, preemption of state-imposed restraints like those challenged in Parker is a garden-variety exercise of Congress's commerce power.

To evaluate arguments in the second category, the article identifies three canons of statutory construction that could serve as vehicles for implementing concerns regarding federalism and state sovereignty: (1) the avoidance canon; (2) the federal-state balance canon, and (3) the anti-preemption canon. None of these canons, it is shown, supports Parker's state action doctrine. The article concludes that Sherman Act preemption of state-imposed restraints is so plainly constitutional that the avoidance canon is simply inapposite. The article then applies the federal-state balance and anti-preemption canons. Both canons protect traditional state regulatory spheres from inadvertent national intrusion, whether by regulation of local private conduct or preemption of state exercise of historic police powers. Far from bolstering the state action doctrine, the application of these two canons reveals that Parker's invocation of federalism and state sovereignty is selective, purporting to solve a problem that the Court itself created. Consistent application of these canons and the federalism principles that inform them actually strengthens the case for Sherman Act preemption, albeit within a much narrower sphere than the Sherman Act currently operates. The federal-state balance canon addresses statutory regulation of private conduct and thus does not speak directly to state action cases such as Parker, where a state itself displaced free competition. 18The canon could, however, apply to hybrid restraints, private agreements encouraged or enforced by the [\*123] state. Academic and judicial proponents of the state action doctrine have expressed concern about possible Sherman Act preemption of state and municipal regulation, including hybrid restraints, of local activities that produce no interstate harm. Such federal oversight, they say, would deprive state and local governments of their status as laboratories of democracy that try out novel solutions, such as hybrid restraints, to local problems. Application of the federal-state balance canon to prevent preemption of laws authorizing such restraints would apparently vindicate these concerns. However, such concerns have much wider application than Sherman Act treatment of state-imposed or state-encouraged restraints. If states are to be sovereign laboratories that experiment with novel solutions to economic problems, they must also retain discretion regarding how to regulate all private restraints - not just hybrid restraints - that produce no interstate harm. Indeed, principled application of the federal-state balance canon would have required the Court to reject the post- Wickard expansion of the Sherman Act to reach all private restraints that produce no interstate harm. The Court instead ignored this canon, vastly expanding the reach of the Act vis a vis private restraints the state has not authorized. This expansion raised the prospect of Sherman Act preemption of local regulation, including regulation authorizing hybrid restraints. Parker and its progeny thwarted such preemption, protecting - to this extent anyway - traditional state regulatory prerogatives. Consistent application of the federal-state balance canon offers a different and more principled solution, namely, restoration of the pre- Wickard boundary between state and federal power over trade restraints and retraction of the scope of the Sherman Act. Such revision of the boundaries between state and federal authority over such activity would nearly eliminate the potential clash between the Sherman Act and local regulation that purportedly induced Parker and its progeny to announce and maintain the state action doctrine. States would remain free to act as laboratories with respect to such restraints, unmolested by the Sherman Act. Restoration of the original federal-state balance in the antitrust context would not eliminate the prospect of Sherman Act preemption of state-imposed or state-encouraged restraints. States could authorize hybrid restraints that directly burden interstate commerce, thereby injuring out-of-state consumers. However, Sherman Act invalidation of such restraints would in fact protect the original federal-state balance, by interdicting the sort of direct burdens on interstate commerce preempted by the Court's pre- Wickard Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The anti-preemption canon fares no better as a justification for the state action doctrine. To be sure, this canon establishes a presumption against [\*124] applying federal statutes in a manner that supersedes the exercise of "historic police powers" over "an area traditionally regulated by the states." However, this canon would not protect the scheme in Parker itself. The scheme in no way exercised historic police powers but instead regulated a domain - interstate commerce - over which Congress traditionally possessed exclusive authority. California's regulation of the price of interstate raisin sales produced substantial interstate harm and thus would not have survived the doctrine of implied preemption in place when Congress enacted the Sherman Act. Preemption of the Parker scheme would have restored the traditional federal-state balance, by invalidating self-interested legislation that directly burdened interstate commerce and imposed substantial harm on out-of-state citizens. What, though, about Parker-like regulation that produces only intrastate harm? Sherman Act preemption of such restraints would certainly interfere with the exercise of historic police powers. Here again, however, application of the anti-preemption canon would solve a problem the Court itself created when it ignored the federal-state balance canon and applied the Sherman Act to private restraints that produced no interstate harm. As noted above, however, principled application of federalism concerns as reflected in the federal-state balance canon would preclude application of the Sherman Act to such restraints - public or private. Restoration of the Sherman Act to its original and more limited scope would eliminate the putative conflict between federal antitrust law and local regulation producing no interstate harm and thus obviate any need to apply the anti-preemption canon. Application of both federalism canons reveals that federalism in this context should be an all-or-nothing proposition. Consistent regard for federalism requires uniform treatment of private contracts "in restraint of trade" and state-imposed restraints that produce the same results. There are two possible forms of consistent treatment: (1) invalidation of all such local restraints, public or private, "across the board," or (2) reducing the scope of the Sherman Act, so that the Act only reaches those restraints - public or private - that produce interstate harm. Recognition that the Court's Sherman Act jurisprudence reflects inconsistent regard for federalism does not itself reveal which consistent approach the Court should take. The article ends by identifying several considerations suggesting that the Court should resolve the modern inconsistency in favor of federalism. Consistent reduction in the scope of the Sherman Act would produce a regime governing interstate commerce that best replicates the regulatory framework that the 1890 Congress - jealous to protect free competition from all threats - anticipated. Proponents of Parker [\*125] who see states as laboratories for economic experimentation should welcome such reform, which, ironically, would result in less preemption of state-created restraints than current law. Part I of this article reviews the content and scope of the Sherman Act during the pre- Wickard era, when the Supreme Court enforced meaningful limits on the scope of the commerce power and the Sherman Act. Part II describes the facts and holding of Parker as well as subsequent decisions elaborating on the scope of state action immunity. This part also details the considerations of federalism and state sovereignty that both the Court and academic proponents of Parker have invoked. Part III reviews the federalism-based objections to Sherman Act preemption that several scholars have raised. Part IV evaluates and rejects the constitutional arguments against such preemption. Part V evaluates and rejects claims that certain canons of statutory construction counsel in favor of Parker's state action immunity. This part concludes that Parker and its progeny rest on a selective respect for federalism and concludes that a principled Sherman Act jurisprudence would consistently enforce or ignore federalism considerations. Part VI briefly contends that the Court should resolve modern doctrinal inconsistency in favor of federalism and reform the scope of the Sherman Act accordingly.

I. The Commerce Power and the Sherman Act: 1890-Present

Passed in 1890, Section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids "contracts, combinations ... and conspiracyies in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States ..." 19Section 2 prohibits monopolization of any "part of the trade or commerce among the several States." 20Each Sherman Act controversy thus requires courts to resolve two questions. Under Section 1, courts must ask: (1) Is the challenged agreement "in restraint of trade" and (2) does the agreement also restrain "commerce among the several States." 21Under Section 2, courts must ask: (1) does the challenged conduct "monopolize" a relevant market and (2) is that monopolized market "part of the trade or commerce among the several States." 22 [\*126] The Sherman Act was an exercise of the commerce power, and Congress drafted the Act against the backdrop of a well-developed jurisprudence defining the scope and nature of that authority. 23While Congress rarely exercised this power before 1890, the Supreme Court had enforced what became known as the "dormant" Commerce Clause. 24The Court constructed a quasi-statutory framework that invalidated all state legislation that regulated "inherently national" subjects of interstate commerce, even absent Congressional action. 25These decisions inferred from Congressional silence that Congress intended that such subjects be "free and untrammeled" from state regulation. 26 State legislation "regulated" such commerce and thus exercised an exclusive power of Congress if it imposed a "direct burden" on such commerce. 27Impacts were "direct" if they imposed economic harm on citizens in other states, raising the prospect that state regulation would produce self-interested results. 28Legislation that impacted such commerce only "indirectly" exceeded the scope of the commerce power and thus survived this regime. 29The result was the allocation of regulatory authority into mutually exclusive spheres, enforced by a doctrine of implied preemption that invalidated state enactments exercising authority reserved for Congress. 30 [\*127] The Court's earliest Sherman Act decisions drew upon this jurisprudence to answer both questions necessary to resolve Sherman Act controversies. 31Agreements were "in restraint of trade" if they directly impacted commerce by producing supracompetitive prices. 32Such agreements only restrained "commerce among the several States" if these direct impacts injured out-of-state consumers. 33Indeed, in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, the Court opined that the Commerce Clause authorized Congress to regulate private agreements producing such direct effects because these restraints produced the same impact on interstate commerce as analogous state-imposed restraints deemed invalid under the Court's Commerce Clause precedents. 34 In 1911, the Court famously reformulated its interpretation of "restraint of trade," in Standard Oil v. United States. 35There the Court held that the Sherman Act only reaches agreements or conduct that restrain trade "unreasonably." 36Soon thereafter, the Court announced that this same standard governed Section 2 analysis. 37Although a different verbal formulation, this Rule of Reason, like the direct/indirect standard, focused on the propensity of a restraint or conduct to produce monopoly or the consequences of monopoly, namely, higher prices, reduced output, or inferior quality. 38However, the Court retained the direct/indirect standard for [\*128] answering the second question posed in Sherman Act controversies, that is, whether a contract in restraint of trade or monopolistic conduct also restrained "commerce among the several States" or monopolized any "part" of "trade or commerce among the several States." 39Thus, the Act reached only those unreasonable restraints or monopolistic conduct that also directly burdened interstate commerce by exercising market power to the detriment of out-of-state consumers. 40 By 1911, then, the Rule of Reason, combined with the direct/standard governing the Act's scope, protected "the free movement of trade ... in the channels of interstate commerce" 41or, as the Court soon put it, "free competition in interstate commerce," from private restraints. 42At the same time, the Court's quasi-statutory Commerce Clause jurisprudence invalidated state legislation that imposed "direct burdens" on interstate commerce. 43This coherent legal regime protected free interstate trade from threats posed by the self-interested public and private actors. 44Implementation of each regime required the Court to ask the same economic question when applying the direct/indirect standard, viz., did the challenged private conduct or legislation directly obstruct or burden interstate commerce. This regime left states and private parties free to adopt regulations or restraints that imposed [\*129] indirect burdens on such commerce, as such provisions posed no threat to out-of-state consumers. This unified competition-protecting regime survived into the 1930s, invalidating private and public direct burdens on interstate commerce. 45Indeed, the Court had no occasion to consider whether the Sherman Act preempted state legislation that directly burdened interstate commerce precisely because the Court's quasi-statutory Commerce Clause jurisprudence itself preempted such restraints, rendering any Sherman Act involvement superfluous. The Court adjusted application of the direct/indirect standard over time in light of changed facts that suggested the existence of interstate harm that prior Courts had not perceived. 46For instance, early decisions, such as United States v. E.C. Knight, held that the Sherman Act did not reach intrastate monopolies, even if such firms sold products across state lines. 47However, beginning with Standard Oil, the Court read the Act (and the commerce power) to reach activities that, while nominally local, "directly" affected interstate commerce by exercising market power to the detriment of out-of-state consumers, narrowing E.C. Knight accordingly. 48While the effective reach of the commerce power and the Sherman Act changed, the interstate harm principle that governed the boundary between state and national power - and the concomitant economic inquiry - remained fixed and unchanging. 49A robust regime of competitive federalism generated regulatory policy, including antitrust policy, governing economic activity that [\*130] produced no interstate harms and thus fell within the exclusive authority of states. This coherent regime and resulting allocation of regulatory power did not survive the 1940s. In Wickard v. Filburn, the Supreme Court famously jettisoned the direct/indirect test as the standard governing the scope of the commerce power, claiming that the standard was mechanical, formalistic and unduly restricted the authority of Congress. 50Instead, the Court said: the Commerce Clause empowered Congress to reach any activity that produced a "substantial economic effect" on interstate commerce, even if the effect was incidental or indirect. 51This novel standard empowered Congress to regulate conduct that produced no interstate harm and thus could not prompt legislation favoring a state's citizens over those of other states. 52 Wickard also implied that state and federal power over local activity was coextensive and thus not mutually exclusive, as the Court had previously maintained for several decades. 53 Wickard was not an antitrust case. However, before the decade was out, in Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar, the Court engrafted Wickard's substantial effects test onto the Sherman Act, overruling five decades of precedent. 54As a result, the Act reached any restraint of trade that induced a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce, even if the restraint's harms were confined to a single state. The Court has applied the Act to intrastate conspiracies between liquor wholesalers, 55a monopolistic scheme to prevent expansion of a single hospital, 56an agreement between lawyers setting title search fees in one county, 57and a trade association's conspiracy to restrict entry by subcontractors working on local building projects. 58 [\*131] Most recently, the Court affirmed the Federal Trade Commission's condemnation of an agreement excluding some individuals from the practice of teeth whitening in one state. 59The Commission had found that the challenged conduct substantially impacted interstate commerce because some affected firms purchased out-of-state equipment and supplies. 60Numerous other decisions have also involved restraints that produced harmless but fortuitous interstate effects. 61 Mandeville Island Farms read a novel principle into the Act, a principle that authorized application of the statute to restraints that threatened no interstate harm. While initially developed to govern private restraints, Mandeville Island Farms' substantial effects test created broad potential to interdict state-imposed restraints of local trade previously deemed beyond the commerce power. 62

II. Parker and its Progeny

Parker v. Brown evaluated the post- Wickard claim that the Sherman Act preempted anti-competitive state regulation. This part describes the facts and holding of Parker as well as subsequent decisions expanding the scope of state action immunity and elaborating upon its rationale. The part ends by detailing the considerations of federalism and state sovereignty that both the Court and academic proponents of Parker have invoked. A. Parker v. Brown Decided shortly after Wickard but before Mandeville Island Farms, Parker v. Brown considered a challenge to California's "Agricultural Prorate Act," as applied to the state's raisin industry. 63The Court properly described the Act as an effort to "restrict competition among growers and maintain prices in the distribution of their commodities to packers[.]" 64The statute empowered a State Agricultural Prorate Commission to propose to growers so-called "pro-rate marketing plans" limiting output and thus raising the prices of agricultural commodities. Proposals became law if 65 percent of growers owning 51 percent or more of acreage devoted to a particular crop voted to approve it. California farms produced 100 percent of the nation's raisin output, and imports accounted for one-sixth of one percent of national raisin consumption. 65Growers generally sold their output to local "packers," who packaged the raisins and sold 90-95 percent to out-of-state purchasers. 66In 1940, the Commission proposed and producers adopted a raisin pro-rate plan. The plan required the state's growers to deliver 70 percent of their output of "standard raisins" to a "program committee" which could only sell raisins at "prevailing market prices" or hold them off the market indefinitely. 67Growers were free to sell the remaining crop through "ordinary commercial channels" at whatever price they wished, albeit only after purchasing a "marketing certificate" authorizing such sales. 68The Act imposed civil penalties, fines and/or imprisonment for violation. 69Thus, the Act coercively replaced the pre-existing regime of free competition between private individuals with market outcomes determined by the State. A dissenting farmer who was both a grower and a packer challenged the program under the Commerce Clause and the Sherman Act. 70The plaintiff [\*133] sought to enjoin officials from enforcing the Act against him, thereby allowing him to continue setting whatever price and output maximized his profits in a free market. 71He argued that such equitable relief was necessary because the Act's "unusual, oppressive and unreasonable" criminal penalties deterred him from waiting to be prosecuted under state law before invoking the Commerce Clause and Sherman Act as "defensive tactics," i.e., as affirmative defenses. 72In short, the plaintiff invoked two possible sources of federal preemption: the Sherman Act and the Commerce Clause. 73 Writing before Wickard, a three-judge district court enjoined the Act. 74The court held that the Prorate Act, while regulating local activity, directly burdened interstate commerce and thus contravened the quasi-statutory regime of implied preemption derived from the Commerce Clause. 75The court invoked with approval various decisions implementing the pre- Wickard regime dividing authority over commercial subjects between states and the national government. 76Given the court's Commerce Clause holding, it did not address the Sherman Act. 77 California appealed to the Supreme Court, which, after oral argument, ordered re-argument and additional briefing, including from the United States [\*134] as Amicus Curiae, on the possible application of the Sherman Act. 78In a brief co-authored by antitrust hawk Thurmond Arnold, the United States argued that both the Sherman Act and the quasi-statutory regime derived from the Commerce Clause preempted California's scheme. The whole point of the Act, the government said, was to ensure that "competition, not combination, should be the law of trade." 79The "end sought," the government continued, was "the prevention of restraints of free competition in business and commercial transactions, which tended to restrict production, raise prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers of goods or services." 80While the Sherman Act did not expressly refer to state enactments, the Court's precedents established that a federal statute preempted any state law "that stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 81 Invoking pre- Wickard antitrust decisions applying the direct/indirect standard, the government contended that California's regulation of local activity, in fact, monopolized the national raisin market and thus increased ( i.e. regulated) the price of raisins sold in interstate commerce. 82There was "no doubt," the government said that "the plan involved in this case controls the market price," which increased thirty percent one year after the adoption of the scheme. 83It did not matter that the growers sold their output to California packers. 84Sherman Act precedent established that agreements to "restrain or control the supply ... entering and moving in interstate commerce" were "a "direct violation'" of the Act. 85Because the plan reduced output and increased the prices paid by packers, the scheme would "undoubtedly directly affect and restrain the supply and price of raisins in interstate commerce." 86The pro-rate plan was "inconsistent with the policy embodied in the Sherman Act" and thus preempted. 87 [\*135] The government's Commerce Clause argument echoed similar themes. "Inherently national subjects" of interstate commerce, the government said, were subject to exclusive congressional control. 88The Court's precedents "regarded as a matter of great consequence whether the burden of a statute fell primarily upon persons outside of the regulating state." 89"If anything was of national commercial importance," the government continued, "the supply and price level of a commodity moving in interstate commerce falls into that category." 90Moreover, the program plainly regulated that subject, granting to a state agency the power to "monopolize the entire national supply of raisins, determine the quantity to be shipped in interstate commerce, and to control the interstate price structure." 91The benefits of the scheme "accrued to California Producers," with the result that "the action of the state is not likely to be subjected to the normal political restraints upon legislation." 92The program did not merely govern a matter of local concern but instead "determined the quantity of raisins which may go to market - and the market is the national interstate market." 93Based on these and other considerations, the government concluded, "the California raisin program is unconstitutional." 94 A unanimous Court rejected both challenges. The Court properly assumed that the Sherman Act would condemn such a program if adopted and enforced solely by private agreement. 95While the scheme limited the output of "local" crops, the resulting harm fell almost entirely on out-of-state [\*136] citizens. These direct and predictable interstate harms justified application of the Act to nominally "local" conduct, even under pre- Wickard precedents. 96 Beginning with the Sherman Act, the Court conceded for the sake of argument that Congress could preempt state-imposed restraints like California's plan. 97In particular, the Court noted with approval several decisions holding that Congressional legislation had occupied a "legislative field" and thus "suspended" state laws. 98Suspension, of course, was synonymous with preemption, and such decisions exemplified what the Court now calls "field preemption." 99The Court did not mention decisions invoked by the United States recognizing "conflict preemption," which invalidated state laws creating obstacles to the accomplishment of federal objectives. 100 Still, the Court found that the Sherman Act did not "suspend" California's pro-rate plan. The plan was not, the Court said, a private agreement but "derived its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of the state, and was not intended to operate or become effective without that command." 101Neither the Act's language nor its legislative history, the Court said, evinced any purpose "to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature." 102 [\*137] The Court expressly invoked federalism considerations to support this conclusion, contending that the Constitution's division of sovereignty between national and state governments counseled against application of the Sherman Act to such restraints: In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress. 103 The statute's legislative history contained no indication that the Act would apply to such state action, the Court said, and the main sponsor of the bill, Senator Sherman, had asserted that it "prevented only "business combinations.'" 104 Having rejected the Sherman Act challenge, the Court went on to reverse the lower court's Commerce Clause holding that invalidated the scheme. 105The Court conceded that California's regulation of "matters of local concern" was "so related to interstate commerce that it also operated as a regulation of that commerce," that is, the interstate sale of raisins. 106Under pre-1890 (and pre- Wickard) case law, this conclusion that a state was regulating the price of interstate transactions or transportation sufficed to invalidate the scheme. 107However, Congress had not, the Court said, exercised its commerce power (given the Court's Sherman Act holding!), with the result that the Court [\*138] should "reconcile[]" Congressional and state power. 108Such "reconciliation," the Court said, required "the accommodation of competing demands of state and national interests involved." 109 Analogizing to Wickard, the Court rejected the direct/indirect standard for assessing the validity of the restraints, signaling that even direct restraints of interstate commerce could survive Commerce Clause scrutiny. 110The inquiry was not, the Court said, whether the restraint was "direct," (as it assuredly was), but instead whether "the matter is one which may appropriately be regulated in the interest of safety, health and well-being of local communities and, because of its local character, and the practical difficulties involved, may never be adequately dealt with by Congress." 111Because of the activity's "local character," the Court said, there might be a "wide scope for local regulation without substantially impairing the national interest in the regulation of commerce by a single authority and without materially obstructing the free flow of commerce." 112The Court did not explain why the impact of California's self-interested control over the nation's entire raisin supply was "immaterial." 113Nor did it mention various decisions invalidating state regulation of the price and output of products subsequently sold across state lines because they "directly impacted" such commerce. 114 The Court confined its Sherman Act holding to state-imposed restraints on market actors. Such restraints coercively restricted the rights of individuals to engage in the sort of free competition the Sherman Act [\*139] ensures. 115By contrast, the Court said, a state could not "give immunity to those [private parties] who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful." 116Nor, Parker said, could a state participate in otherwise unlawful agreements or combinations with private parties. 117The Court thereby conceded that the Act would preempt some state laws, presumably because such state endorsed conduct or conduct of the state itself would nonetheless conflict with federal law. 118 Thus was born antitrust's "state action doctrine," whereby state-imposed restraints of interstate commerce are "immune" from the Sherman Act, regardless of their economic effects. 119 Parker has remained good law without question for more than seven decades, despite the Court's flexible approach to stare decisis in the antitrust context. 120 B. Parker 's Progeny: Hybrid and Municipal Restraints While Parker purported only to immunize restraints imposed by "a state or its officers or agents," subsequent decisions expanded the doctrine. These cases protected restraints that private parties adopted pursuant to otherwise valid state regulatory programs, reasoning that the threat of private antitrust liability would deter parties from participating in such schemes. 121Indeed, [\*140] some such regimes require all parties in a particular industry to adhere to prices set by a subset of the industry's firms. 122For instance, a statute might require liquor dealers to set retail prices equal to wholesale prices plus a specified mark up. 123Some scholars have dubbed such agreements "hybrid restraints," whereby "the government empowers private firms to make choices, or to exercise discretion, as to the nature or level of consumer injury." 124Such restraints "cede[] to private actors "a degree of private regulatory power' that results in a restraint of trade" 125States can immunize such private restraints from the Sherman Act, and thus escape preemption, if: (1) the legislature clearly articulates a policy to restrict competition and (2) the state "actively supervises" the outcomes ( e.g. price and output) of resulting restraints. 126The liquor regulation just described would satisfy the first part of this test because the state has expressly supplanted competition. Thus, the scheme's validity would depend upon how closely the state scrutinized resulting prices. 127 Such "hybrid" restraints are a small subset of the universe of unreasonable private restraints. Indeed, states' own antitrust laws generally ban unreasonable private restraints. 128When it comes to private restraints, hybrid restraints are the exception and not the rule. [\*141] The Court has applied a similar regime to restraints imposed by municipalities, holding that such entities do not possess the sovereignty possessed by states. 129Restraints imposed by municipalities are fully subject to the Sherman Act, unless the state has clearly articulated a policy displacing competition. 130There is, however, no "active supervision" requirement for such restraints. 131 Thus, Parker and its progeny recognize three distinct types of state-created restraints that thwart free competition but may still escape Sherman Act preemption. First, there are cases like Parker itself, where states coercively displace free competition, expressly setting price or output. Such restraints are without exception immune from the Act, and thus escape preemption. Second, there are hybrid restraints, where the state authorizes or compels private actors to engage in anticompetitive behavior. 132These restraints are immune from the Act if the state satisfies the elements of clear articulation and active supervision. Third there are those cases where a municipality coercively displaces free competition. 133Such restraints are immune if the state satisfies the "clear articulation" requirement. 134 Failure to establish the prerequisites of state action immunity for hybrid or municipal restraints results in two legal consequences: (1) Sherman Act liability for private parties who comply with such restraints and (2) preemption of state or local enactments that authorize or compel such agreements. 135It will be useful to distinguish between these categories of [\*142] state action immunity when evaluating the arguments against preemption of state interference with free competition.

C. The Federalism and State Sovereignty Rationales for the State Action Doctrine

The Court has repeatedly reiterated the federalism and state sovereignty rationales for Parker and its progeny , invoking Parker's reference to our "dual system." 136If anything the Court has increased the emphasis on these rationales for the doctrine; modern decisions identify no other normative justification. It is no surprise that jurists supportive of these values in other contexts have invoked such considerations. 137However, jurists hostile to such values in other contexts have also endorsed Parker and its progeny on identical grounds. 138

Numerous scholars have endorsed Parker's understanding of the Sherman Act. 139

[Footnote 139] See, e.g., William H. Page & John E. Lopatka , Parker v. Brown, the Eleventh Amendment, and Anticompetitive State Regulation, 60 WM. L. REV . 1465, 1472 (2019); James R. Saywell, The Six Sides of Federalism in North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 76 OHIO ST. L. J. FURTHERMORE 1, 4-9 (2015); Jean Wegman Burns, Embracing Both Faces of Antitrust Federalism: Parker and ARC America Corp., 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 29, 38 (2000); Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political Process, 96 YALE L. J. 486 (1987); William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and Critique of the State Action Exemption, 61 B.U.L. Rev. 1099, 1101 (1981); Handler, supra note 118, at 19-20; Paul R. Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 328 (1975).

These scholars echo Parker's invocation of the nation's "dual system" [\*143] and contend that Sherman Act preemption of state-created restraints would trench unduly upon what they characterize as "constitutional" values of state sovereignty and federalism. 140

[Footnote 140] See Page & Lopatka , supra note 139, at 1468-69; Saywell, supra note 139, at 4-9; Burns, supra note 139, at 38-39 (invoking Supreme Court decisions recognizing the "fundamental dual-government structure of the Federal Constitution" to justify Parker); id. (contending that the "dual structure of the federal Constitution ... "requires that Congress treat the States in a manner consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the governance of the Nation [sic].'") (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 709 (1999)); id. at 38 ("When applied to antitrust, these [recent federalism] rulings make crystal clear that, as a practical matter, antitrust federalism is here to stay. Even if Congress tried to override or limit the Parker shield, such an attempt likely would fail."); Page, supra note 139, at 1102-1107 (describing and endorsing "constitutional basis of the Parker doctrine"); id. at 1128-30 (contending that "active supervision" requirement for hybrid restraints contravenes Parker's constitutional foundation); James F. Blumstein & Terry Calvani, State Action as a Shield and a Sword in a Medical Services Antitrust Context: Parker v. Brown in Constitutional Perspective, 1978 DUKE L. J. 389, 419-24 n.193 (grounding state action doctrine in Tenth Amendment case law); Mark L. Davidson & Robert D. Butters, Parker and Usery: Portended Constitutional Limits on the Federal Interdiction of Anticompetitive State Action, 31 VAND. L. REV. 575, 597-604 (1978) (same); Handler , supra note 118, at 7 n.35 (contending that preemption of state-imposed restraints would "breach[] the basic tenets of the federalism upon which rests our constitutional form of government."); id. at 15 (contending that Sherman Act scrutiny of such restraints "is plainly at war with the fundamental principles of American federalism"); see also Brief Amicus Curiae for the Am. Dental Ass'n, N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494 (2015) (No. 13-534) (criticizing preemption of state's anticompetitive regulation as "trampling upon the sovereignty of the states in our federal system"); Allensworth , supra note 62, at 1402-04 (discussing academic literature contending that Parker rests on constitutional limits on Congress's authority to override state regulation).

Several have also elaborated upon Parker's rationale, contending that the Constitution contemplates that states should be entitled to "regulate their own economies." 141

Several such scholars argue that post- Wickard expansion of the Act to reach local restraints producing no interstate harm bolsters the case for immunity. 142Reversal of Parker, they say , would ensure federal antitrust [\*144] scrutiny of innumerable garden-variety police power regulations, many governing purely local subjects, because such regulations restrain activity with fortuitous but substantial impacts on interstate commerce. 143Federal judicial scrutiny of local regulation would, it is said, replicate the supervision of state economic regulation under the Due Process Clause during the Lochner era. 144These fears have a strong empirical basis. Aside from Parker itself, every Supreme Court decision applying the state action doctrine has involved regulation of local activity that produced only intrastate harm. 145

According to several proponents of Parker, a well-functioning federal system requires states to serve as laboratories of democracy that experiment with various approaches to local economic problems. 146

[Footnote 146] See Saywell, supra note 139, at 7-8 (invoking laboratory metaphor to contend for relaxed definition of active supervision and broader Parker immunity); Burns, supra note 139, at 44 (contending that antitrust federalism, including Parker, protects the existence of "fifty state laboratories, in which ideas can be implemented and tested."); Handler, supra note 118, at 5-6 & n.26 ("To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.") (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)) ; see also Note, supra note 144, at 2561-62 (arguing that respect for states' role as laboratories militates in favor of respecting diverse state antitrust regimes).

The modern theory [\*145] of competitive federalism predicts that, under certain conditions, rivalry between such sovereigns can produce optimal legislation. 147Preemption, by contrast, would displace these laboratories as sources of novel economic policies responsive to local needs.

Indeed, some have argued that, properly understood, federalism and state sovereignty require more robust immunity from Sherman Act preemption. Some, for instance, have criticized the requirement that states "actively supervise" private parties' implementation of anticompetitive agreements. 148

[Footnote 148] See Saywell, supra note 139, at 6 ("The federal government must respect [state] sovereignty - not redefine it by requiring active supervision of a state's own agencies."); Page, supra note 139, at passim (criticizing this requirement as inconsistent with federalism); Handler, supra note 118, at 9 n.45 and 18 (criticizing proposals that would condition immunity on sufficient "state supervision").

Others contend that restraints imposed by municipalities should enjoy absolute immunity. 149These scholars contend that states should remain free to allocate authority between their respective subdivisions as they see fit, without satisfying procedural requirements imposed under the aegis of the Sherman Act. 150If Parker rests on respect for "federalism and state sovereignty," they say, the Court should respect the otherwise constitutional process that states employ to authorize localities and private parties to impose anticompetitive restraints. 151These arguments would immunize any restraint on competition that a state or its subdivision authorizes under a state's own [\*146] constitutional processes and shield such authorization from Sherman Act preemption. 152

Parker's proponents recognize that anticompetitive state legislation may sometimes impose economic harm on other states. 153Some contend that dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence will interdict such enactments, obviating any need for Sherman Act intervention, while leaving states free to regulate local activity nominally within the scope of the Act. 154Any succor from the Commerce Clause appears illusory, however. Parker itself rejected the plaintiff's dormant Commerce Clause challenge, even though nearly all the harm produced by the challenged program fell on out-of-state consumers. 155None of these scholars has questioned that holding or identified any decision invalidating Parker-type restraints. Given Parker's deferential Commerce Clause review of state-imposed restraints, the Sherman Act is the only plausible source of preemption. 156Thus, these scholars effectively contend that each state's internal democratic processes should constitute the sole remedy for such wealth-destroying regulation, even when out-of-state voters bear most of the resulting harm. 157

[Footnote 157] See, e.g., Saywell , supra note 139, at 7-8 (contending that Sherman Act preemption of squelches local experimentation and innovation a deprives states of their position as laboratories); Page, supra note 139, at 1107 ("Deference to considered state economic choices thus constitutes the touchstone of the Parker doctrine. This approach draws doctrinal support from the Madisonian model of representative government and dictates judicial restraint as long as the "process of representation' affords interested parties an opportunity to influence the formulation of policy."); Handler, supra note 118, at 19 ("There are democratic processes by which unwarranted laxity of the states can be rectified."); id. at 20 ("I would not substitute preemption for substantive due process to achieve a federal censorship of state legislation; I would turn to the states as the forum for the correction of the mischief[.]").

III. Federalism-Based Objections to Sherman Act Preemption

As the United States explained in its Parker brief, state-imposed restraints of interstate commerce pose obstacles to achieving the central policy of the Sherman Act, namely, reliance upon free competition to allocate the nation's economic resources. 158To be sure, California's scheme imposed significant economic harm on out-of-state citizens, unlike nearly all other state-created restraints. 159However, Mandeville Island Farms expanded the object of the Act to include protecting free competition from local restraints producing no interstate harm. Straight-forward application of the Court's preemption doctrine would thus seem to establish that the Sherman Act preempts all state-created unreasonable restraints - regardless of interstate harm - that produce a substantial effect on interstate commerce, because they pose obstacles to achieving this objective. 160

However, some scholars and the Court contend that principles of constitutional federalism and state sovereignty bolster if not require Parker's rejection of Sherman Act preemption. 161Invocation of "federalism," or "state sovereignty," does not resolve concrete cases. Presumably such considerations must manifest themselves within some doctrinal frameworks, and not as a judicial talking point. The Sherman Act, after all, is a statute, and only the Constitution can restrict its reach.

Still, despite repeated claims that considerations of federalism and state sovereignty justify Parker's state action doctrine, neither the Court nor most of Parker's academic proponents have specified the nature of their federalism or state sovereignty concerns with doctrinal precision. 162

[Footnote 162] See, e.g., Handler, supra note 118, at passim (endorsing Parker without identifying any constitutional doctrine militating against preemption); id. at 7 n.35 (contending that preemption of state economic regulation would "breach[] basic tenets of federalism upon which rests our constitutional form of government is based.").

At best, some proponents have invoked the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments as possible [\*148] sources of such immunity, usually without elaboration. 163

[Footnote 163] See, e.g., Page & Lopatka , supra note 139, at 1468 (the Court has derived the Parker doctrine "from the principle of sovereign immunity"); Burns, supra note 139, at 38 (invoking Supreme Court's then-recent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence as supporting Parker); Page, supra note 139, at 1105 n.36 (suggesting that Parker could be interpreted as resting upon "the eleventh amendment or, perhaps, ... the tenth amendment."); Davidson & Butters, supra note 140, at 597-604 (contending that Tenth Amendment case law justifies Parker's state action doctrine).

As a result, academic evaluation of the supposed federalism and state sovereignty rationales for Parker's rejection of preemption requires identification of possible doctrinal bases for such concerns, one or more of which could help justify Parker and its progeny.

Such concerns could manifest themselves in two broad categories. First, federal preemption of state-imposed restraints could be outright unconstitutional. 164

[Footnote 164] See Burns, supra note 139, at 38 (asserting that the Tenth and Eleventh amendments prevent Congress from expressly preempting local state legislation otherwise subject to the commerce power); Davidson & Butters, supra note 140, at 597-604.

Second, preemption of such restraints could contradict one or more canons of construction that courts employ to discern the original meaning of ambiguous texts. The remainder of this article will identify and then evaluate the possible arguments in these two categories that may conceivably militate against Sherman Act preemption of state-imposed restraints. As will be seen, evaluation of arguments in the first category will help inform evaluation of arguments that one or more canons of statutory construction justify Parker's interpretation of the Sherman Act.

#### The aff preserves state enforcement while addressing a narrow question – absent clarity on externalities, fed-state turf wars sideline state enforcers – Kobayashi and Sack

Kobayashi 20 [Bruce H. Kobayashi, George Mason University, Antonin Scalia Law School Professor, 10-4-2020 https://gaidigitalreport.com/2020/10/04/exemptions-and-immunities/#\_ftn92]

B. Spillover Effects and Antitrust Federalism

The current state action doctrine does not enable jurisdictional competition or promote the principles of federalism because it does not account for the spillover effects of anticompetitive state regulation. Judge Easterbrook examined the Court’s state action holdings and found that the Court’s rulings were indifferent as to whether the effects of the regulation were actually internalized by the regulating state.[91] Allowing states to enact anticompetitive legislation reduced the extent and effectiveness of competition among the states, and thereby increased the cost of exit and relocation.[92]

This nature of the spillover effect is exemplified in Parker v. Brown.[93] The state action doctrine was used to uphold a California regulation which authorized a raisin cartel. California raisin growers benefited greatly from that ability to price fix. However, over 90% of the grapes were exported outside of California—nationally and internationally—making the impact of the California raisin regulation reach beyond state lines.[94] The regulation harmed a large number of consumers outside of California while only benefiting a small number of private interest parties within the state.

State action doctrine, although meant to preserve that state’s independence, actually allows the state to reap the benefits of the anticompetitive regulation while displacing the costs onto other states.[95] Therefore, it is worth considering if the current state action doctrine should be thought of differently, in a way that fully takes into accounts issues of federalism. Judge Easterbrook proposes a state action rule which considers the spillover effect of anticompetitive state regulation. Instead of examining clear articulation and active supervision, the Court would uphold an anticompetitive state regulation as long as its anticompetitive effects are internalized by that state’s residents.[96] Aligning state action doctrine with the economics of federalism will not only maintain states’ roles in antitrust, but also ensure that state antitrust exemptions have a diminished negative impact on consumer welfare. Analyzing the anticompetitive overcharge of regulations is also more administrable than attempting to analyze the regulations under the dormant Commerce Clause.[97] Considered under Easterbrook’s approach, Parker’s California raisin prorate program would be subject to antitrust scrutiny because the regulation’s costs were not internalized.

State regulation of seemingly local competition is likely to effect more than just the economy of that specific state. When states grant antitrust immunities in situations involving interstate commerce, the state is exporting the anticompetitive effects of its regulations to citizens outside its own borders. Without accounting for the federal interest in an integrated national economy, state action doctrine far surpasses its narrow purpose of supervising local competition.

#### On balance, even if they win some link turn, the aff’s link is bigger and outweighs

Meese 21 [Alan J. Meese, Ball Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School and Co-Director, William & Mary Center for the Study of Law and Markets. 16 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 115, Fall 2021, Lexis]

VI. Which Consistency?

Recognition that the Court's Sherman Act jurisprudence reflects inconsistent regard for federalism does not itself reveal which consistent approach the Court should take. Nor does the invocation of the generalized value of federalism. Finally, considerations of stare decisis do not militate in favor of either approach, as either approach would require the Court to overrule numerous decisions. 342

Several considerations suggest that the Court should resolve the modern inconsistency in favor of federalism. The resulting regime would restore the pre- Wickard allocation of regulatory authority over trade restraints between states and the national government. The Sherman Act would thus reach only those restraints, including state-imposed restraints, that directly burden interstate commerce. Instead of interfering with valid state prerogatives, preemption in this narrow context would fortify the traditional federal-state balance by restoring Congress's exclusive authority over conduct or regulation thereof that produces interstate harm.

[\*182] The resulting increase in exclusive state authority would reinforce and extend states' historic role as "laboratories of democracy" that generate innovative and diverse solutions to varied local economic problems. Such "freedom of action" over local economic matters would include the power to adopt less intrusive regulation - indeed, no regulation at all - of private conduct currently governed by a one-size-fits-all national floor imposed under the Sherman Act. Such complete flexibility in regulatory options would help satisfy the conditions necessary for effective interjurisdictional rivalry and resulting legislative choices. 343

Indeed, proponents of Parker should applaud such a restoration of the traditional federal-state balance in the antitrust context. These scholars decry Sherman Act preemption of state regulation of local economic subjects. To be sure, the sort of restoration advocated here would result in some preemption of restraints, such as those in Parker, that produce interstate economic harm. However, the same restoration would eliminate preemption of what is probably a far larger category of restraints, namely, those hybrid restraints that states impose without satisfying the requisite procedural requirements. 344 All and all, then, a consistent vindication of federalism would result in fewer conflicts between state law and the Sherman Act and less preemption than the current regime.

#### Failure to meaningfully constrain anticompetitive effects from Parker causes the Court to obliterate state role

Allensworth 16 [Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School; J.D., Harvard Law School; M.Phil, University of Cambridge; B.A., Yale University, October 2016, ARTICLE: THE NEW ANTITRUST FEDERALISM, 102 Va. L. Rev. 1387]

Conclusion

It is common to observe that since Garcia v. San Antonio Metro, there are no judicially-enforced boundaries between federal and state power. Federalism, in other words, is dead. 284 But in fact, judicially-enforced federalism - lurking behind an obscure and technical area of law known as state action antitrust immunity - is very much alive. For most of the last century, the Court quietly tinkered away with the contours of this federalism, struggling under the false formalism of a discernable boundary between state regulation and private cartels. But with the Court's last three antitrust cases, the tinkering has given way to reformation.

What used to be a doctrine with deep roots in constitutional federalism - the sort now declared "dead" - is now a doctrine with close ties to the federal administrative state where courts sit in judgment of an agency's procedure. The change is a welcome one, both because the old antitrust federalism was unworkable and because the new regime of accountability review addresses the inherent capture at the heart of modern state regulation, while affording some deference to state regulatory choices. Accountability review mitigates the risk of delegated self-regulation while retaining some deference - without which antitrust federalism would not be federalism at all.

The success of the new regime depends on how the Court defines its requirement that states "actively supervise" self-regulation or else expose it to antitrust challenge. The Court should only find "active supervision" where the state's politically accountable actors have taken transparent responsibility, not only for the regulation in general, but also for its specific anticompetitive effects. Without giving accountability review such bite, states will continue to selectively repeal the Sherman Act in the guise of self-regulation. If the new antitrust federalism fails to rein in the self-dealing epitomized by the current state of professional licensing, [\*1445] for example, the Court may be forced to take a heavier hand against the states and sacrifice federalism at the altar of competition. But abandoning the federalism of antitrust federalism is strong medicine; better to give the new antitrust federalism a fighting chance and save its obliteration for another day.

#### Their “spillovers good” arg doesn’t apply – “interstate friction” still occurs as states regulate after the aff it’s just a question of whether there is a federal role that determines if those spillovers are beneficial or harmful – Sack & Adler

### State Sovereignty DA – Warming Impact – 2AC

#### Not existential AND their models fail.

Piper 19---Kelsey Piper, citing John Halstead climate change mitigation researcher at the Founders Pledge. [Is climate change an "existential threat" — or just a catastrophic one? 6-28-2019, https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/6/13/18660548/climate-change-human-civilization-existential-risk]

I also talked to some researchers who study existential risks, like John Halstead, who studies climate change mitigation at the philanthropic advising group Founders Pledge, and who has a detailed online analysis of all the (strikingly few) climate change papers that address existential risk (his analysis has not been peer-reviewed yet).

Halstead looks into the models of potential temperature increases that Breakthrough’s report highlights. The models show a surprisingly large chance of extreme degrees of warming. Halstead points out that in many papers, this is the result of the simplistic form of statistical modeling used. Other papers have made a convincing case that this form of statistical modeling is an irresponsible way to reason about climate change, and that the dire projections rest on a statistical method that is widely understood to be a bad approach for that question.

Further, “the carbon effects don’t seem to pose an existential risk,” he told me. “People use 10 degrees as an illustrative example” — of a nightmare scenario where climate change goes much, much worse than expected in every respect — “and looking at it, even 10 degrees would not really cause the collapse of industrial civilization,” though the effects would still be pretty horrifying. (On the question of whether an increase of 10 degrees would be survivable, there is much debate.)

Does it matter if climate change is an existential risk or just a really bad one?

That last distinction Halstead draws — of climate change as being awful but not quite an existential threat — is a controversial one.

That’s where a difference in worldviews looms large: Existential risk researchers are extremely concerned with the difference between the annihilation of humanity and mass casualties that humanity can survive. To everyone else, those two outcomes seem pretty similar.

To academics in philosophy and public policy who study the future of humankind, an existential risk is a very specific thing: a disaster that destroys all future human potential and ensures that no generations of humans will ever leave Earth and explore our universe. The death of 7 billion people is, of course, an unimaginable tragedy. But researchers who study existential risks argue that the annihilation of humanity is actually much, much worse than that. Not only do we lose existing people, but we lose all the people who could otherwise have had the chance to exist.

In this worldview, 7 billion humans dying is not just seven times as bad as 1 billion humans dying — it’s much worse. This style of thinking seems plausible enough when you think about past tragedies; the Black Death, which killed at least a tenth of all humans alive at the time, was not one-tenth as bad as a hypothetical plague that wiped us all out.

Most people don’t think about existential risks much. Many analyses of climate change — including the report Vice based its article on — treat the deaths of a billion people and the extinction of humanity as pretty similar outcomes, interchangeably using descriptions of catastrophes that would kill hundreds of millions and catastrophes that’d kill us all. And the existential risk conversation can come across as tone-deaf and off-puttingly academic, as if it’s no big deal if merely hundreds of millions of people will die due to climate change.

Obviously, and this needs to be stressed, climate change is a big deal either way. But there are differences between catastrophe and extinction. If the models tell us that all humans are going to die, then extreme solutions — which might save us, or might have unprecedented, catastrophic negative consequences — might be worth trying. Think of plans to release aerosols into the atmosphere to reflect sunlight and cool the planet back down in the manner that volcanic explosions do. It’d be an enormous endeavor with significant potential downsides (we don’t even yet know all the risks it might pose), but if the alternative is extinction then those risks would be worth taking.

But if the models tell us that climate change is devastating but survivable, as most models show, then those last-ditch solutions should perhaps stay in the toolkit for now.

Then there’s the morale argument. Defenders of overstating the risks of climate change point out that, well, understating them isn’t working. The IPCC may have chosen to maintain optimism about containing warming to 2 degrees Celsius in the hopes that it’d spur people to action, but if so, it hasn’t really worked. Maybe alarmism will achieve what optimism couldn’t.

That’s how Spratt sees it. “Alarmism?” he said to me. “Should we be alarmed about where we’re going? Of course we should be.”

Swedish teenager Greta Thunberg has taken an arguably alarmist bent in her advocacy for climate solutions in the EU, saying, “Our house is on fire. I don’t want your hope. ... I want you to panic.” She’s gotten strong reactions from politicians, suggesting that at least sometimes a relentless focus on the severity of the emergency can get results.

So where does this all leave us? It’s worthwhile to look into the worst-case scenarios, and even to highlight and emphasize them. But it’s important to accurately represent current climate consensus along the way. It’s hard to see how we solve a problem we have widespread misapprehensions about in either direction, and when a warning is overstated or inaccurate, it may sow more confusion than inspiration.

Climate change won’t kill us all. That matters. Yet it’s one of the biggest challenges ahead of us, and the results of our failure to act will be devastating. That message — the most accurate message we’ve got — will have to stand on its own.

#### States alone can’t fill the federal void

Coglianese 2-20 – Cary Coglianese is the Edward B. Shils Professor of Law and Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, where he is also the Director of the Penn Program on Regulation and the faculty advisor to The Regulatory Review, Shana Starobin is Assistant Professor of Government and Environmental Studies at Bowdoin College and a former Fellow of the Penn Program on Regulation at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, Let’s Be Real About State and Local Climate Action, Feb. 20th, 2018, https://www.theregreview.org/2018/02/20/coglianese-starobin-state-local-climate-action/

We are thus grateful to Craig Segall and David Hults for responding to an earlier essay of ours by extolling the virtues of various state and local climate initiatives. Yet as much as we personally share Segall and Hults’s hopefulness that “real progress” on climate policy can be made over the next several years, as scholars we have a duty to do more than just traffic in hope. Optimism can [obscure] ~~blind~~ decisionmakers and the public to real policy challenges at the state and local level. More troubling still is the possibility of lulling the public into thinking the United States can adequately address climate change without federal action.

Segall and Hults respond to an essay we wrote that first appeared earlier this summer, not long after President Donald J. Trump had announced his intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. President Trump’s announcement prompted an immediate outpouring of responses from state and local leaders, many of whom pledged to work to meet the U.S. emissions reduction commitments under the Paris accord. Former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg perhaps best exemplified these leaders’ optimism when he declared, “We’re going to do everything America would have done if it had stayed committed.”

Yet achieving comparable reductions without national governmental action takes much more than optimism. Granted, a good number of scholars who we respect and admire—Cinnamon Carlarne, Dan Esty, Eric Orts, Barry Rabe, Chuck Sabel, among others—have been suggesting for years that successful environmental policy starts from the ground up, particularly from voluntary, collaborative action by non-federal actors. And in recent years, a variety of initiatives such as the U.S. Climate Alliance, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, and the Pacific Coast Collaborative—have percolated “up” in the fashion that these scholars, as well as Segall and Hults, have described.

In the absence of any meaningful federal action, such bottom-up strategies would appear irrefutably to be better than nothing. It is certainly undeniable that any effective policy to reduce carbon emissions depends on behavioral change at the ground level. After all, as long as the U.S. energy system depends heavily on carbon-based fuels, then each person contributes in some way to greenhouse gas emissions.

Yet recognizing the need to change behavior at the local level neither logically nor empirically compels the conclusion that policy action on climate is best taken at the local level. On the contrary, as one of us has previously argued in print, a global problem like climate change will be best addressed through action at the broadest and highest governance level possible, such as through a national carbon tax or an upstream cap-and-trade system. Administering myriad local policies will prove costly and cumbersome. Diffuse responses require careful coordination to minimize leakage and regulatory arbitrage. And if they do not cover the entire country or planet, subnational efforts will inherently be restricted in their impact due to their limited geographic scope.

That is the reality in terms of where the United States stands today. A recent report released by the new initiative spearheaded by Michael Bloomberg and California Governor Jerry Brown trumpets the fact that “states, cities, and businesses constituting more than half of the U.S. economy have mobilized behind the U.S. pledge under the Paris Agreement.” But scratch beneath the surface and, as Amy Harder has noted, the pledges from states to date only cover “up to 35 percent of America’s total greenhouse gas emissions, according to the report’s appendix data,” which “means this group represents roughly less than 5 percent of the world’s emissions, despite comprising an economy that’s the world’s third-largest.”

### State Sovereignty DA – Inequality Module – 2AC

#### State regs good link assumes we END Parker immunity – it’s just limited – reasonable regs still allowed

Meese 15 [Alan J. Meese, Ball Professor of Law and Cabell Research Professor, William and Mary Law School, 2015 https://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/assets/Uploads/ILR-100-5-Meese.pdf]

Like Professor Hovenkamp, I too am uncomfortable with the Parker, Exxon, and ARC America trio. As others have noted, Parker arose when serious people believed that state-enforced cartelization or monopolization could help stabilize the macro economy—a claim that only politicians make today. All three decisions countenance some regulation by political entities that do not internalize the full costs of their actions. The predictable result will be too many state-imposed restraints and too much state antitrust regulation. Such overregulation, of course, will distort the allocation of resources and reduce national wealth. Moreover, to the extent that such regulation reduces price flexibility, Parker and its progeny interfere with the process of natural economic adjustment and thus exacerbate recessions. Far from destroying the ability of states to engage in regulation, reversal of such decisions would simply confine states to “reasonable” regulation, just as the Sherman Act confines private parties to reasonable restraints of trade. Federal preemption of state-imposed cartels, for instance, would leave states perfectly free to combat externalities, produce public goods, and redistribute income via taxing and spending.

## BizCon

### Econ – 2AC

#### Biden FTC makes link inevitable

Clayton 8-10 [E. Steele Clayton, IV Bass, Berry & Sims PLC University of Tennessee College of Law - J.D. 8-10-2021 https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/be-prepared-aggressive-antitrust-8939761/]

This summer has seen a flurry of bold antitrust announcements from the Biden administration. By issuing a sweeping executive order calling for numerous changes to antitrust enforcement and by naming progressive favorites and prominent Big Tech critics to head the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), President Biden has signaled that federal antitrust policy is entering a new era.

The FTC has already begun carrying out its mandate to reshape antitrust policy. Under the leadership of new Chairwoman Lina Khan, the FTC has moved quickly to eliminate checks on its antitrust enforcement powers. A majority of the FTC’s commissioners have expressly disavowed the agency’s longstanding approaches to policing antitrust violations and have given the new chair unprecedented authority over investigations and rulemakings.

Collectively, the Biden administration and the FTC have sent a clear message to the business community: aggressive antitrust enforcement is back. Companies should expect to see an increase in antitrust investigations, stiffer penalties for violations, more burdensome merger reviews, and new rules targeting a range of industry practices. In this environment, effective antitrust counseling and compliance programs are more important than ever.

#### Turn – aff reduces harmful state regulation

Meese 15 [Alan J. Meese, Ball Professor of Law and Cabell Research Professor, William and Mary Law School, 2015 https://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/assets/Uploads/ILR-100-5-Meese.pdf]

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#### NC Dental litigation causes confusion – only a risk the aff solves

Hittinger 19 [Carl W Hittinger, BakerHostetler’s antitrust and competition practice national team leader, J.D., Temple University Beasley School of Law, September 2019 https://www.bakerlaw.com/webfiles/Litigation/2019/Alerts/GCR-Private-Antitrust-Litigation.pdf]

As for private litigation, multiple cases following North Carolina Dental have identified open issues and emerging trends for antitrust actions involving government bodies. One important threshold issue confronted by private litigants is whether claims may be dismissed at the very onset of litigation due to application of state action immunity. Some courts have denied motions to dismiss claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as long as the complaints plausibly allege the immunity is not established. In a case similar to North Carolina Dental, for example, a district court recently ruled it would be ‘premature’ to dismiss an antitrust claim against the Board of Dental Examiners of Alabama where the complaint plausibly alleged that the board was not actively supervised by the state.34 Other courts have implicitly rejected the notion that parties can plead away application of the immunity. In one such recent case, a district court dismissed an antitrust claim against a public utilities body based on South Carolina’s statutes reflecting a clearly articulated policy of displacing competition in and active supervision of the sale of electricity, notwithstanding complaint allegations that the body had exceeded its authority and was inadequately supervised by the state.35

Courts have also diverged on whether rulings on the dismissal of claims under state action immunity are immediately appealable. After North Carolina Dental, the Ninth Circuit held that a lower court order denying a dismissal motion based on state action immunity is not immediately appealable.36 The Ninth Circuit accepted that the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits ‘have reached the opposite conclusion’, but explained that disallowing immediate appeals of the rejection of the immunity defence is ‘the better view’ given, among other reasons, the Supreme Court’s caution against broad assertions of immunity against suits.37 Similarly, the DOJ has submitted an amicus brief arguing that refusing to dismiss under state action immunity is not immediately appealable.38

The most challenging issue since North Carolina Dental may continue to be whether the particular facts of individual cases can satisfy the application of state action immunity to government bodies with private actors. The Supreme Court implicitly acknowledged there would be uncertainty when recognising that application of the doctrine requires a ‘flexible and contextspecific’ analysis. Justice Samuel Alito’s dissent put a finer point on the uncertainty, identifying the lack of clarity on what constitutes ‘active market participants’ or how to define the markets in which they participate.39 One FTC commissioner agreed that these are ‘key questions that need to be addressed’.40 And they have been, somewhat, in recent years.

As Justice Alito forecasted, litigants and courts have laboured with determining whether government entities include sufficient private participants to require such entities to prove satisfaction of both the ‘clearly articulated state policy’ and ‘active state supervision’ state action immunity prongs (as opposed to only the first).41 A developing approach to this issue among courts focuses on whether the private participants actually exercised control over the governmental entities in question. For instance, following North Carolina Dental, the Third Circuit reasoned that a state university does not need to satisfy the active state supervision prong because the private party with which the university allegedly conspired in real estate dealings had not dominated the university’s real estate decisions.42 More recently, a district court determined that a state agency tasked with overseeing certain healthcare programmes, with a board consisting of five healthcare providers and six members who were not healthcare providers, was excused from satisfying the active state supervision prong because the board was not ‘controlled’ by the private participants who comprised ‘only a minority’ of the agency board.43

A related issue that has proven to be equally challenging is whether the state itself must provide the required active supervision. To illustrate, the Ninth Circuit recently held that ‘active supervision must be “by the State itself ”’ and, consequently, the court ruled that Seattle’s ordinance regulating ride-hailing services (eg, Uber) was not eligible for state action immunity because the city of Seattle, rather than the state of Washington, supervised and enforced the ordinance.44 At the same time, other courts have found active supervision satisfied where provided by municipalities alone.45 As these and similar cases progress through the courts, further clarity on areas of uncertainty about state action immunity should be realised.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in North Carolina Dental not only provides valuable guidance for the application of state action immunity, it also sets the stage for continued development of the doctrine. In the nearly five years since the decision, government antitrust enforcers have relied on it for broadening their enforcement of the federal antitrust laws against quasi-government actors. Private litigants have also relied on it in pursuing cases that portend widespread impact on state and local government operations. All who believe they operate with state action immunity should proceed with caution and consider reviewing their conformity with the principles explained by the Supreme Court, in addition to assessing whether they remain eligible for immunity

#### Antitrust increases business confidence and growth broadly

OECD 14, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Factsheet on how competition policy affects macro-economic outcomes”, OECD, October 2014, https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/2014-competition-factsheet-iv-en.pdf

Most importantly, it is clear that industries where there is greater competition experience faster productivity growth. This has been confirmed in a wide variety of empirical studies, on an industry-by-industry, or even firm-by-firm, basis. Some studies seek to explain differences in productivity growth between industries using measures of the intensity of competition they face. Others look at the effects of specific pro-competitive interventions, particularly trade liberalisation or the introduction of competition into a previously regulated, monopoly sector (such as electricity).

This finding is not confined to “Western” economies, but emerges from studies of the Japanese and South Korean experiences, as well as from developing countries.

The effects of stronger competition can be felt in sectors other than those in which the competition occurs. In particular, vigorous competition in upstream sectors can ‘cascade’ to improve productivity and employment in downstream sectors and so through the economy more widely.

The main reason seems to be that competition leads to an improvement in allocative efficiency by allowing more efficient firms to enter and gain market share, at the expense of less efficient firms (the so called between-firms effect). Regulations, or anti-competitive behaviour preventing entry and expansion, may therefore be particularly damaging for economic growth. Competition also improves the productive efficiency of firms (the so called within-firms effects), as firms facing competition seem to be better managed. This can even apply in sectors with important social as well as economic outcomes: for example, there is increasing evidence that competition in the provision of healthcare can improve quality outcomes.

There is also evidence that intervening to promote competition will increase innovation. Firms facing competitive rivals innovate more than monopolies (although after such competition a firm may of course end up with a monopoly through a patent). The relationship is not simple: it is possible that moderately competitive markets innovate the most, with both monopoly and highly competitive markets showing weaker innovation. However, as competition policy does not focus on making moderately competitive markets hyper-competitive, but rather on introducing or strengthening competition in markets where it does not work well, this would still imply that most competition policies serve to promote innovation.

Because more competitive markets result in higher productivity growth, policies that lead to markets operating more competitively, such as enforcement of competition law and removal of regulations that hinder competition, will result in faster economic growth.

Is there evidence that pro-competitive policies are effective?

In addition to this evidence that competition promotes growth, there have been studies directly of the effects of competition law itself, and of product market deregulation. Although it is difficult to distinguish the effects of individual policy changes, there are some studies showing that introducing competition law raises productivity. Conversely, the selective suspension of antitrust laws in the USA during the 1930s seems to have delayed recovery.

Many studies of the effect of competition law use international comparisons of different countries’ experiences, to assess whether countries with competition laws (or longer-standing, or more effective competition laws) achieve faster economic growth. The task is a difficult one because of many other factors that affect the overall economic growth rate, including other policies introduced at the same time (e.g. Eastern Europe’s transformation after 1989). Some studies find no effect, but the overwhelming majority of such studies do find a positive effect of competition law on economic growth. Most ascribe this effect to increased productivity, although there may also be an effect on investment, especially in developing countries, perhaps because competition laws boost business confidence and reduce corruption.

### Econ – A2: Link – Biz Con – 2AC

#### No impact – Biz con’s irrelevant

Doll 16 – Bob Doll, Chief Equity Strategist at Nuveen Asset Management, “Despite Lackluster Growth, Equities Remain Attractive”, Financial Advisor, 8-9, <http://www.fa-mag.com/news/despite-lackluster-growth--equities-remain-attractive-28409.html>

July’s jobs report confirmed that U.S. economic growth remains on track. 255,000 new jobs were created last month, the unemployment rate remained at 4.9% and average hourly earnings climbed 0.3%.2 These stronger-than-expected results raise the chances of a Fed rate hike before year end. Long-term U.S. growth has been lackluster and will likely remain so. Since the start of the recovery seven years ago, real gross domestic product growth has averaged just over 2%.3 Tailwinds such as the improving labor market and low mortgage rates have been counteracted by headwinds such as low business confidence. We expect these crosscurrents will persist. Nominal growth has been particularly weak this cycle. Compared to previous expansions, nominal growth (which includes the effects of inflation) has been extremely low.3 Since nominal growth is determined by both unit growth and pricing power, this trend has been a primary culprit behind recent weakness in corporate earnings. Increases in government spending are a mixed bag for the economy. After several years of a sequester-enforced decline in spending, government spending has increased in 2016.4 While this boosts economic growth, additional regulations and increased control of private resources through stringent health insurance rules limit the economy’s ability to promote higher standards of living. China’s economy is slowing, but the rate should be manageable. Fears of a Chinese hard landing have been a persistent worry for investors. Chinese authorities have been slowly shifting the country’s economy away from exports and investment spending and toward domestic consumption. We believe Chinese growth is slowing from the officially reported 10% level of a few years ago toward something closer to a more-sustainable 5% by the end of this decade.5 Despite Risks, the Global Economy Remains Resilient Since the current economic recovery began, investors have contended with a number of economic issues. The most recent risk has been the extent to which the Brexit vote might trigger widespread contagion. So far, it appears that outside of slowing growth in the United Kingdom, effects have been limited. Investor worries are now focused on Italy’s banking and political systems. Italian banks are struggling with a rash of bad loans on their balance sheets and thin capital buffers. This storm has been brewing for some time, and coincides with the upcoming constitutional referendum that could reshape Italy’s political system. Investors are rightfully viewing the turmoil with caution. In addition, many are questioning the overall state of the world economy in light of rising geopolitical instability, consternation over the upcoming U.S. elections, questions about global monetary policy, relatively low business confidence and a renewed slump in oil prices. Yet, we believe the global economy has been, and should continue to be, resilient in the face of all of these risks. We believe global monetary policy remains supportive of growth and the global recovery will continue, especially in the United States.

# 1AR

## Case

### 1AR---AT: Coops Turn

#### Current antitrust laws

Vaheesan ’19 [1NC Author, Sandeep and Nathan Schneider; 2019; Legal Director of the Open Markets Institute; Assistant Professor, Department of Media Studies, University of Colorado Boulder; “Cooperative Enterprise as an Antimonopoly Strategy,” <https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=pslr>] MULCH

In the current antitrust environment, bargaining cooperatives exist, at best, uneasily. The federal antitrust agencies, the FTC, in particular, have sued associations of professionals and other independent workers for engaging in collective bargaining and adopting restraints on direct price competition. Under current antitrust law, bargaining cooperatives are suspect and may even be condemned as per se illegal. Indeed, prevailing antitrust policy represents an existential threat to the core mission of bargaining co-ops to aggregate, permitting them to exist so long as they do not exercise the collective power of their individual members. In other words, antitrust law tolerates bargaining cooperatives that do not bargain cooperatively. As a result, organizations like the Freelancers Union208 in the United States and SMart209 in Europe, which have hundreds of thousands of members between them, would face significant constraints on their ability to advocate collectively for a class of independent workers. In an economy in which independent workers represent a significant share of the workforce, it is essential that independent workers have the ability to establish collective organizations and build collective voice.

#### Internal governance

Basterretxea 22 (Imanol Basterretxea, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of the Basque Country, Economic and Industrial Democracy, 2022, Vol. 43(1) 362–387, “Corporate governance as a key aspect in the failure of worker cooperatives” via Sagepub, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0143831X19899474>) MULCH

*\*FED = Fagor Electrodomésticos S. Coop, a coop that collapsed in 2015*

The research shows that it is too simplistic to blame the failure of FED just on external factors. While recognising the importance of the external challenges that contributed to the demise of FED, as previous research highlights (Alzola et al., 2015; Arando and Bengoa, 2018; Errasti et al., 2016), our article shows that internal factors linked to the cooperative’s governance system and culture influenced key failed strategic decisions and reduced the capability of the firm to reverse the decline caused by external factors. The research shows that democratic governing bodies can slow down or indefinitely postpone painful decisions concerning the closure of factories and units that lose money but employ worker owners. Painful measures that could have saved part of the firm weren’t taken or even proposed by management to the General Assembly, since managers knew in advance that the worker owners would vote them down.

## BizCon

### 1AR---AT: Hedger Link

#### CEI is full of hacks

Eliperin 13 (Juliet Eliperin, Reporter, “Anatomy of a Washington dinner: Who funds the Competitive Enterprise Institute?,” 06/20/13, The Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/06/20/anatomy-of-a-washington-dinner-who-funds-the-competitive-enterprise-institute/>, TM)

People have plenty of conspiracy theories about the libertarian Competitive Enterprise Institute: that it's merely an extension of the Koch brothers' empire, or a subsidiary of Exxon-Mobil Corp. While the group does not disclose its donors as a general rule, it does reveal which companies and interest groups sponsor its annual fundraising dinner -- which takes place Thursday night at the J.W. Marriott -- along with how much they contribute. CEI provided a copy of its dinner program to the Fix, ranking donors according to the value of five metals -- chromium, tungsten, nickel, copper and tin -- which ecologist Paul Ehrlich bet economist Julian Simon would be more scarce in 2005 than in 1980, the year of the wager. (Ehrlich lost the bet.) The lineup of sponsors both confirms certain stereotypes about the right-leaning think tank and challenges others. The energy sector donated $110,000 to the event, the same amount given by conservative foundations (three of which are associated with the billionaires Charles and David Koch). But the biggest single donor is Google, which gave $50,000, and Facebook kicked in $25,000.

### 1AR---Thumpers

#### Antitrust links thumped – Biden’s pushing, enforcement is up, and more is coming

Morrissey 3-1 [Gerald A. Morrissey III, Partner at Holland & Knight, 3-1-2022 https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2022/03/biden-administration-intensifies-offensive-against-ocean-shipping]

The Biden Administration issued a press release and fact sheet on Feb. 28, 2022, titled "Lowering Prices and Leveling the Playing Field in Ocean Shipping." The release builds on a series of ongoing efforts (see previous Holland & Knight alert, "DOJ to Collusive Price Gougers Exploiting Supply Disruptions: We Will Prosecute You," Feb. 18, 2022) to tackle supply chain disruptions by leveraging the Shipping Act and antitrust laws. The main takeaways are:

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) is expanding its cooperation with the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC). Building on the DOJ-FMC 2021 memorandum of understanding (MOU), the DOJ will "provide the FMC with the support of attorneys and economists from the Antitrust Division for enforcement of violations of the Shipping Act and related laws." Likewise, the FMC will share shipping industry experience with the DOJ for Sherman Act and Clayton Act enforcement actions.

The FMC has already taken steps to audit ocean carriers, based on complaints received from cargo owners. In addition, the DOJ recently announced an initiative to investigate and prosecute antitrust activities in other parts of the supply chain. In its most recent initiative, the Administration is again focusing on ocean shipping, and highlighted high shipping costs and practices perceived to contribute to congestion and cost increases.

Shipping Act Reform. The Biden Administration called on Congress to "provide additional tools ... to address problems in the ocean shipping industry" and expressed encouragement with current legislative efforts. The Administration is referring to bills under consideration in the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate — the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 2021 (OSRA 2021) (H.R. 4996) and the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 2022 (OSRA 2022) (S. 3580) — proposing an array of different changes to the Shipping Act intending to target congestion, practices and charges. OSRA 2021 passed the House in December 2021 with bipartisan support. The Senate companion bill, OSRA 2022, is under consideration in that chamber. Despite the common purposes, the bills have significant differences that must be worked out.

Changes to Antitrust Immunity? The Administration also called on Congress to "address the immunity of alliance agreements from antitrust scrutiny under current law." According to the White House Fact Sheet, "Congress steadily deregulated the industry — expanding the antitrust immunity while weakening ocean carriers' obligations to publicly disclose prices and fees and treat businesses and their customers fairly." Further details were not provided, but neither OSRA 2021 nor OSRA 2022 appear to directly address antitrust immunity.

The White House also indicated that existing oversight efforts would continue, reported on progress with the FMC's audit program, new investigations, a new data initiative, and a pending FMC rulemaking on Demurrage and Detention billing currently open for public comment (through March 17, 2022).

Conclusion and Considerations

Coming on the eve of President Joe Biden's State of the Union address on March 1, it is anticipated that President Biden will highlight these and other efforts to address supply chain issues. Moving forward, expect continued activity on the legislative and regulatory fronts. Stakeholders with interests in the legislation and the current rulemaking still have opportunities for involvement.

Regarding the enhanced DOJ-FMC cooperation, the initiative points yet again in the direction of heightened scrutiny ahead, with the potential for more robust investigations, more enforcement capacity and harsher penalties. As Holland & Knight has advised previously, supply chain stakeholders should review their practices and antitrust compliance protocols, proceed cautiously and engage legal counsel before initiating discussions or entering into agreements with marketplace counterparties.

#### New merger guidelines thump

Scarborough 2-4 [Michael W. Scarborough Skyler Hicks Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, 2-4-2022 https://www.natlawreview.com/article/looking-ahead-to-tougher-merger-guidelines-and-enforcement

Although the number of corporate mergers surged during President Biden’s first year in office, all signs point to a tougher regulatory environment for deals going forward.

In 2021, $5.8 trillion changed hands as a result of corporate mergers across the globe.[1] This 64 percent increase over 2020 far surpassed the previous annual record,[2] and now the Biden Administration appears to be taking steps toward fulfilling the President’s goal of ramping up antitrust enforcement.[3]

[Footnote 3] [3] Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy | The White House

One such measure includes taking a more critical approach when evaluating proposed mergers, and federal agencies have already filed several high-profile investigations.[4]

On January 18, the Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division jointly announced plans to “modernize federal merger guidelines to better detect and prevent illegal, anti-competitive deals.”[5] These are expected to overhaul both the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines, presumably in a unified set of new guidelines.[6]

The FTC and DOJ joint press release noted that “many industries across the economy are becoming more concentrated and less competitive” and this new rulemaking effort seeks to modernize current guidelines to better reflect evolving markets.[7] Instead of relying solely on traditional antitrust metrics such as consumer prices, the new guidelines appear poised to adopt additional assessment criteria that take into account factors such as a merger’s impact on privacy or how even low-priced marketplaces can exercise monopoly power.[8]

FTC Chair Lina Khan has been a vocal critic of big-tech and is expected to push new guidelines that would make it harder for large tech companies to consolidate. However, Khan has commented that she intends for the new rules to apply to all industries in light of the market consolidation taking place across the board in industries ranging from retail to healthcare.[9] While Jonathan Kanter, the newly-installed head of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, appears aligned with many of Khan’s concerns, it remains to be seen whether he will push as aggressively as Khan when it comes to the updated guidelines, including as to potential reforms to the traditional economic analyses undergirding prior iterations of the guidelines.[10]

The two Republican FTC Commissioners voiced their concern in a joint statement that the new guidelines could “discount or ignore [the value of] efficiencies when analyzing mergers” and that the new rules might also unduly focus on mergers that harm competition without asking the more pertinent question of whether or not a consolidation that hurts business rivals also “benefit[s] consumers through lower prices, enhanced quality, and more innovation.” [11]

While companies will need to prepare for the increased likelihood that their mergers will face heightened scrutiny, the new rules will likely not be finalized for some time. Both Khan and Kanter aim to finalize the new guidelines before the end of the year,[12] but the process could extend into 2023. In addition, inasmuch as the enforcers remain “severely under-resourced,” they will likely have to continue to selectively pick and choose which mergers to investigate and potentially challenge.[13] Nevertheless, companies should begin to anticipate how a far more progressive antitrust agenda might apply new metrics that could subject them to expensive and drawn out merger investigations going forward.

### 1AR---AT: Courts Block

#### Big win in court for the FTC last month

Milmo 1-19 [Dan Milmo is the Guardian's global technology editor, 1-19-2022 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/jan/19/techscape-breaking-up-meta]

As the judge stressed in his 48-page decision, it is “anyone’s guess” whether the FTC will win its case against a $920bn (£675bn) business that can afford very decent lawyers. Boasberg, a Washington-based district judge who hears cases under federal law, has simply ruled that the FTC has a “plausible claim” under the Sherman Act, which prevents monopolistic companies from ripping off consumers.

Even so, Boasberg has given the FTC’s case a boost. He is allowing the claim to proceed even though Meta operates in what competition experts call a zero-price market. As billions of people around the world know, Meta’s services are free – how can consumers in the US be harmed economically by a service they don’t pay for?

The FTC argues that by acquiring Instagram and WhatsApp, Meta stifled competition and ended up giving a poor deal to consumers in the market for “personal social networking” services. It argues that the acquisition of these companies was anticompetitive because it led to poorer service – for instance lower levels of service quality in privacy and data protection – and less choice for consumers. On the latter, the FTC cites the fact that Meta (then Facebook Inc) shut down an app designed to compete with Instagram once it had bought the photo sharing service in 2012. The complaint also alleges that Meta benefits from barriers to entry in the social networking market such as high switching costs, ie the difficulty of moving to a new social network and taking all your photos and associated data with you.

Meta their match

Rebecca Allensworth, professor of law at Vanderbilt University in the US, says the decision is “a really bad sign” for Meta. “I think the judge sounded very approving of all the arguments made by the FTC. At the same time, it’s the beginning of the beginning [of the case].”

Allensworth added that it was a “big win” for the FTC that Boasberg accepted a more subjective definition of competition in the social media market, instead of expecting the watchdog to crunch through economic data. The FTC has also peppered its complaint with quotes from Meta executives, which Boasberg picks up on. For instance, Boasberg refers to statements made by Zuckerberg about Meta’s structural advantages in the market. He also refers to an email in which the Meta founder states that it is “better to buy than compete.” Boasberg’s decision carries a Zuckerberg quote stating that he saw messaging as a threat and would pay $1bn for WhatsApp “if he could get them” (he ultimately paid $19bn for the business in 2014).

#### Judicial antitrust enforcement now

Baker Botts 21 [4-16-2021 https://www.bakerbotts.com/thought-leadership/publications/2021/april/fifth-circuit-hands-ftc-win-in-ftc-first-fully-litigated-reverse-payment-case]

On April 13, 2021, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC” or “Commission”) ruling that the “reverse-payment” settlement agreement between Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. (“Endo”) and Impax Laboratories LLC (“Impax”) violated federal antitrust laws. The Fifth Circuit’s decision—which upholds the FTC’s first fully-litigated reverse-payment case since the Supreme Court’s landmark 2013 ruling in FTC v. Actavis (“Actavis”)—found the FTC’s findings that Endo and Impax entered into an unlawful “pay-for-delay” agreement to be supported by “substantial evidence.” Significantly, the panel also rejected Impax’s primary argument that the FTC needed to do more under the rule of reason to balance the anticompetitive conduct against procompetitive justifications—namely that the FTC needed to evaluate the strength of the patents at issue and assess whether it was likely Impax would have entered the market earlier absent the settlement. The court “disagree[d] that Actavis requires the Commission to assess the outcome of the patent case in order to find anticompetitive effects”—focusing heavily on the mere size of the alleged payment—and found the fact that generic competition was “possible” absent the settlement, combined with the large payment, was enough to infer anticompetitive effect under the framework outlined in Actavis.

The Fifth Circuit’s decision leaves in place the FTC’s cease-and-desist order enjoining Impax from entering similar reverse-payment settlements going forward (as the decision noted, the FTC did not invalidate Impax’s agreements with Endo or impose any monetary sanctions). But the impact of the decision on the industry as a whole—and courts’ treatment of patent settlements—may be widespread. Indeed, according to the FTC’s acting chair Rebecca Slaughter, the panel’s decision represents an “important milestone in the decades of work by FTC staff to stop pay-for-delay agreements.” And while it remains to be seen how courts (particularly courts in other circuits) will view this decision—and in particular, the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the guidance set out in Actavis—the ruling here will certainly have an impact on how parties approach settlement agreements to resolve Hatch-Waxman suits in the future.

Background and FTC Decision

Endo, the brand-name pharma company in this case, began selling an extended-release formulation of oxymorphone (an opioid) called Opana ER in 2006. In 2007, Impax filed the first application to market generic extended-release oxymorphone. At the time, two of Endo’s patents for Opana ER would not expire until September 2013, and Endo sued Impax for patent infringement in January 2008. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, this would delay any FDA approval of the generic for 30 months—until June 2010—unless the litigation concluded earlier in Impax’s favor. Early settlement talks between the two companies failed, and Endo purportedly projected that generic entry would cut Opana ER sales by 85 percent and cost it approximately $100 million in revenue within six months. Separately, Endo also planned to move customers to a new reformulated version of Opana ER that would be protected by new patents and not be therapeutically equivalent to Impax’s generic, thus precluding pharmacists from automatically substituting the generic in place of the brand when filling prescriptions—a move known as a product transition or “product hop.” But the success of Endo’s product hop depended on the reformulated Opana ER getting to market sufficiently in advance of Impax’s generic product. Endo also allegedly projected that the reformulated Opana ER would generate about $200 million in annual sales by 2016 if the market transitioned to the reformulated product before the generic entered, but only $10 million annually if the generic entered first. In June 2010, with the possible launch date for Impax’s generic imminent, the parties settled the patent litigation shortly after the patent infringement trial began and less than a week before the FDA granted final approval to Impax’s generic product. Under the settlement, Impax agreed to delay launching its generic until January 2013—two and a half years after it otherwise could have entered at risk, but several months before certain patents for Opana ER expired. In return, Endo agreed not to market its own generic version of extended-release oxymorphone until after Impax’s 180-day Hatch-Waxman exclusivity period expired in July 2013, and it agreed to pay Impax a credit if sales revenue for the original formulation of Opana ER fell by more than 50 percent between the dates of settlement and the date of Impax’s entry. The agreement to provide Impax with the credit protected Impax if Endo transitioned its customers to the reformulated Opana ER; which Endo did in March 2012, resulting in a $102 million credit to Impax. In January 2017, the FTC brought separate actions against Endo and Impax alleging that the settlements was an “unfair method of competition” in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act and an unreasonable restraint of trade under the Sherman Act. Endo settled, but Impax chose to litigate. The case proceeded in the FTC’s administrative court. In May 2018, following a three-week trial with 37 witnesses and over 1,250 exhibits, the FTC’s administrative law judge (“ALJ”) D. Michael Chappell concluded that although the reverse-payment agreement restricted competition, it was nonetheless lawful because “as a whole” its procompetitive benefits outweighed the anticompetitive effects because it allowed Impax to enter the market before the Opana ER patents would have expired. Specifically, he found that “the evidence proves that consumers have benefitted from the [Endo-Impax agreement] by having uninterrupted and continuous access to generic Opana ER since January 2013,” and that the “real-world effect procompetitive benefits of the Endo-Impax Settlement are substantial.” Judge Chappell also found that any anticompetitive harm was “largely theoretical” because there was little chance of Impax entering the market earlier absent a settlement, and Impax would not have launched “at risk.” The full Commission reviewed the ALJ’s decision de novo and reached an entirely different conclusion. The Commission unanimously reversed the ALJ, finding that to be procompetitive, the benefits of the “pay-for-delay” agreement must be directly linked to the restraint of competition to outweigh the proof that the restraint harms competition—which the Commission held was not the case here. The Commission further held that Impax’s procompetitive justifications failed because there were less restrictive ways of achieving the purported benefits. Impax’s appeal to the Fifth Circuit followed.

Fifth Circuit Decision

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the Commission’s ruling, holding that the FTC had “substantial evidence” to conclude that the reverse payments replaced “the possibility of competition with the certainty of none.” The panel found that the over $100 million in payments from Endo to Impax did not represent the fair value of services rendered or avoided litigation expenses, nor was it otherwise linked to the restraint of competition in a way that would outweigh the proof that the agreement harmed competition. The opinion also rejected Impax’s argument that the rule of reason required the FTC to do more to balance the harm with the procompetitive justifications—specifically, Impax contended that the FTC should have looked at the strength of the patents and assessed whether Impax could have entered the market earlier absent the settlement. The court held that Actavis does not require Impax’s proposed analysis, and the fact that generic competition was “possible,” combined with the large payment, was enough to infer anticompetitive effect. Indeed, in evaluating the parties’ arguments, the panel placed great emphasis on the size of the payment in evaluating the settlement. And despite holding that the FTC was not required to assess the strength of the patents or predict the outcome of the patent infringement action, the panel nonetheless reasoned that if Endo was actually “highly likely” to prevail in the infringement suit, then Impax would have likely settled for early market entry only—without any payment at all. The more than $100 million Endo ultimately paid to Impax would have been a “windfall” if Impax was likely to lose the infringement suit. The court held that the “need [for Endo] to add that substantial enticement” indicates that at least some portion of the payment was for exclusion beyond the point that would have resulted from litigating the case to conclusion. In other words, the court found the objective of the payment to Impax was to delay its product so Endo could maintain supra-competitive prices for Opana ER, the profits from which it then shared with Impax rather than face a competitive market. Impax also argued that, in hindsight, the settlement was not anticompetitive for two primary reasons. First, Endo obtained additional patents after-the-fact and has proven their validity in court. And second, Endo’s alleged “product hop” ultimately failed because in 2017 Endo voluntarily withdrew the reformulated Opana ER from the market due to safety concerns. Impax’s generic version of extended-release oxymorphone—which it began marketing in January 2013—is the only version available on the market today. But the Fifth Circuit rejected this argument as well, holding that it is “a basic antitrust principle that the impact of an agreement on competition is assessed at the time it was adopted,” and that principle applies equally in reverse payment cases. So, the focus of the inquiry is on the facts as they existed when the parties adopted the settlement. The panel concluded that because the payments at issue were unquestionably “large” and “[n]either the saved costs of forgoing a trial nor any services Endo received justified these payments,” “[s]ubstantial evidence supports the Commission’s finding that the reverse payment settlement threatened competition.” The panel next addressed the question of whether Impax could show procompetitive benefits, which the Commission concluded it could not. Although the ALJ concluded that the settlement benefitted competition, the Commission found that the procompetitive benefits did not “flow from the challenged restraint—the reverse payments themselves.” As a result, the Commission did not treat Impax’s ability to enter the market nine months before the patents expired as benefits to be weighed against the anticompetitive effects of the reverse payments. The Commission assumed arguendo that Impax could connect the settlement’s purported procompetitive effects with the challenged restraint, but nonetheless determined that even if that was the case, there was a “less restrictive alternative” because “Impax could have obtained the proffered benefits by settling without a reverse payment for delayed entry.” Given the Commission’s assumption, the panel reviewed only the “less restrictive alternative” finding—i.e., whether “substantial evidence” supports the Commission’s conclusion that FTC’s Complaint Counsel had established a less restrictive alternative. Impax argued that the evidence the FTC relied on was not probative of whether it in fact ever had the opportunity to enter in a no-payment settlement or could have done so. The panel nonetheless found that the FTC’s findings—relying on “industry practice,” as well as fact and expert witness testimony—would “allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the no-payment settlement was feasible.” And because there was “more than enough evidence” to uphold the Commission’s view that a less restrictive alternative was viable,” the panel held that it “must uphold” the Commission’s conclusion that the reverse-payment settlement was an agreement to preserve and split monopoly profits and amounted to an unreasonable restraint of trade.

Conclusion

The Fifth Circuit’s opinion handed both the FTC and private plaintiffs a huge win in the years-long battle against purported “pay-for-delay” settlements. But the panel’s interpretation of the guidance set out in Actavis—particularly the Supreme Court’s guidance that only “large and unjustified payments” should be subject to antitrust scrutiny—potentially places outsized importance on the size of the alleged payment (and in effect treats the payment itself as the restraint), regardless of the strength of the patents at issue or the parties’ valuations of the patent infringement action. This interpretation goes beyond what Actavis and other courts have held. And while the court’s decision may have been impacted by the highly deferential and highly nebulous “substantial evidence” standard which the FTC is accorded in its appeals, the opinion will inevitably have a significant impact on future patent settlements.

### 1AR---AT: I/L

#### “Biz con” is psychological garbage, can change quickly, and subject to a litany of alt causes

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These vital signs make many people believe that we’ve turned the corner on the economy, that we’ve started a healing process. And their discussions often note one particular sign of systemic recovery: confidence. There is considerable hope that the markets are heralding a major development: that Americans have lost the fears and foreboding that have made the financial crisis of 2008 so enduring in its effects. Hope is a wonderful thing. But we also need to remember that changes in the stock market, the housing market and the overall economy have relatively little to do with one another over years or decades. (We economists would say that they are only slightly correlated.) Furthermore, all three are subject to sharp turns. The economy is a complicated system, with many moving parts. So, amid all those complications, there are other possibilities: Could we be approaching another major stock market peak? Will the housing market’s takeoff be short-lived? And could we dip into another recession? There are certainly risks. Congress is mired in struggles over the budget crisis and the national debt. The government is questioning the risk to taxpayers in its huge support of housing through Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal Housing Administration and the Federal Reserve. Problems in Europe, Asia and the Middle East could easily shift people’s confidence. There have been abrupt and significant changes in confidence in European markets since 2009. Is there any reason to think that the United States is immune to similar swings? For years, I’ve been troubled by the problem of understanding the social psychology and economic impact of confidence. There hasn’t been much research into the emotional factors and the shifts in worldview that drive major turning points. The much-quoted consumer sentiment and confidence indexes don’t yet seem able to offer insight into what’s behind the changes they quantify. It also isn’t clear which factors of confidence drive the separate parts of the economy. Along with colleagues, I have been conducting surveys about aspects of stock market confidence. For example, since 1989, with the help of some colleagues at Yale, I have been collecting data on the opinions and ideas of institutional investors and private individuals. These data, and indexes constructed from them, can be found on the Web site of the Yale School of Management. I have called one of these indexes “valuation confidence.” It is the percentage of respondents who think that the stock market is not overvalued. Using the six-month moving average ended in February, it was running at 72 percent for institutional investors and 62 percent for individuals. That may sound like a ton of confidence, but it isn’t as high as the roughly 80 percent recorded in both categories just before the market peak of 2007. How do the these figures relate to other stock market measures? I rely on the measure of stock market valuation that Prof. John Campbell of Harvard and I developed more than 20 years ago. Called the cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio, or CAPE, this measure is the real, or inflation-adjusted, Standard & Poor’s 500 index divided by a 10-year average of real S.& P. earnings. The CAPE has been high of late: it stands at 23, compared with a historical average of around 15. This suggests that the market is somewhat overpriced and might show below-average returns in the future. (The use of the 10-year average reduces the impact of short-run, or cyclical, components of earnings.) For perspective, compare today’s valuation, confidence and CAPE figures to those of other important recent periods in the stock market. In the spring of 2000, a sharp market peak, only 33 percent of institutional investors and 28 percent of individual investors thought that the market was not overvalued. The CAPE reached 46, a record high based on data going back to 1871. (For the period before 1926, we rely on data from Alfred Cowles 3rd & Associates.) Yet most respondents in 2000 thought that the market would go up in the next year, so they hung in for the time being. That suggests that the 1990s boom was indeed a bubble, with investors suspecting that they might have to beat a hasty exit. They ended up trying to do just that, and brought the market down. But then consider the valuation confidence in October 2007,

another major peak, after which the stock market fell by more than 50 percent in real terms. At that peak, the CAPE was at 27 — a little higher than it is now, though not extraordinarily lofty. In 2007, valuation confidence was 82 percent for institutional investors and 74 percent for individual investors, or not far from today’s levels. Investors at the time didn’t think that they were floating on a bubble, and they saw the probability of a stock market crash as unusually low. Yet a plunge soon occurred. The cause appears not to have been so much the bursting of an overextended bubble but the subprime mortgage crisis and a string of financial failures that most investors couldn’t have known about. Clearly, confidence can change awfully fast, and people can suddenly start worrying about a stock market crash, just as they did after 2007. Today, the Dodd-Frank Act and other regulatory changes may help prevent another crisis. Even so, regulators can’t do much about some of the questionable thinking that seems to drive changes in confidence. For example, why is a record high in the United States stock market a reason for optimism? Nothing is remarkable about reaching a market record: the S.& P. Composite Index has done it 1,007 times, based on daily closes, since the beginning of 1928. That’s about once every 23 trading days, on average, though the new records tend to come in bunches. The important fact is that we haven’t set a nominal stock-market record in six years. And we haven’t set one in 13 years if we use the inflation-corrected S.& P. Composite total-return index. That this index may be about to set a record means only that we haven’t made any real money in the stock market in 13 years, which hardly seems a reason for confidence. But public thinking is inscrutable. We can keep trying to understand it, but we’ll be puzzled again the next time the markets or the economy make major moves.

#### Best literature review proves biz con is irrelevant for prosperity – it reflects political conditions and isn’t predictive – even the best theoretical studies are correlative not causal

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There are two broad questions about business confidence that are important to the social scientific community: where does business confidence come from; and what does it achieve? Questions about the origins of business confidence have received little scholarly attention. The most prominent recent research in this area is Buthe (2002). Buthe shows that business confidence is higher in both Germany and the US under conditions of right government, and that this effect remains even when controlling for real economic conditions. Buthe explains his first result as a function of business’ collective ideological and distributive concerns, but admits that his theory does not provide a ready explanation for his second result. Additionally, Silverstone and Mitchell (2005) obtained firm-level data from quarterly business confidence surveys in New Zealand. They found that survey respondents tended to respond the same way to the questions about the macroeconomic situation as they respond to microeconomic questions about their own enterprise, and also found that firms’ responses are affected by signals of confidence coming from elsewhere in the economy. That is, confidence can be contagious. They also found, however, that different types of firms associate different things with their overall confidence, and that those associations change over time. These findings lead Silverstone and Mitchell (2005, p. 18) to conclude pessimistically that: “it is not immediately apparent what a rise or fall in business confidence actually means.” The performance of business confidence can be broken in to two constituent parts: its predictive performance; and its causal impact. The most wide-ranging study on the predictive performance of business confidence was conducted by Santero and Westerlund (1996) under the auspices of the OECD. They examined patterns of business confidence, consumer confidence, and economic output across eleven advanced economies, finding that business confidence is a good predictor of output whereas consumer confidence is not. The best correlations between business confidence and output were found when the output measure (in this case year-on-year GDP growth) is lagged by either two or three financial quarters, which they say provides a clue that the business confidence indicator is indeed prescient of future events, rather than simply reflective of current ones. I will return to this point later in the paper. In terms of the causal impact of business confidence on the economy, Santero and Westerlund’s empirical analysis also found that business confidence measures “Granger caused” changes in economic output. Granger causation is a measure of correlation rather than causation – testing whether variable A (in this case business confidence) provides additional information about the future value of variable B (here GDP growth) beyond the information contained in variable B’s own history. While this empirical result is interesting, it does not provide any theory under which business confidence has an independent impact on output. Such an independent impact is of critical importance to business leaders because its existence is ultimately what makes politicians and citizens alike wary of actions that would lower business confidence. A causal impact does, however, exist in economic theory. Ng (1992) showed that, in broadly defined conditions of imperfect competition, self-fulfilling drops in business confidence (which Ng defines as the expected value of aggregate demand) are possible. That is, an exogenously caused drop in business confidence can plausibly cause a recession entirely on its own. Business confidence causal impact on political phenomena such as incumbent approval, partisan public opinion, and election results are substantially unexplored in the academic literature, despite the assumption of such effects found in much business and political journalism.